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STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE

Vol. 38, No. 5

Studying and Teaching Intelligence	[redacted]
A Policymaker's Perspective on Intelligence Analysis	[redacted]
British and American Policy on Intelligence Archives	[redacted]
Honoring Two World War II Heroes	[redacted]
Some Lessons in Intelligence	[redacted]
The Kennedy-Khrushchev Exchanges	[redacted]
Fifteen Sixty-Four Days	[redacted]
Truman and Stalin: Launching the Pravda	[redacted]
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Origins of the Congress of Cultural Freedom, 1947-50	[redacted]
Robert Fulton's Skyhook and Operation Cuddles	[redacted]
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STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE

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The importance of interchange

Studying and Teaching Intelligence

Ernest R. May

Editor's Note: The following is the keynote address to the Symposium for Teaching Intelligence which was sponsored on 1 and 2 October 1993 by CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence.

Last summer, a friend of mine was driving on Cape Cod just after a severe storm. A state trooper waved him down. Up ahead a large tree had fallen across the road. He worried that he had missed a "road closed" sign. The trooper bent down, rested his elbows on the window, and said, "If a tree falls when no one is around, does it make a sound?" My friend's comment: "Only in Wellfleet!"

In a sense, we are dealing here with a different version of that old metaphysical conundrum. If scholars and journalists do not know what intelligence agencies have done, can they be said to have done anything? More practically, if scholars and journalists do not tell citizens what intelligence agencies have done for them in the past, why should the citizens expect intelligence agencies to be useful in the future? And the reality is that most scholars and serious journalists do not know enough about the real history of the Intelligence Community to explain to citizens why Congress should drop money into that black box.

To say this is not to disregard the extraordinary accomplishments of those few scholars and journalists who have sought to penetrate what Walter Laqueur called the "world of secrets." A generation ago, the literature on intelligence was at or below the level of literature on business before the arrival of modern business history and business education. Libraries had a few reference works such as R. W. Rowan's *Story of Secret Service*. These works had solidity and reliability comparable to H. G. Wells's *History of the World* or Elbert Hubbard's *Little Journeys to the Homes of the Great*. In most of the literature, fact—if any—was indistinguishable from fiction. Some of the best items actually were works of fiction, as, for example, Somerset Maugham's *Ashenden or the British Agent*.

During the past 25 years, this condition has changed completely. The amount of serious research on intelligence has been such as to produce—and warrant—several new learned journals. *Intelligence and National Security*, edited by Christopher Andrew and Michael Handel, is one primarily for historians. *The International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, edited by F. Reese Brown, is more for political scientists and intelligence professionals. The Joint Military Intelligence College's *Defense Intelligence Journal* is a new entry. The contents pages of these journals and their often-crowded review sections provide a register of research easily comparable to research in any of the other major subfields of history or political science.

The revolution in intelligence scholarship, however, has been largely self-contained. It has not so far had much effect outside its own inner circle. Writing on intelligence rarely appears in other learned journals—even *Diplomatic History* and *World Politics*.

A search through the 1992 citation indexes for social sciences and arts and humanities turns up relatively few entries for titles that, for intelligence specialists, are standard works. For Christopher Andrew's *Her Majesty's Secret Service*, for example, there are only three citations; for Harry Hinsley's *British Intelligence in the Second World War*, the same number; for Loch Johnson's *America's Secret Power: The CIA in a Democratic Society*, four; for John Ranelagh's *The Agency*, five; for Gregory Treverton's *Covert Action*, two; for David Kahn's *The Codebreakers* and Thomas Powers's *The Man Who Knew the Secrets*, none.

These numbers are all the more disappointing when one notes, as an example, that the three citations of Andrew's *Her Majesty's Secret Service* are in articles by intelligence specialists—Loch Johnson, Wesley Wark, and Andrew himself, or, as another example, that almost all citations to Johnson's book, Ranelagh's, and Treverton's are in law journal articles concerned with intelligence oversight. As against the three citations of Hinsley's *British Intelligence in the Second World War*, there are 12 for his 30-year-old book, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace*. As against three citations for my own collection, *Knowing One's Enemies: Intelligence Assessment Before the Two World Wars*, there are 10 for my 20-year-old essay collection, *"Lessons" of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy*.

There is clear need to make research on intelligence better known and better understood outside the company of intelligence specialists. The open question is how to do it. At the risk of starting the conference with an off-key chord instead of a keynote, I will suggest some possible approaches. I will speak first of scholars and second of the Intelligence Community, but it will be my main argument that the precondition for further progress is long-term collaboration between scholars and members of the Intelligence Community, partly along lines suggested by this conference's format.

Scholars who work on the history, politics, or methodology of intelligence agencies need to address more often and more explicitly questions as to the influence of intelligence on choices made by governments and, more broadly, on currents in international politics and the world economy.

Two examples suggest models. One is John Lewis Gaddis's essay, "Intelligence, Espionage, and Cold War History," originally published in *Diplomatic History* in 1989, then republished, with some revisions, in his 1992 book, *The United States and the End of the Cold War*. Drawing largely on work by intelligence history specialists, Gaddis identifies junctures at which clandestinely collected intelligence might have affected choices by the American and Soviet Governments. He concludes that currently available evidence warrants few judgments. He makes the point, however, that the question ought not to be ignored. How *did* Philby et al influence Moscow's estimates and actions? How did Penkovsky et al influence London's and Washington's?

Apart from October 1962, in the Cuban missile crisis, how did imagery from U-2s and satellites affect Western decisions and positions? Apart from the incident on the eve of the Yom Kippur war described in Henry Kissinger's memoirs, when did raw communications intercepts lead policymakers to conclusions different from those of the experts advising them? (Were there any other occasions when, as a result, the policymaker's conclusion was the right one? The scarcity of other such anecdotes suggests not.) Gaddis's essay identifies questions about intelligence to be posed in all courses about modern international relations. He helps thus to set agenda for scholars doing specialized research on intelligence.

The second example is an essay by Thomas Powers in *The New York Review of Books* for 13 May 1993. As is typical for *The New York Review*, the essay makes only token reference to most of the 16 books ostensibly being reviewed. Powers writes instead about the question of whether the United States got its money's worth from the half trillion dollars that he guesses to have been spent on intelligence between 1945 and 1991. He recites story after story reminiscent of those that used to be publicized by Senator William Proxmire as examples of foolish government waste. (He begins by describing a powerful motorboat, manned by anti-Communist Cubans, that cruised Lake Tanganyika during the early 1960s at the expense of the United States. To what purpose—he muses.)

Like Gaddis, Powers deplores the shortage of evidence on particular episodes. His provisional conclusion is, however, at odds with his anecdotes, for he predicts that future historians "are probably going to find that the happy outcome of the cold war depended heavily on the CIA's spies, the NRO's satellites, and the NSA's monitoring of communications." He expresses doubt that this will be so because of the effect of intelligence on particular decisions. "Many small victories and defeats

in the cold war have explanations of that sort," Powers writes. "But what American intelligence contributed to the outcome was something quite different—the confidence that we knew what the Soviets were up to, and could afford to contain their forays while waiting for the deep change in attitude which George Kennan had predicted back in 1947.... Intelligence on the grand scale was necessary to the policy of deterrence...; it was the hard-won, detailed knowledge, held by both sides, of what nuclear weapons could do, how many there were, what they were pointed at, and the certainty that they would penetrate any defense."

One can accept Powers's conclusions or question them. What matters is that they address issues necessarily central to survey courses on contemporary history or international relations.

For broad and lasting effect on teaching about international affairs, there will have to be many studies following up or adding to these essays by Gaddis and Powers. In addition to continued scholarly writing on intelligence per se, we need articles and books forcing all serious teachers to turn their students' attention time and time again to the effects and influence of intelligence.

Some historical works already do this for the late 1930s. Building on the work of Wesley Wark, D. C. Watt includes secret intelligence and intelligence analysis as factors in his account of the immediate origins of the European war of 1939, *How War Came*. In *Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Entry into World War II*, Waldo Heinrichs deals with MAGIC and other intelligence as an integral part of the evolution of United States policies in 1941. But few works dealing with later events weave intelligence even into their narratives, let alone into conclusions serviceable for survey courses.

It has been 20 years since silence about ULTRA was broken. One can scarcely count the occasions when someone has since declared that the history of World War II would have to be rewritten. In fact, it has been rewritten only episodically and that mostly via articles in specialized intelligence journals. And it is hard to point to episodes of the Cold War with standard versions that take account of intelligence as Watt and Heinrichs do.

Exceptions that might spring to mind include the Iranian and Guatemalan coups of the 1950s, the "missile gap," the U-2 and Bay of Pigs affairs, and the Iran-Contra imbroglio. In fact, most writings about these episodes illustrate my basic point, for they tell intelligence stories, not stories that illustrate interplay between intelligence and policy. If intelligence is to become an important integral element in teaching about international affairs, scholars need to produce scores of monographic studies detailing this interplay.

But here we come to the Intelligence Community, for other historians cannot do what Watt and Heinrichs have done unless they have similar material with which to work. I am confident that the history of World War II will eventually be rewritten, integrating analysis of the impacts of ULTRA, the Double Cross system, special operations, and the rest, for many documents are open. Together with official histories, they provide a basis for cross-questioning the testimony in autobiographies and trial records. Eventually, the new details will be pieced together with the old, altering the panorama.

What will be the case for the Cold War depends on the extent to which scholars gain access to comparable documentation and guidance. The Director of Central Intelligence is committed to making historical materials accessible. Commitment from the person at the top is not always a guarantee of action by an organization. (My university is a confederation of comparatively autonomous faculties. The faculties do not keep the same calendars. One president of the university made it his goal to get a unified calendar. He failed. It is still often the case that, if I let a Business School student into a spring term course, I have to do so knowing that the student will graduate before I give my final exam.) The almost complete opening of OSS records and the recent release of documents on the Cuban missile crisis and on estimates of the Soviet Union indicate that at least some parts of the Intelligence Community are prepared and equipped to make the Director's wish a reality.

Even if there is no letup in the current momentum, there will always be less release of documentation than scholars desire. If there is any release at all, it will

always be more than some intelligence officers think prudent. I myself favor a common rule for all records relating to national security, including *all* intelligence files—signal intelligence included: namely, a fixed 25- or 30-year rule. On the recent side of the line, the presumption should be nondisclosure with a basis for exceptions much more restrictive and more rarely used than the current Freedom of Information Act. After the fixed date, the presumption should be complete public access, with exceptions being also rare and made only as a result of agency petitions approved by an independent board, appointed by the President with advice and consent of the Senate.

This formula may be unrealistic—as unacceptable to habitual users of the FOIA as to the guardians of secrets. But scholars on the one hand and insiders concerned with accessibility on the other (legislators and legislative staffers included) ought with some sense of urgency to work out regular procedures that can substitute for ad hoc decisions and that can continue over the long term.

Access to documents is only part of what scholars need from the Intelligence Community. An almost equally important need is that specifically addressed through the format of this conference. Scholars need orientation to the world from which the documents emerge so they can understand and evaluate the documents, make informed guesses about the extent to which the essential record is complete or incomplete, and cross-question memoirs and testimony.

Scholars dealing with modern international relations need to try to understand tribes in governments much as anthropologists try to understand tribal communities elsewhere.

Let me give two illustrations of how scholars can go wrong if they do not understand tribal mores. One is at the expense of another scholar. The second is at my own expense. The first has to do with the tribes that wear US military uniforms, the second with those in the US State Department.

Some years ago, an eminent and exceedingly able scholar presented at the Woodrow Wilson Center a paper dealing with postwar planning during World War II by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The paper made much of some memoranda issuing from a JCS committee composed of very senior officers. Gen. Andrew Goodpaster commented on the paper. Though with characteristic tact, General Goodpaster made the point that those particular senior officers were not ones in whose judgment the chiefs of staff placed great trust. "If you are looking for the memoranda to which General Marshall paid attention," General Goodpaster said, "find those with the initials 'GAL' for Col. George A. Lincoln. That was the person Marshall respected."

The basic point is one that any academic should appreciate. We all know that seniority, eminence, and such are not necessarily good indicators of who carries weight in department meetings. To thread one's way through the immense volume of papers in any modern government agency, scholars need the kind of guidance that General Goodpaster offered—about whose initials mattered to whom. That information has to come from people who were there.

The second illustration—at my expense—concerns an exceedingly able graduate student who went through the records from our Embassy in Tehran that had been reconstructed from shredded fragments by those who occupied it during the Carter administration hostage crisis. The student reported with some excitement having found numbers of State Department reports belying conventional wisdom on American blindness to the weaknesses of the Shah. Long before the Shah's fall, these reports were calling attention to weaknesses in his regime and to the growing power of the mullahs.

I disappointed the student by questioning whether he really had a basis for challenging the conventional belief. His new documents were mostly airgrams, not cables, and were of relatively low classification. From my own experiences as a consultant, chiefly in the Defense Department, I had arrived at an anthropological rule of thumb, namely that documents aimed for notice at the policy level would nearly always be made to appear very urgent and very restricted in circulation. (This applied equally to State Department and intelligence traffic for Southeast Asia which I had seen in the 1960s. And I remember being told by a very experienced American Ambassador that an airgram classified

as Confidential was not expected to be read by anyone. It was something for the file, just in case the Embassy's backside needed someday to be covered.)

Very recently, however, a Harvard colleague with Bush administration experience in the State Department and the White House told me that I was too categorical in what I said to the student. Because of the cumbersomeness of precautions against hostile communications interception, this colleague said, it has become customary for some State Department posts to use airgrams rather than cables for their most sensitive reports. Also, this colleague noted that the use of classification or of marks such as "EXDIS" or "NODIS" as means of getting attention has come to vary from bureau to bureau.

These two examples illustrate the need for someone doing research on foreign policy or international relations to use the approaches not only of the anthropologist but also of the historically oriented anthropologist. We have to pay attention to organizational cultures and to changes in those cultures over time.

This is not easy to do in any circumstances. It is particularly hard for organizational cultures in the Intelligence Community. For the Pentagon or the State Department or their counterparts abroad, the inquisitive scholar can at least start with some help from organization manuals, appropriations hearings or their equivalents, and public records giving some indication of fast- and slow-track career paths. For CIA, the DIA, the NRO, or NSA, all such materials are classified.

Until the extensive hearings on Robert Gates's confirmation as DCI, nothing in the public record gave outside scholars any insight into the cultures producing intelligence estimates. And, though we now have some other examples of direct testimony, an astonishingly large quantity of indirect testimony fed through reporters, and a number of memoirs, we have to use such evidence with extraordinary caution. Among other things, we have to remember that Intelligence Community compartmentation means not only that the left hand may not know what the right hand has done but also that the left thumb may not know what has been done by the left forefinger. We also have to remember that many intelligence officers are *trained* to be skillful liars.

If intelligence is to become a major standard component in teaching about international relations, the Intelligence Community will need both to make available documentary records and to encourage the direct personal interchange that will enable scholars to understand and use those records. This conference offers a model of how to promote such interchange. The participating scholars will benefit, and the benefits will spread to other scholars and to students. I hope that members of the Intelligence Community will perceive the long-term usefulness of making the scholarly community better able to understand what intelligence officers do and how what they do relates to what others in government do.

For it is in the interest of the Intelligence Community to have its work dealt with as part of the warp and woof of international relations even if, as is sure to be the case, the descriptions are sometimes unflattering or critical or worse. In England, it is said that students who graduate from the better public schools do not necessarily leave knowing Greek and Latin, but they leave profoundly convinced of the existence of these languages. It will be an advance if Americans who study international relations emerge convinced of the existence of their intelligence agencies. And, as one last exhortation—of sorts, let me quote the wise observation of Mark Twain: "History never comes out right. Historians exist to remedy that defect."

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Insightful Interviews

A Policymaker's Perspective On Intelligence Analysis

Jack Davis

Editor's Note: This article is based on the author's interviews during 1991-93 of Ambassador Robert D. Blackwill. The author has written several other articles on intelligence and policy.[1]

Sherman Kent, in *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*, his path-breaking effort to join intelligence doctrine and practice for post–World War II America, concluded that:

> There is no phase of the intelligence business which is more important than the proper relationship between intelligence itself and the people who use its products. Oddly enough, this relationship, which one would expect to establish itself automatically, does not do this. It is established as a result of a great deal of conscious effort . . .[2]

Despite guidance from Kent and numerous subsequent authors, the terms of engagement between intelligence analyst and policymaker are still ill-defined doctrinally and thus practiced as much to suit the immediate preferences of the players on both sides of the relationship as to meet the fundamental demands of sound policymaking. The quest to join sage principle—*what should work*—to solid practice—*what does*—is more important than ever in post–Cold War America, as resources for intelligence support of policymaking are cut back more rapidly than responsibilities.

The original pillar of Ambassador Blackwill's doctrinal views on intelligence and policy was *self interest*—his effort to make the relationship work for him personally under trying conditions. He served as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for European and Soviet Affairs, National Security Council Staff, during 1989-90, a tumultuous period that witnessed the collapse of the Soviet Union and the reshaping of Europe. The more lasting pillar is his concern for the *national interest*—a belief that the United States can ill afford prevailing patterns of ineffective ties between experts on events overseas and policymakers in Washington.

Some Key Points

The Ambassador's framework for defining the requirements for sound intelligence–policy relations consists of four key points:

- Roughly 90 percent of what passes for national security analysis in the US Government, including structured study of events overseas, is done by intelligence analysts.
- The national interest requires that this effort be effectively joined to the policymaking process.
- The officials who carry most of the day-to-day burden of policymaking on key issues are so besieged by time-consuming responsibilities that decisions on how much to stay informed on events overseas and in what way are narrowly based on self interest in managing the pressures and getting the job done.
- Intelligence professionals have to carry nearly all the burden to convince each key policy official that they are committed to servicing his or her analytic needs via customized expert support.

Thus, to meet their responsibilities in promoting the national interest, intelligence professionals have to become expert not only on substantive issues but also on serving the self interest of policy professionals by providing specialized analytic support.

Curriculum Vitae

Ambassador Blackwill's career as a Foreign Service Officer began in 1967, after a stint in Africa with the Peace Corps. During 1979-80, he served on the NSC Staff as Director for West European Affairs. In the early 1980s, he worked at the State Department as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, first for Political-Military Affairs, and then for European Affairs. From 1985-87, he was US Ambassador and head of the US Delegation to the NATO–Warsaw Pact negotiations for reduction of conventional military forces in Europe.

Ambassador Blackwill's recent tours of duty as policy decisionmaker have been interspersed with periods as an administrator, lecturer, and program director at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. In his current stay at Harvard, Ambassador Blackwill directs a program on public policy for the Russian General Staff. His publications—including his latest book, New Nuclear Nations[3]—address issues of arms control and European affairs rather than intelligence per se.

A Shaky Start

I first met the Ambassador in November 1987, when he was teaching in the CIA-funded Kennedy School Seminar on Intelligence and Policy. He seized the attention of the class of some 30 Directorate of Intelligence (DI) division chiefs and managers from elsewhere in the Intelligence Community by asserting that as a policy official he never read DI analytic papers. Why? "Because they were nonadhesive." As Blackwill explained, they were written by people who did not know what he was trying to do and, so, could not help him get it done:

> When I was working at State on European affairs, for example, on certain issues *I was the Secretary of State*. DI analysts did not know that—that I was one of a handful of key decisionmakers on some very important matters. Why bother to read what they write for a general audience of people who have no real responsibility on the issue.

More charitably, he now characterizes his early periods of service at the NSC Staff and in State Department bureaus as ones of "mutual ignorance":

> DI analysts did not have the foggiest notion of what I did; and I did not have a clue as to what they could or should do.

An unpromising start. Yet during his 1989-90 NSC Staff tour, Ambassador Blackwill—by the lights of DI analysts working with him on European affairs—raised analyst–policy relations to an exemplary level. Time after time, the DI's Office of European Analysis (EURA) provided much-needed intelligence support under stringent time constraints. In a tribute with resonance in the hometown of the Washington Redskins, Blackwill called the EURA crew his "analytic hogs," opening up holes in the line for him to run through. At least one EURA analyst considers this period "the most exciting and meaningful" of his career.

The balance of this article consists of the Ambassador's replies to my questions.

From Mutual Ignorance to Mutual Benefit

Q: What caused your apparent change of mind about the utility of DI analysis?

A: I had started to rethink my position even before our 1987 classroom encounter. As chief negotiator for the MBFR talks,[4] I worked closely for the first time with Agency analysts—those assigned to the US delegation. They regularly came up with information and interpretations that helped me sharpen my approach to the individual negotiating issues. When I gave them a special task, they delivered to suit my schedule, even if it meant considerable inconvenience to them.

One more matter important to negotiators, and to heavily engaged policymakers generally. Unlike other intelligence people I had worked with in the past, including those from State, my informal talks about possible US tactical initiatives with CIA analysts from the Arms Control Intelligence Staff did not end up in *The Washington Post*.

My understanding of the role of intelligence was also broadened by my work at Kennedy School. In addition to the CIA seminar, I collaborated with Professors Ernest May and Richard Neustadt on a course called "Assessing Other Governments." Here, the importance of country expertise, of language skills, of perspective and a sense of history were underscored by well-documented case studies.

Then there was the survival factor. I knew soon after [President] Bush's election in November 1988 that I was to be selected for the NSC Staff job on both Europe and the USSR. This meant longer hours and more pressures for me than ever before. Frankly, I was concerned about forgetting what my 10-year-old daughter looked like. So I sat down in Cambridge and planned how I was going to interact with Executive Branch colleagues, with Congress, with the press—and with intelligence. I decided that in my own self interest I had to arrange to get as much support as practical from Agency analysts.

Q: Why Agency analysts?

A: You mean besides the fact there are many more of them in my areas of responsibility than in the other intelligence outfits? My experience at State convinced me that INR [Bureau of Intelligence and Research] works for the Secretary. I suppose it is the same at Defense. I judged that Agency analysts would be much more likely to provide close and continuous support to an NSC Staff director.

Back to State. From my White House perspective, the State Department almost never met a deadline it could not miss. Then there is also the confidentiality factor. As I said earlier, your musings about possible policy initiatives are not leaked to the press by the DCI to shoot down your policy.

The most important consideration is that Agency analysts are better informed about individual countries than anyone else in the [US] Government. And I judged they had the wit—the historical perspective I spoke of—to interpret this information for my benefit and the President's benefit. I just had to determine whether they had the professional interest and enterprise to be responsive to my overtures.

Let me expand on one point. Intelligence analysts—essentially DI analysts—do 90 percent of the analysis by the USG on foreign affairs. Policy officials, even those with academic backgrounds, are too busy with more pressing matters.

In some administrations, the most heavily engaged and influential policy officials on any given issue spend 90 percent of their time assessing their policy competitors in Washington. I am talking here about getting ready to leverage competing Administration officials, not just Congress. Busy decisionmakers concentrate what little time they have for foreign policy analysis on narrowly focused aspects of key agenda issues—often how to deal effectively with their foreign counterparts. Let me tell you, any policy official who can do his own research on all aspects of an issue, cannot be very important—because he is not fully engaged in the coalition-building and power-leverage games essential for getting serious policy work done in Washington.

And there is no second team. If Agency analysts do not do the work of keeping up with developments overseas that the decisionmakers need to know about, it does not get done. It was in my *self interest* to see if I could get those analysts working for me, to help me keep up with a broad range of developments I could not possibly follow on my own.

What Works, and What Does Not

Q: You have mentioned *self interest* a couple of times.

A: Let me explain. The policymakers who count the most—those five to 10 on any issue who have the most power for getting anything done, decided, implemented—work much harder than intelligence analysts.

During 1989-90, I was often at my desk from 7 in the morning till 10 at night. Others at the NSC Staff, Brent Scowcroft and Bob Gates for instance, started even earlier.[5] Unlike analysts, we had no evening tennis games. No weekends.

Even with these hours, as I indicated, I needed help to stay informed. But it had to be the right kind of help. I could not afford to read intelligence papers because this or that intelligence agency was entitled to produce them. It did not matter to me how much work the Agency had put into its products, or how polished they were in scholarly terms. In fact, I could not afford the time to read intelligence papers written by personal friends and colleagues. I could only read intelligence products tailored to help me get through my substantive schedule. There was no other rational choice.

Q: The old issue of "adhesive analysis."

A: You asked, so let me unload here. During my [1989-90] NSC tour, the Agency was still putting out gobs of analytic products that I never read. During the two years I did not read a single [National Intelligence] Estimate. Not one. And except for Gates, I do not know of anyone at the NSC who did. The reason, at least for me, is simple. There was no penalty to be paid for not reading an NIE. It did not cost you anything in terms of getting done the most important policy things you had to get done.

The same goes for your other general audience papers. I got them, but I did not read them. I am sure somebody did, or you would not bother to put them out. Let me grant without hesitation that there is a lot you put out for good reason that has nothing to do with policymakers at my level. I think, however, that you ought to consider the cost–benefit ratios of producing papers that are read mostly by specialists at the desk level at State and Defense, or by policy officials with general interest but no direct say on an issue.

Q: What about the NID [*National Intelligence Daily*]? I've heard a number of NSC Staff members praise its utility over the years.

A: Of course, I was interested in the PDB [*President's Daily Brief*] because President Bush read it. As for the NID, I would spend, literally, 60 seconds a day on it. This was a defensive move. I wanted to know in advance what would likely be leaked to the press by readers in Congress. Other than that, there was, again, no cost to me, no penalty, from not having read the NID.

Q: What did you read, aside from what you commissioned directly from DI analysts?

A: Despite what you hear about policymakers not having time to read, I read a lot. Much of it was press. You have to know how issues are coming across politically to get your job done. Also, cables from overseas for preparing agendas for meetings and sending and receiving messages from my counterparts in foreign governments. Countless versions of policy drafts from those competing for the President's blessing. And dozens of phone calls. Many are a waste of time but have to be answered, again, for policy and political reasons.

Q: Let's turn to what you commissioned from DI analysts.

A: One more minute, please, on what I *did not* find useful. This is important. My job description called for me to help prepare the President for making policy decisions, including at meetings with foreign counterparts and other officials. One thing the Agency regularly did was send me memos on the strategic and tactical agendas of foreign officials; in effect, what they wanted from the United States. Do you think that after I have spent long weeks shaping the agenda, I have to be told a day or two before the German foreign minister visits Washington why he is coming?

O.K. What *did* I want from analysts? I want their reading of what is going on in the domestic affairs of country "X" or "Y"—countries the President is planning to visit to advance foreign policy or countries from which we are going to receive important visitors to discuss problems and bilateral strategy, or countries on which, for one reason or another, we feel a need to get US policy into better shape.

What is going on domestically in these countries that could have an impact on how the President's counterparts and my counterparts will behave? What pressures

are they under at home? Although I knew the national security issues cold, I could not become expert on all important issues affecting Germany or France or Italy at the national level, much less at the provincial or state levels. DI analysts knew this, and they helped me bone up on what I needed to understand to nuance and sharpen the US approach.

You also have to consider that President Bush, as a political animal, was naturally interested in the domestic politics of other leaders, even when there was no pressing bilateral business on the table.

Q: We variously call this "opportunity analysis," or "value-added analysis." Sometimes we call it "targeted tactical analysis."

A: I never put a label on it. Your terms are all good ones. Incidentally, the MacEachin metaphor you told me, about scouts and coaches, is also useful.[6] Yes, intelligence analysts should help key policymakers make the best game plan by telling them what they do not know or appreciate sufficiently. Regarding my own needs, this was mostly, as I said, on the domestic politics of the countries I was dealing with.

Whatever label you put on it, the service I got on Europe from EURA was superb and invaluable. As you know, when I traveled to Europe, EURA analysts prepared a daily cable for me on key developments. They got it to me first thing in the morning European time, which means they worked late into the night in Washington to get it done. I appreciated that immensely. Once a senior State Department colleague joined me for breakfast in Brussels as I was reading my very own newsletter. He studied it with great interest and asked me where it came from. I chose not to give him a clear answer.

EURA people met without exception whatever deadlines I set for informal memos while I was in Washington. They also were responsive and quick with some major projects I laid on with little advance notice. My only problem with their written work is sometimes the text had gone through too many levels of review and began to read like a NID article. If I wanted a NID article, I could read one. What I wanted was the analyst's unvarnished response to my questions. After I made this point, the incidence of overpolished papers diminished.

Qs: What about briefings?

A: Yes, because you get a chance to ask questions, briefings can be more helpful than memos. Here, too, I got first-rate customized service. Whenever I asked for briefings in my office, the analysts who came were both informed and responsive. Really terrific people.

Again, I was mostly interested in domestic affairs in this and that country. From time to time, though, I would ask the analysts in my office what the response of a European government would be to the policy initiatives the President was considering or that I was thinking of recommending to the President. Their unrehearsed responses here were also useful. I always hesitated to put such requests into writing for fear of leaks to the press. I learned you can trust DI analysts. They were well informed. Ready to help. And they kept their traps shut.

Q: That sounds like a good advertisement for DI analysts.

A: You bet. They were expert on their subjects. They were responsive to my needs. And they did not leak my confidences to the press.

Politicization Not an Issue

Q: Did your NSC Staff colleagues resent your close ties to DI analysts?

A: Not that I was aware of. The people who worked for me, rather than being resentful, made use of EURA support on their own.

Q: What about this kind of closeness pushing analysts across the line into policymaking?

A: Again, I saw no problem with EURA analysts. When I asked, they provided advice on tactics to support an established policy. They were good at that too.

But the EURA people did not get into policy prescription. And where it did happen on occasion with others, when intelligence people started recommending policy, I pushed them back.

Q: What about telling you what you wanted to hear, or avoiding bad news?

A: Not a problem. I wanted their help in avoiding setbacks as well as for advancing policy goals. If there were negative developments I had to know about, they let me know. We had trust going both ways.

I would like to continue with this for a minute. I know during the Gates confirmation hearings [for DCI during 1991] the media were full of charges of analysts writing to please policymakers. My experience was different. I would argue that at least in my experience close professional relationships encouraged frankness—not politicization. But I know it does not always turn out that way.

Just as top policy aides have got to deliver bad news to the President when called for, intelligence people have got to have the intellectual courage to tell key policy officials that something is not working, or is not going to work. It is tough, really tough, to stop a policy failure based on ignorance of the ground truth. Intelligence analysts have got to rise to this challenge. I am not talking about shouting it from the rooftops. NSC directors are especially resentful when Congress is told bad news before they have a chance to think about it. But limited distribution memos should work. Private briefings might be even better, since that gives the policy official a chance to ask questions.

Often it is important to decisionmakers to know how to get to the *least bad outcome*, to limit the damage. I think options papers work very well here, especially if they are delivered after bad news forces key policymakers to focus on an issue. Somalia is a good example. The analysts could table a paper or lay on a briefing outlining three possible outcomes six months down the road, and what opportunities, leverage, and so forth the United States has to influence the outcome.

Intelligence and Policy Tribes

Q: Why do not more overworked policy officials lean on Agency analysis the way you did?

A: I guess some do, though I do not personally know of any case quite like mine with EURA. The absence of a pattern of effective relations probably reflects a combination of professional differences and mutual ignorance about what really makes the relationship work.

I am not the only policy official who decided that too many intelligence products still are nonadhesive. They are, or were when I last served, too long and complex. Analysts love words and complexities; it is one of their strengths. Good policymakers are driven by the need to take action. They need problems broken down, simplified. You and I have been through this before, and you can probably make a better list of tribal differences than I can. The key still is getting close enough to the individual policymaker to find out what he needs.

Policymakers do not as a rule know what intelligence analysts can do for them. They read Estimates, think pieces, the NID, and say, in effect, "What does this have to do with *my* problems"? They do not see it as their job to teach analysts how to be helpful. Besides, they would not have the time.

Q: How did your counterpart NSC Staff senior directors stay informed, and, for that matter, others in the Bush administration who were the kinds of key hands-on policy officials you think the Agency should cultivate?

A: The only honest answer is, I do not really know. I was too busy with my own affairs. But I seriously doubt that any of them [during 1989-90] received the kind of customized support from the Agency that I am talking about.

Q: This seems to bother you.

A: Yes. As a citizen and taxpayer it sure does. I am talking here about the national interest. Let's go back to my statement that the Intelligence Community does 90 percent of foreign affairs analysis in the USG. Policy choices are made and policy actions are taken whether or not the expertise of analysts is brought to bear. But how can anyone argue that we should pay for this expertise and not make use of it?

I do not mean to say it is all the analysts' fault, but I am fully prepared to argue that if an analyst's work does not have an impact on policymaking as a process, including in the long run, he or she is taking pay under false pretenses. A lot that you do is useful to someone. You have to make it more useful to those who count.

Let me say this: the Agency's understanding of the world is probably needed more today than ever. The world and the challenges the United States faces are changing so rapidly. Also, the new [Clinton] administration does not seem to have yet defined its policy approach. The costs of tribal tensions between analysts and policymakers—mutual ignorance, really—may be rising.

At a Lower Level

Q: Much of what you have had to say relates to officials at your level, the NSC senior director and departmental assistant secretaries and above. What about one level down—deputy assistant secretaries, office directors?

A: I would say, much the same. Find out who counts—the five or 10 midlevel officials who have the most influence on more senior decisionmakers—and cultivate close relations with them. Trade customized support for access to the real agenda, and so forth.

A Program for the DI

Q: How would you combine your various recommendations for Agency analysts into a program? If you were advising the DCI or DDI, what measures would you propose to enhance the effectiveness of relations between analysts and policy decisionmakers?[7]

A: Thank you for letting me know in advance this question was coming. It is a good question, and I have given it considerable thought. Let's see if the seven measures I have sketched out add up to a program.

1. Identify the 30 or so senior policy officials who count—those who really carry weight with administration Cabinet officers on key foreign policy issues. These officials, usually assistant secretaries in policy departments or special assistants to the President on the NSC Staff, regularly set the thinking of NSC principals on major policy decisions. As a rule, these are the assessors of foreign governments, or the analysts of last resort. To contribute to sounder policymaking, intelligence analysts have to reach this group. Remember, the list of policy notables has to be carefully worked out and kept up to date, because office titles do not always reflect real policy weight.

2. Approach the policy officials who count as if they were motivated solely by self interest. Their self-interest has to be worked on because they are just too busy to allow either institutional considerations or personal friendships to determine their attitude toward intelligence analysts.

3. Learn as much as you can about each senior official. Study them as carefully as you do foreign leaders. For example, read everything they have written on the subjects in their policy portfolios. Check them out through mutual contacts.

4. Take the initiative to establish ties. This is an essential obligation of intelligence managers, because policy officials will rarely seek them out.

- For new appointees, send a letter asking for an appointment and spelling out your areas of expertise and the services you are ready to extend.

- For serving officials, anticipate a major pending visit or event and offer to send over your analysts for a briefing on any one of several related aspects. For example, if the prime minister from Denmark is to visit the President, the DI manager should signal that he will bring over his Denmark analyst to fill the

policymaker in on any gaps in understanding in time for the latter to prepare briefing memos for his or her principal, be it the Secretary of State or the President.

- Whenever DI managers know of travel plans by a key policy official, offer to send over country analysts who can fill in the official's knowledge on areas of his choice.

- Have the DCI set up luncheon meetings in town (CIA Headquarters is just too inconvenient), at which analysts and their managers can establish their credentials as entrepreneurial experts.

5. Customize intelligence papers and briefings to solidify the relationship. Many policy officials, overwhelmed by the volume both of their activities and of seemingly important information, will welcome specialized newsletters. They will welcome even one-page summaries of key events overseas that provide the kind of information and analysis they want at the time of day or week they prefer to set aside for keeping up with developments. For the same reason—fear of being overwhelmed—many will welcome customized briefings and memos relating to their policymaking responsibilities on matters on which the DI country analyst is much better informed than they can be or than anyone else in the government. Give them something they will really miss if they do not get it.

6. Place the best and most promising analysts on tours in the policy world. The Agency could offer, free of charge, 50 first-rate people to policy officials around town. Intelligence officers can learn something about how to use intelligence resources effectively by reading about policymaking. You can learn some more by periodic visits to a policymaker's office. But the best way to learn about a different bureaucracy is just the same as the best way to learn about any alien tribe—go live with them for a couple of years.

7. Reward those managers and analysts who are successful in gaining and maintaining access. As a rule, once a win-win relationship takes hold, momentum will keep it going. Once the policy official knows the intelligence unit can and will deliver support when it is needed, he will provide in exchange access to the real policy agenda. But policy officials come and go, and the Agency has to take care of those with talent at starting over again with newcomers who, as almost always will be the case, will not seek you out.

Final Thoughts

Q: How do you stay informed on events overseas these days, while working again at Kennedy School?

A: My main current interest is Russian politics and military affairs. I have been spending one week per month in Russia, dealing directly with the General Staff. While at Harvard, I spend a couple of hours each morning on Internet. It is amazing how much good information and worthwhile commentary is out there for those with the interest and the time. While at the NSC, I had the interest but not the time.

Internet, CNN, increasing visits by all sorts of Americans. The competition for the DI analyst is becoming much stronger. This means you are going to have to work much harder to find a comparative advantage. How do you get more expertise—living there, of course, language, and history?

I worry a bit about this. Just as you cannot rely on quality alone to get your job of informing policy done, you cannot rely only on access. In fact, marketing without a quality product to deliver is worse than passivity.

Q: Final question. At the end of a long day, which is it, working for more expertise, or for more access?

A: The answer, I suppose, is more efficiency. I imagine a textbook breakdown would have the analysts spending 40 percent of their time on collection and other activities for building expertise, 30 percent on analysis and writing—putting things together, and 30 percent on assuring impact on the policymaking process. I never managed an analytic unit, and this is just a guess. I do not think you are anywhere near the last 30 percent.

One final thought occurs to me. Managers in particular should spend enough time establishing and keeping up effective links to the policymaking world that they begin to feel guilty about not having enough time for their other duties. It is that important.

Notes

1. See "Analysis and Policy: The Kent-Kendall Debate of 1949," *Studies in Intelligence*, Vol. 36, No. 5 (1992), and *The Challenge of Opportunity Analysis*, Center for the Study of Intelligence Monograph (July 1992).

2. Princeton University Press (1949), p.180.

3. Co-authored with Albert Carnesale. Council on Foreign Relations, 1993.

4. Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction negotiations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

5. Scowcroft was Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Robert M. Gates, subsequently Director of Central Intelligence, was then Deputy Special Assistant.

6. Douglas A. MacEachin, currently CIA's Deputy Director for Intelligence, uses the scout-coach metaphor for analyst-policymaker relations to underscore that it is the scout's responsibility to help the coach prepare to win the game and not to predict the outcome of the game before it is played.

7. This question was communicated in a letter sent in October 1991 and answered in an interview in November 1991. The DI has been moving in the recommended direction for several years. When the interviewer showed an outline of Blackwill's program to DDI Douglas MacEachin (October 1993), he said, "I guess Bob [Blackwill] and I agree."

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Never-Never Land and Wonderland?

British and American Policy on Intelligence Archives

Richard J. Aldrich

Wesley K. Wark, a noted intelligence historian, once defined the status of British secret service archives as a "Never-Never Land." In an elegant essay on British archival policy in the 1980s he explained how, before 1981, departments of state were told that secret intelligence materials were "never released to the Public Record Office (PRO)." Subsequent to the Wilson Committee White Paper of 1981, this guidance was changed, and departments were thereafter instructed that "the word 'never' should never be used." The Wilson Committee considered that in the fullness of time all such records would eventually find their way into the public domain. But for those outside Whitehall, this intriguing double negative seemed to signal little material change, and secret service archives remained "a far-off place" that no independent historian was ever likely to visit.

In the United States, the experience of historians working on secret service records is continually identified by writers as being very different. The US National Archives are often represented as nothing short of a "wonderland" where all sorts of treasures are on public view a[illegible]where specialist archivists, not least the legendary John E. Taylor who presides over records that originate with CIA, conjure up the most remarkable things. Sensitive British records that are not open to public inspection in the PRO at Kew reportedly are there in profusion. Moreover, it is widely held that items that are not immediately available in the National Archives can be summoned magically through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).

The 1990s have seen a number of important changes in policy and practice relating to the management of secret service archives on both sides of the Atlantic. In Britain, the Waldegrave Initiative on Open Government has resulted in the participation of independent historians in the review process and in rapid decisions to release substantial amounts of intelligence material for the 1940s. There have also been positive responses to the specific requests of historians for closed material, and, as a result, significant parts of "Never-Never Land" are now open to visitors.

Meanwhile, in the United States there have been notable changes in practice. Surprising materials continue to be released into the National Archives, but problems caused by the FOIA have rendered this archival "Wonderland" perhaps a little less productive than it once was.

The Waldegrave Initiative has been operating for a year, and it is perhaps an opportune moment to review the new archival elements of this policy in a comparative Anglo-American frame. Accordingly, the first objective of this essay is to assess the importance of the recently released papers, focusing on the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) and new evidence on Pearl Harbor as a case study. The second is to use this as a reference point for a wide-ranging comparison of British and American policy on intelligence archives, particularly regarding wartime and postwar materials.

The JIC and Pearl Harbor

It is now widely appreciated by historians that the story of the higher management and control of British intelligence during World War II was unique. Between 1936 and 1941, there evolved, albeit a little uncertainly, an efficient and centralized mechanism for coordinating the numerous British clandestine organizations and for ensuring the careful assessment and distribution of the

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intelligence they collected. This was the JIC, consisting of intelligence chiefs and chaired by a senior official of the Foreign Office, normally the head of the Service Liaison Department. The JIC was served by a Joint Intelligence Staff which helped to draft its papers and was organized in a way not dissimilar to its opposite number, the Joint Planning Staff.

Together, these committees constituted the engine room of wartime strategic thinking. This system for the coherent and rational management of a rapidly expanding intelligence community was essential if material derived from codebreaking was to be disseminated in time to have an influence on operational planning. It was also essential for complex deception operations that required sophisticated cooperation among deception planners—MI5 (the Security Service); MI6, the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS); and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), then based at Bletchley Park.

The success of the British system has been contrasted with the equivalent German story, in which Hitler deliberately pitted different organizations against each other. Equally, the American wartime experience was characterized by the lack of a centralized authority. In the postwar period, the contrasting success of the JIC system was underlined by the way in which London imposed it upon regional commands, creating additional JICs in Germany, the Middle East, and the Far East. It is also illustrated by the way in which the JIC system was admired or emulated by Australia, Canada, and the United States.

Given the central importance of the JIC, the release of most (but not all) of its papers and minutes to 1941 has understandably been widely welcomed. At the same time, some have paused to question the value of this particular release, noting that its contents have been largely prefigured in the magisterial five-volume official history of British intelligence during World War II with its extensive treatment of the development of the JIC. Moreover, for many years historians have been aware that perhaps half of the pre-1945 JIC papers (but not the minutes), and at least 30 postwar JIC papers and minutes are available elsewhere, scattered through other categories of files in the PRO. The same question will doubtless be asked of the Special Operations Executive (SOE) archives, because much SOE material has long abounded in the PRO and in Washington. In reality, how valuable has been the release of JIC papers from 1936 to 1941?

The newly available JIC files have undoubtedly contained surprises, even for diligent readers of the official history. This can best be illustrated by focusing briefly upon the vigorous debate initiated by revisionist historians writing on Churchill's and Britain's possible foreknowledge of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The JIC minutes for 1941 cast real doubt upon their suggestion that Churchill received such intelligence and blocked its transfer to the Americans.

Above all, the revisionist case is undermined because of the multiplicity of conduits through which this sort of information was being passed to the Americans as early as July 1941. Churchill was simply not in a position to exercise detailed control over what was passed to the Americans.

The recently released JIC minutes for 6 June 1941 reveal the precise structure of Anglo-American intelligence cooperation in the Far East. They show that American intelligence personnel had already been attached to the Far Eastern Combined Bureau, which presided over the "collection, collation, and dissemination" of all Britain's intelligence in that region, including signals intelligence.

Before June 1941 much of this Anglo-American exchange had concerned intelligence of interest to the army planners. Now, on 6 June 1941, Britain and America resolved to extend this exchange to intelligence on naval matters and ship movements in the Far East. The British Admiralty reportedly was "very anxious to cooperate." London instructed the Far Eastern Combined Bureau that "there should be a full exchange of intelligence between British and American officials in the Far East," including signals intelligence. The exchange of information from such secret sources required the routine approval of the local SIS chief in Singapore, but the only information that London required Singapore to withhold related, not to codebreaking, but to the fledgling SOE station there. This was because the SOE was

beginning to conduct sensitive operations into neutral Thailand, exploring the possibility of a coup d'état against the government in Bangkok which some considered to be increasingly pro-Japanese. Instructions to exchange intelligence material on the basis of "the fullest cooperation" were also issued to British personnel in Shanghai, Hong Kong, Tokyo, Chungking, Bangkok, Manila, and Peking. Accordingly, the multiplicity of links between British and American intelligence developing throughout the Far East from the summer of 1941 renders it improbable that Churchill exercised detailed control over the exchange of individual documents.

One particular revisionist account of Pearl Harbor has gone so far as to suggest that on 5 December 1941 Britain's JIC met and discussed at length the impending Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. This author, Constantine Fitzgibbon, writing in 1976, claimed to base these assertions on a letter received from none other than Victor Cavendish-Bentinck, wartime chairman of the JIC. How do these claims compare with the JIC minutes from the fateful week before Pearl Harbor? The minutes, which are entirely extant for this period, reveal that the JIC did not even meet on 5 December. It met on 3 and 9 December, and Pearl Harbor was not mentioned at either meeting.

The minutes of the JIC will be valuable to many historians for many different reasons. But their release also serves to underline a number of wider points about the nature of secret service archives. It is increasingly clear that sensationalist accounts of important historical events, or malignant interpretations of the actions of politicians and officials, do not result from the early release of intelligence records but from their prolonged closure.

Files that are closed for an absurd length of time are an invitation to entrepreneurial writers to speculate in an over-imaginative way on the nature of the "dirty secrets" that such archives supposedly contain (why else, these authors ask, would they be closed?). Academics may eventually establish the truth of the matter and expound it in tomes that will find their way onto the shelves of university libraries. But the public mind is increasingly informed by the conspiratorial versions of contemporary history, often piled 50 deep in the High Street bookstores. The damage done to the wider public understanding of history by such books is unlikely ever to be undone.

Above all, the lesson to be learned from the eventual release of JIC records is that serious researchers and governments share a clear vested interest in the prompt release of such materials. The fact that these and many other intelligence documents released under the Waldegrave Initiative are remarkable only for their dullness is, paradoxically, very important. After all, one of the elementary rules of textual analysis for all historians when considering a document is to reflect not only on what is there, but also on what is not there.

British and American Archives Compared

What are the essential differences in the way in which the British and the Americans have managed the release of secret service archives? Most obviously, while Britain is releasing the archives of the JIC, of the SOE, and of Churchill's signals intelligence summaries (Dir/C) at approximately the 50-year point, the Americans released most of their equivalent materials at the 40-year point. Much of the British signals intelligence archive, notably for the Far East, (but also some material relating to wartime Europe), remains to be released, and as yet there has been no discussion of the release of wartime SIS materials. Meanwhile, the Americans have released almost all their wartime signals intelligence and their Office of Strategic Services (OSS) records to 1947. OSS fulfilled the functions of both Britain's SOE and SIS during World War II.

The result of this early American release has been the appearance of high-quality academic histories of these subjects. In the 1980s, as a direct result of this de facto 40-year rule, American historians were able to locate retired OSS veterans and conduct interviews that could be compared with the written record. Almost all the participants had safely reached retirement; enough survived from the policymaking level to ensure that conducting interviews was a rewarding activity for historians. A rich and sophisticated literature on the history of OSS is now emerging from the synthesis of oral testimony and written records.

By comparison, as SOE records become available in 1994, there will be few survivors available to talk about the policy level. When wartime SIS archives are released, the written record will doubtless stand alone, devoid of accompanying oral testimony. This is worrying when one reflects on the arcane and technical nature of some secret service activities. The full meaning of some of these documents will not necessarily be self-evident to future historians.

American authorities do not make a squeamish distinction between secret service activities conducted during war and peacetime. CIA is now depositing hundreds of files relating to its changing internal organization for the period up to 1953, including a great deal of correspondence by such luminaries as Walter Bedell Smith and Allen Dulles. Moreover, many American National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs)—the equivalent of British JIC papers—are available for the mid-1950s. This has ensured that diplomatic and military historians working on postwar American subjects have been able to integrate the intelligence dimension into their wider work. The slower release process in Britain tends to encourage the writing of a separate "intelligence history" that is sometimes devoid of context.

Yet the exciting CIA releases of the early 1990s pale beside the extraordinary post–Cold War initiative begun by CIA Director Woolsey in 1993. CIA's Historical Review Group has essentially completed the declassification of political and economic NIEs on the Soviet Union through 1984. Articles from CIA's quarterly journal, *Studies in Intelligence*, also are being declassified.

Declassification of the first 11 Cold War covert actions was begun in 1994. The operations for which records will be released include France and Italy in the 1940s and 1950s, North Korea in the 1950s, Iran in 1953, Guatemala in 1954, Indonesia in 1958, Tibet in the 1950s and 1960s, Cuba in the 1961 Bay of Pigs, the Congo and the Dominican Republic in the 1960s, and Laos in the 1960s. In March 1994 the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence, together with the Truman Library, hosted a conference for historians on CIA during the Truman period, and it used the opportunity to explain this magnificent program in detail.

The American interpretation of the subject of intelligence is also commendably broad. In Britain, the debate has focused narrowly upon the release of secret service records held by SIS, MI5, and GCHQ. In the United States, proper recognition has been given to the importance of somewhat less secret Army, Navy, and Air Force intelligence activities. Before 1953, in both Britain and the United States, armed service intelligence personnel outnumbered those in the secret services such as SIS and CIA. Typically, in occupation areas like Austria, the local CIA station was marginalised by a much grander program of military intelligence operations. This is not just a question of numbers, but of relevance.

For a British historian writing on the subject of British defense policy or strategic planning in the immediate postwar period, the most valuable intelligence materials might be those relating to RAF intelligence rather than those of the secret services. Yet the vast blocks of military service intelligence records withheld in Britain for the period after 1945 pass almost without comment.

But most US military intelligence records have now been released for the period up to 1955. These records contain important material concerning how United States Air Force intelligence analyzed the Soviet Union and formed its impressions of Soviet strategic airpower. Historians have been delighted by what they have found in such records. Meanwhile, government officials have been pleased by the way in which this development has relieved pressure for the release of much more sensitive records, typically postwar National Security Agency (NSA) (signals intelligence) material.

A further respect in which the United States advances a broad definition of intelligence records relates to its commendable emphasis upon regional or "theatre command" intelligence records. Britain and the United States administered large areas of the world during the 1940s and 1950s, and this generated vast regional archives, typically relating to Germany and Austria. These files are important to British and American historians and to academics from the many countries under Allied control.

While many of the British intelligence papers relating to the occupation of Germany and Austria are yet to be released, all of the voluminous files of the United States European Command (EUCOM) and Far Eastern Command (FECOM) are available, including the registry files of their regional intelligence headquarters. Some of the finest studies of US policy in Germany and the Far East have drawn extensively on these types of files.

A final area in which there is something to be learned from good American archival practice is captured records. During the 1980s, historians of Asia were surprised to find that CIA released into the US National Archives the files of the Shanghai Municipal Police, an extensive British-run security agency. These materials, which included files on Sun Yat-sen and Ho Chi Minh, had enjoyed a checkered history. Captured by the Japanese at the outbreak of World War II, they had fallen into the hands of the Nationalist Chinese in 1945. In 1949, with the Communist victory in China, these records were again in peril, and they were eventually offered to CIA and transferred to Washington.

Although relating to the prewar period, these records were examined with interest by security authorities on account of the information they contained on previous associations between serving Western officials and Asian Communists. Academic historians of Asia in the 1980s, perhaps the last of many groups to make use of these records, pronounced them invaluable.

Britain also presides over captured archives. A good example is the German Security Service records relating to Soviet espionage in Europe during the 1930s and 1940s, the so-called Red Orchestra. German wartime security operations had been highly effective and had damaged Soviet espionage in occupied Europe by 1944. German records, therefore, offered a full picture of the nature and techniques of Soviet espionage and were acquired by British Special Counter Intelligence Units as they entered Germany in 1945. Thereafter, CIA was allowed to inspect them to compile a classified internal history of Soviet military intelligence operations in Europe. Yet while this American history, based on materials held in Britain, has long since been declassified and published, the fate of the files themselves remains something of a mystery.

British Documents in the US Archives

British intelligence reports in the files of the Shanghai Municipal Police in Washington are just one example of the profusion of British secret service materials that have reportedly long been available in the US archives. Tales of the existence of such materials in Washington assumed legendary proportions during the 1970s and 1980s. How accurate were these reports and how has the American system of managing sensitive British records changed?

Two important distinctions can be drawn. The first is simply chronological: for the period up to 1945 a vast quantity of British intelligence records of many different types abounds, much of it not yet available in the PRO. Its extent defies comprehensive description here, but some indication can be given by referring briefly to historians who have already exploited these materials. John Costello, in a recent study, *Mask of Treachery*, has demonstrated that both Special Branch and MI5 materials appear regularly in low-level State Department files. Bradley F. Smith, in a path-breaking study of Anglo-American cooperation in the field of signals intelligence to 1947, has illustrated how much GCHQ-related material is available in Washington.

Perhaps the most concentrated source of British intelligence is contained in the archive of the OSS, now running to many tens of thousands of files. Approximately 3 to 5 percent of this material is of SOE, SIS, or MI5 origin or discusses British intelligence in detail. A historian at Harvard University has recently completed a detailed study of cooperation between OSS and wartime MI5/SIS, using unprecedented amounts of British secret service documentation from OSS files. These are not just isolated documents; there are often entire files of British material.

For the period after 1945 the story is rather different. Archivists in the United States often refer to some sort of agreement between the State Department and the British Government detailing the categories of material that London requested be withdrawn from American files. These guidelines have been enforced with much more rigor in relation to postwar materials. Accordingly, there are few MI5 or SIS records for the postwar

period, the primary exceptions being occasional reports relating to Soviet agents that have found their way into declassified FBI files. Perhaps only 200 or 300 pages of material relating to GCHQ are scattered through many different collections of papers, most of which deals with electronic intelligence (ELINT) and communications security (COMSEC) rather than communications intelligence (COMINT). Perhaps fewer than 10 percent of postwar JIC papers are extant in Washington, again in a scattered way, in different types of military and diplomatic files.

The case of postwar JIC papers seems to offer some indication of how industrious American archivists have been in seeking to remove British material. Various cover notes in American files often refer to two or three "attached" British JIC reports at a time, but the papers have usually been removed. We know that after 1945 the British continued to send large numbers of their JIC reports to the Americans via Britain's JIC/Washington located at the British Embassy, hinting meanwhile at hopes of reciprocation. The flow of American JIC reports to Britain had ceased on V-J Day, initially thwarting London's hopes for a continuing postwar intelligence exchange. The British tactic of bombarding Washington with unreciprocated JIC reports eventually paid dividends. On 25 September 1946 the American JIC concluded:

> If it is desired to continue to receive the British JIC intelligence estimates, it is submitted that it must be done on an exchange basis, otherwise the source will dry up. Since there are many areas, particularly in parts of Europe, the Near East and the Middle East, where the British sources of information are superior to those of the United States, it is believed desirable that the United States JIC continue to receive such estimates. This view is reinforced when the world situation is considered.

The Americans recommended that exchange now proceed on a quid pro quo basis. Thereafter, intelligence estimates were routinely exchanged and delegates to major postwar Anglo-American conferences departed London for Washington armed with new JIC material. Only a minority of these exchanged papers have survived and, for those seeking JIC papers after 1945, the US archives are not a wonderland.

This assertion about the paucity of postwar material must be qualified by drawing a second distinction. It has already been remarked that the United States defines its intelligence archives broadly. The vast collections of American service intelligence and regional intelligence contain a great deal of British service intelligence material. Typically, in the papers of US organizations like EUCOM and OMGUS, a substantial proportion of the papers of the British Intelligence Division, Control Commission Germany, are to be found for the 1940s and 1950s. It is disturbing that a reasonable history of this important British organization could be written in Washington but not in London, where the main records have been incinerated.

The Government-Historian Interface

The United States has generally handled the release of its intelligence records in a wise and often generous way. The American system for response to the specific requests of historians for declassification of closed materials is less impressive. The presidency of Jimmy Carter during the 1970s saw the United States introduce FOIA legislation. In principle, its objectives were commendable, enshrining the idea that government information belonged to the people whose taxes paid for it to be generated. Henceforth, the inherent presumption was that documents should be released on request and the burden of proof lay with the government departments to demonstrate any need for them to remain closed. By the 1980s, however, an increasing gulf was opening between principle and practice. Perversely, FOIA, at one time a centerpiece of the American archival system, was actually beginning to restrict access to documents.

Two things had gone wrong. In 1982 the US Government chose to modify FOIA guidelines, allowing government departments wide areas of exemption. This could often be challenged only by resorting to time-consuming and expensive legal action. More important, the FOIA system was being abused by the American public's submission of an avalanche of frivolous requests that absorbed considerable amounts of government time and resources. In the early 1990s many government personnel who had previously been assigned to the routine

and rapid declassification of large blocks of records had to be redeployed to search, often unsuccessfully, for individual documents requested under FOIA. The result has been that some US diplomatic and military records for the late 1950s are still not available due to personnel shortages caused directly by FOIA. Some British Foreign Office records are now being declassified several years ahead of equivalent American series.

Moreover, the material secured through FOIA has not been of sufficient value to offset this problem. American historians have noted with dismay that the printout of FOIA requests for 1991 reveals that well over half were for material on sightings of Unidentified Flying Objects.

The revised British system, backed by a recently announced Advisory Council, offers at least the potential for a more effective and rational system of response to requests. In addition, the presence of independent historians is a particularly welcome development likely to inspire confidence within the academic community. This system appears to be well placed to make judgments about priority among what will be an increasing flow of British requests. It is also less likely to be hijacked by frivolous requests or by demands for unrealistically large quantities of material by one particular lobby group. While the absence of an American-style legal right of access enshrined in law appears disadvantageous, in reality the extensive litigation that the American FOIA system sometimes inspires is one of its least attractive aspects.

Are there any positive lessons to be learned from the American experience of responding to specific requests? The US State Department certainly has some important advice to offer. Faced with increasing backlogs of unprocessed material, it has made available a handlist of categories of documents that it still holds for the period before 1970, with their approximate quantities in shelf-feet. The thinking behind this is commendably logical. How can historians make informed requests without knowing what types of records government still holds?

These lists, often provided in a preliminary form, have nevertheless allowed records officers to gain a more informed view of the priorities expressed by historians. This is supplemented by more informal contact between those who manage the records and those who use them.

Published Documents and Classified Histories

The last two years have seen promising developments in terms of the published information on intelligence in both Britain and the United States. The prospect of more British published intelligence documents has improved because British officials are taking greater interest in the use of sanitization to release documents. This is not a wholly new development; sanitized files have been making their way to the PRO for many years. Nevertheless, this technique apparently will now be exploited more frequently, bringing with it both new problems and new possibilities.

The problems relate largely to the efficient use of time by hard-pressed Departmental Record Officers, because the physical process of blanking out specific sensitive passages on a page is extremely time consuming. An hour spent sanitizing a specific document is an hour not spent declassifying another file. This problem also is recognized in the United States, where sanitization is primarily employed for documents requested through FOIA, and is only rarely used voluntarily by those reviewing records for routine release.

The advantages of sanitization are also considerable. In the field of intelligence, the presence of a single name or a brief reference to a type of source can close a lengthy and valuable document. In the United States, the most impressive use of sanitization has been made by CIA to facilitate a published volume of CIA documents on the Cuban missile crisis. This 370-page book includes raw agent reports, estimates, material on how intelligence was disseminated to policymakers, and retrospective studies conducted immediately after the crisis reviewing the CIA's performance. Some of these documents are sanitized, a few rather heavily, but this volume stands as a powerful testament to the potential value of this technique. The trend toward published intelligence documents is gathering pace in the United States with

the prospect of two volumes of *Foreign Relations of the United States* (FRUS) devoted to the American Intelligence Community (1946-50) scheduled for publication in 1994-95.

The expressed intention of British Departmental Record Officers to make greater use of sanitization makes it more likely that we will see published intelligence material in series such as *Documents on British Policy Overseas* (DBPO). To the surprise of many, a recent volume of DBPO contained the fabled "Global Strategy Paper" for 1950, albeit with three lines dealing with Asia deleted.

This approach could certainly be extended to JIC papers for the same period in the way that many equivalent NIE papers are routinely included in the FRUS series. A volume of DBPO focused upon the work of the postwar JIC would be an ideal reflection of the new Open Government policy and of forthcoming JIC releases into the PRO. Equally, it might be possible to choose a particular event, perhaps the crises in Czechoslovakia and Berlin in 1948, and produce a volume of related British intelligence material that would stand alone, in much the same way as the Americans have done for the Cuban missile crisis in 1962.

The field of official history is a separate area that offers promising developments. The official history of intelligence and special operations is something that Britain seems to do particularly well. One virtue of this sort of history is that it allows the many historians working on wider subjects, typically international history, to take some account of the intelligence dimension even though the primary papers are, in many cases, not available. After all, international historians far outnumber specialist intelligence historians and, moreover, intelligence is often best understood when set in the context of wider developments.

Official histories have done much to encourage this contextual approach. While the SOE papers for France are due to be opened in 1994 or 1995, historians have long been able to turn to M.R.D. Foot's acclaimed official study. Equally, while SIS papers for World War II are unlikely to be available for some time, many important questions that have confronted historians of this conflict are resolved by the magisterial official series on British intelligence.

Perhaps what is needed is an official history of British intelligence during the early Cold War (1945-54). The majority of British historians working on the wider international history of the postwar period do not want to spend hundreds of hours rummaging through the low-level files of Britain's Intelligence Division, Germany. But there are certain basic questions concerning the nature of Britain's picture of Soviet capabilities and intentions that most Cold War historians would like to have answered by an official history.

There are already promising developments in this direction. In 1993 a "semiofficial" history of the Intelligence Corps from its origins in the mid-19th century through to the 1990s was published. Four chapters, accounting for a quarter of the text, cover the postwar period. The discussion of the postwar period is deliberately selective, and it is overtly stated that Northern Ireland is omitted (readers will also note that Army signals intelligence operations are conspicuous by their absence). Nevertheless, this book is an auspicious development.

It is worth dwelling briefly on the parallel American experience. There is no official US intelligence series that can compare with the impressive British official volumes on intelligence or SOE activities in France. The Americans, however, have been quick to release many of the internal classified historical studies that the intelligence services produced years ago for their own reference purposes. For the wartime period, the obvious example is the Signal Research Histories, summarizing much of the "take" from signals intelligence operations against the Axis and describing the development of American signals intelligence organizations.

More recently, CIA has declassified sanitized versions of its internal official histories of the development of CIA from 1945 to 1950 and from 1950 to 1953. But the quality of these volumes is, at best, uneven. Moreover, NSA has decided not to release any chapters of an internal history covering the period from 1940 to 1952.

Nevertheless, for the many American international historians working on the early Cold War period, CIA internal histories are sufficient to answer important

questions. Similar British internal studies exist and consideration might be given to their release, albeit in a sanitized form.

Finally, there is the field of memoirs. The 1980s were a period when the literary efforts of retired British secret service officers were greeted with official hostility. This approach might be contrasted with the American system in which retired intelligence officers are required to submit their memoirs for clearance, a process which usually results in sections of the memoir being sanitized. Historians are not alone in benefiting from memoirs that have appeared under this regime. Arguably, the widely quoted memoirs of William Colby have done much to encourage a sympathetic view of CIA's place in US postwar history. Some have even interpreted this post-1975 wave of approved memoirs as an attempt to offset some of the damage done to CIA's reputation during the various Congressional enquiries of the early 1970s, notably the Church Committee. Whatever their motivation, they have contributed to a more balanced picture of American postwar intelligence.

There is now a strong case for Britain to look again at a similar system of official clearance for memoirs. The most forceful argument for this is derived from recent developments in the former Soviet Union. In the early 1990s numerous retired KGB officers, some quite senior, began to write their memoirs. Their numbers are increasing, and, as a result, we will soon have a growing picture of British intelligence in the postwar period, albeit from a dubious source.

It will be dubious because some of these officers are bitter, unreconstructed Communists with an axe to grind, and because retired KGB officers naturally want to present the achievements of their own service in the best possible light. There is a growing danger that the history of British intelligence will be written by its enemies. One has only to recall the damage done by Kim Philby's propagandistic memoir, *My Silent War,* which remains one of the most widely read accounts of SIS.

In 1993 there were unconfirmed reports that the British Government had made representations to the Russians, asking them to keep certain aspects of their archives relating to Britain closed. However successful this approach was, it will not address the problem of KGB memoirs. At the same time, there have been welcome signs of a more balanced British approach to secret service memoirs, most obviously provided by the unopposed publication of the memoirs of Desmond Bristow, *A Game of Moles*. But if full advantage is to be taken of this slightly bashful shift of policy, some formal mechanism for the clearing of secret service memoirs needs to be instituted.

What, in conclusion, are the important lessons to be learned from recent developments in the British and American archives? The sternest lesson to be derived from the Americans' management of their intelligence materials during the last 10 years is that their sheer volume presents significant problems. From 1945 to 1989, the Western intelligence community enjoyed steady growth. Consequently, the quantities of old intelligence records awaiting declassification will increase for the foreseeable future. At the same time, these types of records are awkward and time-consuming for officials to process for release.

To deal with these sorts of problems, a government requires a carefully considered open-government policy and the commitment of adequate resources and the effective management of those resources through a clear dialogue with historians. Given a picture of what governments hold in their archives, historians will readily articulate their priorities. After all, resources for serious historical research are increasingly limited, and thus the appetite for records is finite. Yet, at present, demand and supply are not sufficiently coordinated. Everything that is routinely declassified is not immediately required by researchers, nor is everything required by researchers given priority by departments. There also will be a growing need to screen out excessive or frivolous requests. There are encouraging signs that a sensible system that fulfills some of these requirements is now emerging.

There also is a need for a climate of greater trust between historians and British departments of state. This will develop only slowly, for intelligence historians who took an adversarial view of official policy in the 1980s have largely concluded that they have been proved right by the nature of some of the documents released in 1993. One can only wonder at those who

have hitherto maintained that terrible things would happen if the public were allowed to gaze upon, for example, records relating to secret postal interception from 1742 to 1792. Accordingly, it is hardly surprising that intelligence historians initially greeted the announcement of the Waldegrave Initiative in 1992 with profound skepticism.

This attitude is now changing with the release of several thousand files relating to wartime SOE, to JIC, and to Churchill's personal summary of signals intelligence materials (Dir/C). This event understandably caught the imagination of the press, but perhaps the most impressive development was the rapid response to detailed requests by researchers for particular files.

There is still some way to go before a balanced policy on all aspects of British intelligence archives emerges, but historians were pleasantly surprised by the reality of the Waldegrave Initiative as it unfolded in its first year. The experience of "Never-Never Land" will not be forgotten quickly, but, at the same time, there are indications that something wonderful has begun to happen.

Prestigious intelligence awards

Honoring Two World War II Heroes

R. James Woolsey, Maj. Gen. Doyle Larson, and Linda Zall

At a ceremony at CIA Headquarters on 27 October 1993, renowned British physicist Reginald Victor Jones became the first recipient of the R.V. Jones Intelligence Award. Jones received the medal engraved with his likeness from DCI Woolsey.

Jones headed scientific intelligence for the Air Staff during World War II and subsequently for the British Intelligence Service. His many accomplishments include the development of methods to foil the Germans' radar and their radio-beam targeting of bomb sites in Britain.

Also honored at the ceremony was Jeannie de Clarens, codename AMNIARIX, an interpreter who dodged Gestapo agents while gathering crucial information on the Germans' emerging rocket weapons programs from behind enemy lines.

Madame de Clarens's courage in collecting this intelligence and forwarding it under difficult circumstances led—through R.V. Jones's analysis and persuasive abilities in London—to the British raid on Peenemunde and to delays and disruptions in the V-1 and V-2 programs, saving many thousands of lives in the West.

Madame de Clarens, who was captured twice and spent time in three concentration camps, was awarded the Agency Seal Medallion by the DCI. He said that both Jones and Madame de Clarens are two remarkable individuals symbolizing the best of the intelligence profession.

Following are the remarks made at the ceremony by DCI Woolsey, Maj. Gen. Doyle Larson, USAF (retired), and Dr. Linda Zall:

DCI Woolsey

Professor Jones, Viscomtesse de Clarens, Reg, Jeannie, distinguished guests, friends:

I first heard about R. V. Jones some 12 or 13 years ago. In the aftermath of three-years' service in the Navy Department, I was appointed to an organization called the Chief of Naval Operations Executive Panel. I was the far-most junior and least prestigious member of this fine panel, and in a meeting one day in 1980 or 1981, an extremely clever idea was floated combining technical ingenuity and a truly crafty and nefarious twist of mind for dealing with the Soviet submarine threat. Either Albert Wohlstetter or Charlie Hertsfeld, who is here today, muttered, "That sounds like an R. V. Jones idea," and I said, "Who is R. V. Jones?" A hush settled over the room. Either Albert or Charlie—I am not sure to this day which one—said, "I thought you were a reasonably well-read young man. You have not read *The Wizard War*?" I said, "No." He said, "Go read *The Wizard War*." I said, "All right"; I did.

A few months later I had an opportunity through a think tank to invite some people to gather and talk about naval tactics and strategy, and I, now enlightened, invited Reg to come to the United States and join us. He came to be a friend at that point, and what I have learned over the years since then is that Reg Jones is not only one of the central figures in World War II, but also, as an individual, he has much to say to all of us about the way we must approach intelligence in the 21st century.

So, although we are talking today about matters from the past, our focus really is on the future. We are not trying to relive the past, much less to reawaken animosities. The Fascist and Nazi regimes of Italy and Germany are long gone, replaced by democracies which are friends and allies, representatives of their intelligence services and others of our allies who are here today, as is the Ambassador of France. Indeed, in the intervening half century, we have together fought and won another whole war successfully—this time a cold one. The point is not what happened in the past in and of itself, but rather what the extraordinary accomplishments we honor today can tell us about what we have to do in the future.

The award we inaugurate today, and of which Reg is the first recipient, the R. V. Jones Award, will be similar in one way and different in several ways from other awards which we give in the Intelligence Community. Like a number of our other awards, the R. V. Jones Award will, in the future, ordinarily—probably exclusively—be given in private. For two reasons intelligence successes must almost always be celebrated only among a handful of people many, many years after they occur. You do not want those from whom you are successfully collecting intelligence to know that the success has occurred, and you also do not want to have the methods of success known because they may well be useful in other circumstances.

But unlike our other awards in intelligence, the R. V. Jones Award, engraved with Reg's likeness, will not be reserved for Americans, although Americans are eligible. It will be given in the future to intelligence officers or organizations in the United States or other countries who demonstrate "Scientific Acumen Applied With Art in the Cause of Freedom."

"Scientific acumen applied with art" is the best way we could think of, in a few words appropriate to a medal, to sum up "behaving as R. V. Jones would have." What do we mean by this and how is it relevant to the intelligence world of the future? As the head of scientific intelligence for both the Air Staff and later the British Intelligence Service, Reg Jones during World War II masterminded a combined effort. He was a sort of one-man, all-source intelligence collection, evaluation, and analysis system, who, in his spare time, designed countermeasures, implemented covert action, and targeted military forces. Reg would dispute the one-man characterization. He has always been generous to his colleagues even while insisting, sometimes quite stubbornly, on his own views.

What is unique about Reg Jones is not only that he was, and is, an extraordinarily gifted scientist with a great deal of ability to integrate information, form hypotheses and test them, and make sound judgments, it is that he was also an innovator in intelligence collection. In addition, he was an analytical nerve center where a spirit of ingenuity and an ability to combine information from imagery, signals intelligence, and espionage made the whole of his government's and the Allies' understanding of the enemy's mind much greater than the sum of the individual inputs. He was also a source of ideas and plans for covert action to influence the course of the war. As a superb targeter of military forces, he was a most crafty inventor of countermeasures to thwart enemy action.

In short, nothing in intelligence was alien to Reg Jones. In getting his ideas implemented, he trod on many toes, for intelligence is a business in which turf protection reaches heroic proportions and rice bowls multiply geometrically. In treading on those toes, however, he became the sparkplug, the broker, the midwife for many courses of action that substantially altered the course of the war, shortened it, and contributed to victory.

In intelligence collection, for example, Reg Jones himself analyzed the sensitivity of navigation gear from shot-down bombers in the search for the beams. He was instrumental in developing wingtip cameras for certain types of photo missions, substantially improving reconnaissance. He planned the commando raid on Bruneval to obtain a German radar, and, incidentally, a German radar operator. And, as for his understanding and appreciation for the classic and essential craft of espionage, more in a moment.

In evaluation and analysis, Reg Jones's superb gift for using intelligence to understand the mind of the enemy came from his ability to integrate information from many different sources, to use one type to tip off

another, to take one type of clue—for example, the mere order of addresses on a signal intercept—and to see then that it would make an agent report fall entirely into place. It was Reg Jones's ability to integrate the output from the remarkable codebreaking that was going on at Bletchley, from agent reports, from captured equipment, from reconnaissance, and from many other sources that made him such a remarkable puzzle solver—puzzles in which many of the pieces had of course been hidden by his adversaries. He would patiently piece together clues, develop an hypothesis, task those who collected intelligence, manage the collection, form a conclusion, demand to be heard, persuade his superiors of his view, design actions to counter what he had learned about, and then do it all over again.

In the field of countermeasures, Reg invented "window," which we came later to know as "chaff," the principal method for deceiving radar in its time. His gift for putting himself in the shoes of his adversary—a gift that is common to all great chess players, poker players, and intelligence officers—was essential to these deception operations. By coming to understand which beacons, for example, would be finding night fighters on particular evenings, he was able to insert British long-range night fighters into the midst of the German formations, to begin firing, dart away, and thus start fights among the German fighters themselves.

His understanding of the radar wavelengths that receivers on U-boats could detect led him to call for British radars to be developed with different wavelengths to detect the U-boats. He then masked the effectiveness of his new method of detection by putting out false indications that the British were using a wholly fictitious infrared method of submarine detection. This led the Nazis to concentrate, entirely unproductively, on development methods for avoiding detection of their U-boats by his wholly fictitious infrared system.

In all of these efforts, Reg Jones's attitude and approach toward intelligence embodied some timeless principles. The first, and in many ways the most important of these, was his respect for the enemy's abilities. Reg was a resolute foe of a fallacy that is common in the intelligence business—frequently called mirror-imaging—namely, assuming that one's opponent will act as one does one's self. He was thus able to understand, for example, that the Germans had made a breakthrough in rocket fuels, which had not been thought of by Allied scientists. As he put it in one heated discussion around the Cabinet table in addressing the issue with Churchill, "Just because our experts have not thought of liquid fuels, there was no cause to assume that the rocket was either more or less eminent than it was before our argument had started."

He continually stressed that it was quite possible for the Germans to have succeeded in scientific undertakings, such as the Knickebein beams, where the British or the Allies had not yet conceived of the approach. His respect for his adversary's abilities, their very great abilities, led him to be able to learn from them, as in the case of the clever German operation that permitted the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau to escape the British blockade. Jones likened the German naval tactics to the principle he call "climatization by slow change"—one of a number of categories of practical jokes which Professor Jones, a lifelong practical joker and designer of humorous hoaxes (you can tell it from the poker face and the twinkle in the eye)—has often analyzed and set forth for admiring and chuckling audiences.

Believing firmly with Thomas Hobbes that "force and fraud in war are the two cardinal virtues," Reg was successful to a remarkable degree in understanding and thwarting his adversarys' moves because he was able to put himself in their position. My particular favorite of these involved the defense of Malta.

Holding Malta was an important part of maintaining control of the Mediterranean early during World War II, and the British radar on Malta was an important link in that defense. At one point, the German armed forces had installed powerful new jammers in Sicily. Once they were turned on, they effectively jammed the Malta radar and made defense of the island extremely difficult.

An urgent request arrived on Reg's desk from the signals organization in Malta asking what steps they should take in light of the effective German jamming. Because he had taken care to understand not only German jam-

ming, but also—and this is the key—the way the German military forces made their decisions to see whether or not their jamming was successful, Reg gave a surprising response to Malta: do absolutely nothing different than you had been doing before—continue to scan.

Sure enough, after a few days, the German jammers on Sicily were turned off. At the end of the war General Martini, the Director General of Signals for the Luftwaffe, had been taken prisoner and was being questioned. During the discussion, he asked his former adversary, Reginald Jones, what remarkable antijamming device the British had been able to install in their Malta radar, and the General ruefully learned of Jones's deception—I suppose uttering some equivalent of "Curses, foiled again!"

Although his reputation is that of a man who knew and knows his own mind, Reg Jones was also a team player, a characteristic which is essential for success in intelligence. His tactics in persuading others in his own government to go along with his judgments have often been both kind and deft. For example, his original mentor, Churchill's close adviser, Frederick Lindemann, later Lord Charwell, was on the other side of a number of arguments against Reg on scientific matters during the war.

On the key issue of the development of a V-2 rocket at Peenemunde, Jones worked until he was certain of his facts, then he visited Charwell privately to tell him that, if Charwell continued to deny the existence of the rocket, there was nothing he could do in the interest of the war effort except force a clear confrontation that Charwell would lose. But if Charwell would look at the facts and be persuaded, Reg offered to bring out the new evidence as gently as he could, over the period of a week or so, in order to give Charwell an opportunity to change his ground. Charwell agreed to the second course.

Most delicious, in a sense—two senses—however, occurred when Reg was trying to persuade the group captain who was the head of the photographic branch of the Air Staff, D.D. Laws, nicknamed "Daddy," of the importance of moving to use wingtip cameras for photoreconnaissance to improve stereoscopic photography, and for a number of other reasons. As Jones puts it in *The Wizard War*, "By this time I was beginning to get on personal terms with "Daddy" Laws. Finally, I found his weak point. Of all the improbable hobbies for a group captain, his was the making of jam. If only I could convince him that I, too, was interested in jam-making, he might be more sympathetic to my ideas about cameras. My moment came when I asked him one day whether he had ever made quince jam. 'No,' he exclaimed—and then with a wistful look in his eye—'but, by God, I'd like to.' I offered to get him quinces, and henceforward, photographic Mosquito aircraft for low-level work were fitted with forward-facing wingtip cameras."

When it came down to it, however—and in many ways this is the most important aspect of being an intelligence officer—when diplomacy and quince jam did not work, Reg Jones was a man who stuck to his guns and stood his ground. He was careful and deliberate in his analysis, but when the chips were down, he had, in the battles of Whitehall, the one absolutely essential ingredient for intelligence officers: courage. As he put it in the introduction to *The Wizard War*, dedicated to "all those in Nazi-occupied Europe, who in lone obscurity and of their own will risked torture and death for scientific intelligence," he noted that "courage is the quality that guarantees all others."

This is no less important when a young 28-year-old analyst, with a theory about some navigation beams that no one else has really heard of or understands, is confronting his mentor together with the prime minister and the entire War Cabinet. It is as important there as it is on the front lines. Time and again—on the beams, on the capabilities of the V-2 (dealt with in another Cabinet confrontation)—the strength of character behind Reg Jones's defense of his judgments was powerful.

This strength was born of devotion to those for whom he spoke—those whose lives were on the line. As he put it—referring to two members of the French Resistance who had been executed—"while men like Giran and Faye, and women, too, suffered torture and death for us alone among their perverted enemies, our squabbles in London went on." He added, "I knew what devotion was being offered by so many of our sources, and I was

going to see that their sacrifices were turned to as good advantage as possible. This was the only way in which we could keep faith with them."

This brings us to my last point—Reg Jones's attitude toward espionage and to those who conduct it, as the medal says, "in the cause of freedom." Some today try to put the effective use of technology and classic espionage at odds with one another. Nonsense! In Reg Jones's mind and writings, there is no hint of any such false separation between the role of science and the role of human beings undertaking the dangerous, lonely, and heroic job of espionage "in the cause of freedom."

For three reasons, espionage was in World War II, always has been, and, in my judgment, always will be, a unique, vital, and central feature of intelligence. This is true, first of all, because much of intelligence involves attempting to understand the intentions and the plans of an adversary. When an adversary is clever and tough, he can limit your ability to learn about his actions from reconnaissance or from intercepting signals. Sometimes on the vital subject of his plans and intentions, there is no means available other than espionage.

Second, espionage is often essential to providing an indication, a tip, a direction for targeting and using technical intelligence assets, such as reconnaissance or signals intelligence.

Finally, espionage in the cause of freedom has one great advantage because the human spirit is the Achilles heel of tyranny. Although democracies labor under some tactical disadvantages in espionage—and they will have their failures—in conducting espionage against regimes under the control of Nazis, Fascists, Communists, and the like, free governments have one great asset in those long twilight struggles. The uglier the regime, the more it will become vulnerable in time to its own people, including those who work for it officially—those who possess secrets. Through disgust, through cynicism sometimes, but often through a quiet, private thirst for freedom, those who are forced to live in and work for tyrannical regimes will come to be willing to reveal those regimes' plans and activities. When that happens, cracks appear in the regimes' armor.

Just as brave individuals succeeded in espionage against the Nazis and Fascists a half century ago, today we see these sorts of cracks in the armor of regimes that proliferate weapons of mass destruction and foster terrorism. We and those regimes' own people will ultimately defeat these regimes as well. When we do, it will be in very important part through espionage because of brave and clever men and women such as those in this building and in the intelligence services of our friends and allies who are here today and who are willing to spend their lives working and supporting those who work in the front lines and the back alleys of the world in the cause of freedom.

A half century ago, it was espionage that led the Allies to understand the rocket and missile programs at Peenemunde, and that brings us to the second person we are honoring today—Jeannie Rousseau, the Vicomtesse de Clarens, codename AMINIARIX. She is listed first by Reg in the dedication of *The Wizard War* as one of those for whom "courage is the quality that guarantees all others."

As Reg relates it, when he first inquired about the source of the extraordinary report that had originally tipped off the British Government to what was going on at Peenemunde, all he could learn was that it came from "*une jeune fille la plus remarquable de sa generation*," part of a small espionage network reporting from occupied France. Early in the war she had, because of her gift with languages, served as an interpreter in transactions with the Germans and had begun to report on what she had seen and heard. She was arrested by the Gestapo in 1941 but was later released and prohibited from staying in the coastal area. She returned—if you know her, you would know why—immediately to espionage in Paris. During 1943, she filed two—indeed, many others—but two particularly remarkable intelligence reports about Peenemunde. These reports led Reg, and ultimately, the rest of the British Government and the rest of the Allies, directly to the missile and rocket development work going on there. Her courage in collecting this intelligence and in forwarding it under very difficult circumstances, led, through Reg Jones's analysis and persuasive abilities in London, to the British

R.V. Jones, DCI Woolsey, and Jeannie de Clarens.

raid on Peenemunde and to delays and disruptions in the V-1 and V-2 programs, saving thousands of lives in the West.

Shortly before D-Day, a plan to evacuate her and two other agents was aborted by the Gestapo. She was the first to be caught. But even as she was being captured, she succeeded in warning her comrades so that one was able to escape. And again, as Reg has put it: "AMNIARIX's reports stand brilliantly in the history of intelligence, and three concentration camps—Ravensbruck, Konigsberg (a punishment camp), and Torgau could not break her."

We thus today present two awards for two remarkable individuals, symbolizing the best of the intelligence profession. Could I ask Reg Jones and the Viscomtesse de Clarens, Reg, AMNIARIX, to join me please?

Jeannie de Clarens is hereby awarded the Agency Seal Medallion for heroic and momentous contribution to Allied efforts during World War II as a member of the French Resistance. At the age of 20, she used her position as an interpreter for the Germans to report what she saw and heard. Arrested and released by the Gestapo in 1941, she devised a new cover and with her language skills as entree used her extraordinary intuition and considerable wiles to provide intelligence on German missile research.

In September 1943 she filed a stunningly accurate report on the German missile order of battle. When captured by the Gestapo in 1944, Madame de Clarens had both the mettle and heart to warn her companions, who successfully escaped. With her place in history secure and

having spent the last year of the war in three German concentration camps, we could understand had she rested on her laurels.

Instead, Madame de Clarens has continued her fight for human dignity and freedom, including her work for Amnesty International. Her wartime exploits remind us that, even in a world of high-technology espionage, the human agent remains indispensable to vital operations beyond the reach of science and that there can be no substitute for human courage "in the defense of freedom."

Maj. Gen. Doyle Larson

Reg, Mr. Woolsey, Madame. I think DCI Woolsey did a great job in describing a great man. I have a few personal things to contribute. I really cannot say anything that would add much to what you have already seen. This man is a close personal friend, and, as I thought about the remarks I wanted to make, I could not help but go back to some of the original statements that I read from Churchill—that, when World War II broke out in 1939, Reg Jones was a junior employee of the British Air Ministry working on a project to develop infrared detection of aircraft. He had been paid 50 pounds for that project, a princely sum.

In the course of conducting the project, Reg had been reading about the development of new military weapons and techniques, and because at the time there were very few scientists in Britain who had shown similar interest, it was perhaps only natural that he should be introduced to Wing Commander Winterbottom, head of Air Intelligence Branch. Thus began a spectacular career that played a vital role in the defeat of the Axis powers, and I think best described by Winston Churchill in Volume II of his memoirs in which he describes how he summoned Reg to their first meeting:

> In June, I received a painful shock. Professor Lindemen reported to me that he believed the Germans were preparing a device by means of which they would now be able to bomb by day or night, whatever the weather. A radio beam like an invisible searchlight would guide the bombers with considerable precision to their target. Lindemen told me also that there was a way of bending the beam, if we acted at once, but that I must see some of the scientists, particularly the Deputy Director of Intelligence Research at the Air Ministry, Dr. R. V. Jones.

And so it was that Winston summoned Reg Jones, and he reports that he arrived a few minutes late. A youngish man who, as I afterwards learnt, had thought his sudden summons to the Cabinet room must be a practical joke. And, if you know Reg and how many times he pulled practical jokes, you can understand that. At any rate, Churchill continues:

> He [Jones] hurried in and took his seat at the bottom of the table. According to plan, I invited him to open the discussion. For 20 minutes or more he spoke in quiet tones, unrolling his chain of circumstantial evidence, the like of which, for its convincing fascination, was never surpassed by tales of Sherlock Holmes or Monsignor Lecoq

In 1979 I was tasked by Air Force Chief of Staff, Gen. Lou Allen, to proceed to San Antonio, Texas, to establish a new Air Force support command called the Electronic Security Command in a JCS activity called the Joint Electronic Warfare Center. As I began to think about trying to create this new kind of activity employing science and technology and modern warfare, I recalled that chapter from Churchill's book. I pulled the book off my bookshelf and read again that chapter entitled "The Wizard War." I became obsessed that I could not proceed any further until I had made contact with this man. I called General Allen, and he immediately said, "That's a good idea. I know this man very well. By all means, bring him over."

And so I made arrangements for Reg Jones to travel to San Antonio, and I instituted a series of seminars for the purpose of government/industry exploration into ways to employ science and technology and modern warfare. I truly believe today that his tutorials and his insights were the seeds that spawned our present strategy for command and control warfare, a strategy recently issued by the JCS that calls for the integrated application of deception, jamming, psychological warfare, opsec, and lethal weapons. Reg did a lecture for me once in one of these seminars, and he referred to this coherent employment as a commander's kit of tools.

One of the things that I did on one of his visits was to practice some of the teachings of Reg Jones. So, a month or so before he left Aberdeen, I called him and asked him if I could call on him to play the Star-Spangled Banner for the banquet on his harmonica. He said, "Well, I believe I can. It's probably just an old Scottish tune." And so at the banquet, at the appropriate time, I called Reg to the podium. He stepped forward, pulled out his harmonica, and played the Star-Spangled Banner.

When he was done, we opened the curtains and, standing behind him on stage, was the Air Force pipe band that began to play a tune for our visiting Scotsman. Then, just to continue this little play with Reg Jones, we brought in on a very special carriage a container carried by an honor guard with great pomp and ceremony. It had a vat in the middle of it, and we presented it to Dr. Jones in the finest traditions of dining in. It was a vat of menudo—a sort of Mexican haggis. It was only appropriate for him to determine if it was fit. He tasted it, and it was.

I believe that Reg Jones's tutorials and lectures were very effective in teaching our military how to employ a kind of brilliant warfare. I also believe that what you saw displayed on CNN during Desert Storm was the direct result of his teachings. The Iraqi command and control system was rendered ineffective in just a few minutes. Reg Jones deserves considerable credit for a stunning victory, and I salute him for that achievement.

Linda Zall

It is a great privilege to speak at this ceremony which recognizes Professor R. V. Jones's contributions to intelligence, and which establishes the R. V. Jones Medal for those who may follow in his footsteps. The concept of the medal is nontraditional, as befits the man after whom it is named. Most awards our society bestows upon its leading scientists honor its great inventors—men and women who invented devices like transistors or lasers. The R. V. Jones Award is different. It is designed to honor those who recognize curious linkages of technology to intelligence and then creatively exploit them.

Before World War II, technology had little impact on intelligence, although technology had repeatedly revolutionized warfare—the stirrup, the long bow, gunpowder, and the tanks and aircraft of World War II are some examples. But due in large measure to R. V. Jones during World War II, science and technology moved into the mainstream of intelligence, where they remain.

That Professor Jones achieved his results despite then conventional wisdom teaches us a valuable lesson. Conventional wisdom, when applied to the future, is compelling, widely accepted, and frequently wrong. For example, the beginning of radio astronomy was delayed over 20 years because few believed we could detect weak radio sources. Another example is Martin Schmidt's discovery of quasars, celestial bodies that according to conventional wisdom could not exist.

With freedom hanging in the balance, Professor Jones used science and technology, unconventionally, in a host of critical areas. Many of these areas have matured into technologies and methods that are the mainstays of today's Intelligence Community. These include his pioneering work in infrared detection, remote sensing, analyses of nuclear technology, and, of course, radar.

With respect to radar, we have seen how Professor Jones understood and overcame German radio-navigation aids and German ground-based, defensive radar systems.

Today, such systems are much more complicated. Modern, ground-based radars use more of the spectrum and employ complex and diverse waveforms; they can measure the shape and characteristics of faraway objects with great precision. Where once a slide rule would have sufficed, we must now use exotic signal-processing techniques, which, in turn, would not be possible without today's computers, advanced digital radio receivers, and associated microelectronics.

Radar has evolved even further, as scientists can now produce images from it. To produce these images, they require extraordinary computational power, more than 10 million times greater than that which was available during World War II.

Recently, scientists have advanced the art still further, exhaustively processing radar returns to detect ground displacements that result from earthquakes—processing which requires another factor of 10 in computer power. But, while the computational accessories needed to understand and use such technology may have changed, the human creativity and insights required remain a constant.

Although Professor Jones is justifiably best known for his work on radar, he was among the first to recognize the potential contribution of infrared technology to intelligence. Today we have sensitive infrared focal plane arrays that are the cornerstone of our global missile warning system.

As an avid consumer of aerial photography, Professor Jones pioneered in what we more broadly refer to today as remote sensing. His success in estimating the German military capability from air photos led to our ability, during the Cold War, to estimate the size of the Soviet military capability. We translated this need into the technology that became our U-2s and SR-71s. These aircraft trace their ancestry to the Spitfires and Mosquito Bombers whose use for reconnaissance he championed. The way in which Kelly Johnson and the Lockheed Skunkworks approached the U-2 design and fabrication is reminiscent of how Professor Jones rejected the large bureaucracy in favor of the small team.

Over the past three decades, "overhead" reconnaissance has moved beyond the atmosphere and into space. Still, the tight link between the exploitation of these new images and the requirements of the analyst remains a tribute to the pioneering efforts of Professor Jones. Were he active in our business today, he would be the consummate tasker of such systems.

Nuclear proliferation is of front page concern today, but it was R. V. Jones, during World War II, who appreciated the threat posed by a German nuclear capability. His analyses of German heavy-water production in Norway lead to a daring attack on the facility. He received his intelligence on that facility from agents. At that time, little technology was available to support his analyses. Today, we have access to sophisticated analytical tools—gas chromatography and mass spectrometer techniques that can detect impurities at concentrations as low as a part in a billion.

As we consider the current state of technology, I should note that my generation has access to a key technology that was not available to Professor Jones—the supercomputer. Supercomputers have enabled recent advances in modeling and simulation, where we can marry intelligence and military operations in ways which were once thought to be science fiction. Virtual simulation was introduced in support of the Persian Gulf war, to enable our fighting forces to rehearse their next day's mission by exposing them to the Intelligence Community's best estimate of the enemy threat. By merging the technologies of computer modeling and simulation, and also telecommunications, we have developed a real-time capability to exploit intelligence data instantaneously in a way that could revolutionize how we wage future conflicts.

These supercomputers have also advanced the world of cryptography. In fact, these computers trace their lineage to the early computational techniques used to break the German and Japanese codes in World War II. Thanks to cryptography, our government officials have the most secure communications in the world.

We are in an information revolution! Unlike in Professor Jones's time, with today's sophisticated satellites and fiber optics, integrated with supercomputers, we have at our fingertips a vast amount of information to support analysts. The future is evolving into a global superhighway that will produce an explosion of data at terabits per second. In fact, we are often overloaded with information on which to make decisions. We must challenge technology to provide us the analytical tools to extract the intelligence nuggets from these vast quantities of data.

Recently, the intelligence and defense communities have been asked to apply our technical capabilities for environmental science. Let me cite an example, using a technology that had its roots in World War II. Then, we used a short-range, undersea acoustic system to help counter the German U-boat threat. As this technology marched forward, scientists can now, by estimating the underwater travel time of acoustic signals, determine if the oceans are warming. This could provide data to settle the ongoing global warming controversy.

As we look to the future, we see a host of challenges to the Intelligence Community posed by new circumstances. Whether these challenges come from ethnic, national, or regional strife that threaten our hope for a new world order, the demands on our technical and HUMINT collection and on our analytical capabilities will be immense. If we are to apply technology creatively to these unconventional intelligence problems, it will require unconventional perspectives. That is the model that R. V. Jones has established, and it is for us, the next generation of intelligence technologists, to appreciate that challenge and to react to it with the skill, creativity, and determination that are the hallmarks of R. V. Jones.

Enduring principles

Some Lessons in Intelligence

R.V. Jones

Editor's Note: The award-winning author made the following remarks at a symposium at CIA Headquarters on 26 October 1993:

Most of what I have to say here about our common interest, the subject of intelligence, can be found in the two books, *Most Secret War* (or *The Wizard War*) and *Reflections on Intelligence*, which you already have. And, if there are matters arising from them on which you would like to question me, I shall be glad to respond. Compared with some of you, though, I spent a relatively few years in full-time intelligence, and most of my experience was gained around 50 years ago. I therefore address you with some diffidence.

Scales of Operation

A point to be made at the outset is the enormous difference between the scale on which you operate today and our own efforts in World War II, and so lessons based on our experience must be drawn with caution. Napoleon made the point when discussing the outcome of actions between his own cavalry and the Mameluke horsemen of Asia Minor. These horsemen were so good that two of them would defeat three of his cavalrymen in a minor skirmish. But in a major battle, 1,000 of his cavalry would defeat 1,500 Mamelukes. On the small scale, horsemanship was the predominant factor, but on the large scale victory would be won by the controlled and disciplined application of force. Wellington made much the same point regarding actions between his cavalry and their French opponents.

On both scales of operation skilled horsemanship and cooperative action were ingredient factors, but the balance of importance between them changed with scale. Similarly, in intelligence personal skill may be the paramount factor on the small scale, but the ability to coordinate the skills of many individuals may be predominant in large-scale operations. All that I can therefore usefully do now is to mention some of the principles that emerged from my experience and leave it to you to decide their relative importance in the present scale of your operations.

World War II

World War II was a fortunate and exhilarating time to be involved in intelligence, when new channels of information were opening up, and when we could quickly see the effects of our work on the operation of war. Moreover, we had a highly specific objective: to discover as much as possible about our German opponents both as regards the threats that they posed to our defenses and to our survival, and as regards the techniques and dispositions by which they hoped, in turn, to defeat our own attacks.

For me personally it was a time even more fascinating than it was opportune. The state of technological developments over a wide range of fields was still elementary enough for one individual to be abreast of them, and yet advanced enough for technology to have profound effects on warfare. Electronics, for example, was in transition from the "steam age" of radio to the sophistication of television, radar, and devices based on the scale-of-two counter.

An Analogy

As I started to analyze what I was doing in building up an intelligence system to cover scientific and technological developments, I came to realize that just as a human head depends on sight, sound, smell, and touch as channels for gathering data about the external world for processing and interpretation by the brain, so an intelligence system depends on spies, electronic and photographic reconnaissance, and so forth. So I came to see

the battle between intelligence and deception as the efforts on one side to establish as many channels as possible through which to observe the opponent, in the hope that he may fail to block at least some of these channels, while the opponent may in addition try to send false, and preferably consistent, signals in as many channels as possible.

To succeed in any such exchange, you should therefore aim to establish (and, if possible, multiply) your channels of observation, and to deepen the sophistication in each individual channel so that if your opponent tries to send false signals in that channel he may fail to match a genuine signal in its sophistication. You will find all this elaborated in *Reflections on Intelligence*.

Channels and Linkages

Besides remarking the value of multiplying the number of channels by which you observe the enemy, it is worth realizing that each channel may also be regarded as a chain of links by which information is processed and passed on. At Bletchley, for example, information came in through radio operators listening to enemy signals encrypted as sequences of letters. These sequences were then fed to the cryptographers for decryption, and the resultant clear texts were amended by further experts to correct for possible errors in transmission and reception. The amended texts then went to specialist units such as Hut 3 in Bletchley, where the texts were edited and correlated with any parallel information before being sent to further bodies such as myself, from whom it might then emerge into a more public light and be used in operations.

The point about such a chain that I want to emphasize is that any one link is likely to be regarded as representing the interests of the ultimate user of intelligence by those links that are nearer the source, while being regarded as representing the source by those links in the chain which are nearer to the user.

Thus, for example, I felt it a duty to look after the interests of our sources such as Resistance agents or the cryptographers at Bletchley or the photographic reconnaissance pilots to minimize the risks to which they would be subjected, and see that their hard-won information would be properly applied by our Air Staff. I also felt it a duty to make as clear as possible to our sources what kind of information would best help the Air Staff, and why.

A key link in the chain is the one at which information obtained by highly secret means is correlated and communicated to the operational staffs. I myself was one of those in such a position, and I tried to avoid taking credit for the inspired work, such as that at Bletchley, which had in fact been done by links further along the chain whose activities were still more secret. To borrow a phrase from Churchill, I often felt that I was the one who "had the luck to give the roar," when the real credit belonged to those out of the limelight. And I came to appreciate the wisdom of Field Marshal Slim's observation that "There are... in any big organization, very large numbers of people whose existence is only remembered when something for which they are responsible goes wrong." Instead, their essential but unobtrusive work should be acknowledged with grateful credit whenever possible.

Collection and Collation

An inherent difficulty in intelligence arises from the fact that the collection and input of information has to be made by source—secret agents, cryptography, electronic intelligence, and so on, while output has to be by subject—naval, army, air, scientific, economic, or political. Here, again, the analogy with the brain is relevant, and in that sense an intelligence system is like a vast neutral network where information is gained, filtered, sorted, and correlated before it can be applied to action.

Conflicts of Priorities

Conflicts of priorities can easily arise when effort is limited on the collection side, and when demands arise from different user interests. My only difference with Bletchley in the entire war arose on this account. This was in 1943, when Enigma decrypts were providing much information of immediate value to military commanders in the field. If, though, their demands absorbed too much of our decrypting effort, there would not be enough left for attempts to decrypt signals of less immediate but of greater long-term value. There was an

understandable temptation for Bletchley to put maximum effort into the shorter term decrypts because of the exhilaration that naturally arose from a more direct interaction with operations. On the other hand, I had to press for as much decrypting effort as possible to be devoted to those lines of Enigma traffic that might throw light on longer term developments, such as those in electronic warfare and the prospective V-weapons.

Fortunately, with the precedent of the beams of 1940 still vivid in our memories, I was able to convince the cryptographers that it would be well worth our while to attempt the decryption of Enigma signals associated not directly with operations but with the trails of V-1s and V-2s at Peenemunde and in Poland. And it was from clues gained from the decrypted traffic in Poland that I was able to establish that the Germans had by July 1944 made at least 1,000 V-2s, and that the weight of the V-2 warhead was fortunately not the 5 to 10 tons suggested by our own experts but no more than 1 ton.

Experts and Emotions

The battle in Whitehall over the prospective weight of the warhead had been fought with much emotion. Walt Rostow, then an intelligence officer with the US Army Air Force, later gave his impression of the first of our Whitehall meetings that he attended:

> Although I was at the time relatively young (27), I had acquired some experience with both academic and government bureaucratic structures and their capacity for bloodless tribal warfare. But I had never been present at, let alone presided over, a meeting with more emotional tension than that centered on the size of the V-2 warhead.... What emerged was a reasonably solid intelligence case for a 1-ton warhead.

Only once since have I myself witnessed such an emotional discussion, and once again it involved rockets. This was here in the United States, following President Reagan's announcement in 1983 of the Strategic Defense Initiative. At that time, eminent men of science opposing the SDI project could accuse other eminent men who were supporting it as being involved in deliberate fraud, while no less a physicist than the President of the National Academy of Sciences could, if press reports are to be believed, dismiss the technical arguments produced by those physicists who were critical of SDI as being of comparable shoddiness to the work of Nazi physicists in prewar Germany. There seems to be something about rocketry that arouses the deepest of human emotions.

The Functions of Experts

The matter of expert opinion brings me to a principle that I was able to clarify regarding the part that experts should play in an intelligence system. By and large, in 1939 our experts in Britain contended that they should be the ultimate authorities in assessing intelligence concerning new enemy weapons. Following the experiences of 1940, I came instead to regard them as our spies on the way in which the laws of nature bore on the problem under consideration. Usually they were very reliable, and great weight therefore attached to their evidence but, occasionally, and such occasions could be important, they were wrong either because their experience was at fault or it was irrelevant or because the enemy was using a discovery that our own experts had not yet made.

One of the failures in scientific intelligence in Britain was in chemical warfare, where intelligence in this field had been left in the hands of our experts at Porton, who dismissed reports that the Germans had something that they called nerve gas, probably because the materials in question were new ones whose behavior was unknown at Porton. So, while expert advice is often very good, it must be assessed in parallel with information coming through other channels of intelligence; if there are contradictions, the validity of the expert advice should be investigated as deeply as would be information coming through any other channel.

Oversight

In the early war years few serving or civilian officers in Whitehall or in government research establishments realized the potential value of scientific intelligence.

This made it difficult for me to gain sufficient support, particularly in recruiting even those few members of staff whom I wanted. But this same lack of appreciation had one great advantage in that it left me in obscurity to get on with intelligence with minimum bureaucratic hindrance and with minimum oversight by external bodies.

Later in the war it was different: with the importance of scientific intelligence clearly recognized, there were attempts by men of ambition to take it over. And, particularly in the field of the prospective V-weapons, every one of our conclusions was likely to be challenged, with the demand that we should hand over every new item of information as it came in, even before we ourselves had time to think about it. Matters came to a head when Churchill found that I was being expected to spend so much time attending committees to hand over information and answer their resulting questions that he gave me authority to cut meetings whenever I felt justified.

I had remarked that my task was like trying to track a hare lying hidden in a field, and then trying to shoot it with a pistol when it bolted. If he asked me to bring him back the hare, there was a sporting chance that I could do it, provided that I could go into the field quietly by myself to locate the hare; but I would never be able to do so if I had to be accompanied by a committee watching my every step. Their very presence would scare the hare long before I could get within range.

At the same time, though, I understand the need for some degree of oversight. Intelligence is an activity where at times there will be temptation, and perhaps even need, to transgress the conventional limits of moral or legal conduct in the hope of achieving some greater aim. Justified though this may be on occasion, it is natural that there should be misgivings by others who may be unaware of what is at stake; and there have been occasions in which zeal of intelligence officers has led them into action that may be prejudicial to some wider interest. Further, although no problem of legality or morality may be involved, the validity of a conclusion reached by an intelligence organization about, for example, the intentions or weapons of a foreign power, may be questioned by outside authorities who may not have all the information on which the conclusion has been drawn. Any of these grounds may give rise to a call for oversight, and, in that case, the first reaction of an intelligence officer should be to turn to the advice in Kipling's "If":

"If you can trust yourself when all men doubt you"

—and here comes the rub—

"But make allowance for their doubting, too."

The V-weapon scare of 1943 and 1944 inevitably led to my work being subjected to some degree of oversight. This was at times disagreeable, but there was one instance in which, although my hackles were tending to bristle, it proved to be of the greatest benefit. It was in December 1943, after we had established the existence and the performance of the V-1, and the British chiefs of staff had asked their American counterparts for assistance in combating the threat, including the supply of new radar, predictors, and proximity-fused shells. The American chiefs of staff, though, were not entirely convinced, and thought that we in Britain might be the victims of a deception perpetrated by the Germans in the hope that we would divert our efforts from the preparations for the landings in Normandy. Your chiefs of staff said that they would give us the necessary help, on condition that someone whom they would nominate could be shown all the details of the work on which we had based our assessment.

Personally, I resented the fact that my work and conclusions had been doubted. But our Chief of Air Staff, Sir Charles Portal, gave me a definite order to open my books to whomever the Americans should send, and I awaited the arrival of the unknown expert with some indignation. As soon as he walked into my office, however, all my worries disappeared. He was H. P. Robertson, the Professor of Applied Mathematics at Princeton, who combined a high achievement in relativity with a lively and generous sense of humor.

Within Robertson's first hour in the office, he was convinced by our work, and we became the closest of friends. So much so, that when the V-1 campaign

against London opened in June 1944 and I had my own hands more than full with the radar attacks preceding the Normandy landings, the impending threat of the V-2, and the need to entertain Niels Bohr in London, Bob Robertson gladly agreed to act as my deputy regarding V-weapons even though at the same time he was Scientific Adviser to the Supreme Allied Commander. Links such as those which were forged between us so warmly in the heat of war, along with parallel links in other fields of intelligence, including the cryptographers, did much to build up the "special relationship" which was the foundation of the postwar history of our two intelligence services.

Minimum Trespass

Even without that beneficial outcome of a demand for oversight, I would recognize the need for its exercise, but this exercise needs moderation. Its operation should accord with the principle of minimum trespass that I have found to be valid for every conceivable aspect of intelligence activity.

Just as the principle, or doctrine, of minimum force should govern the exercise of military power, so should minimum trespass operate in the intelligence field. It should, for example, govern the actions of offensive intelligence in gathering information about foreign powers, and it should also govern the activities of security services in trespassing on the privacy of individuals and of civilian organizations. And, conversely, oversight should trespass as little as possible on the rights of an intelligence organization in maintaining the necessary confidentiality regarding that organization's activities.

Compromise and Balance

There are other aspects of intelligence with which, as with oversight, there are dangers either in having too much or in having too little, and in which optimum compromises have to be found. Among these is the problem of briefing your sources about what they should be looking for. If you tell them too much about what you already know, there is the danger that a source may subconsciously color his future reports in the light of that knowledge; and there is sometimes the further danger that your brief to him may leak out to the enemy.

The briefing of sources (and among these I include all individuals or machines who contribute to the flow of intelligence, be this human, photographic, electronic, or otherwise) is therefore an art in which compromises may be necessary. For myself, though, I was fortunate on vital occasions to find sources who could be trusted and who worked all the better the more that I could tell them about what we were looking for, and why.

The timing of intelligence warnings may also demand compromise: too early may lead to "crying wolf," while too late will lead to disaster. And while too few workers in intelligence may result in something important being missed, so also can too many, when the resulting duplication of effort leads to no single individual taking the responsibility in an emergency because he believes someone else will do so. And while a continuous watch on an enemy activity has obvious merits, it can also lead to tiredness in the watchman, with the result that he may miss a vital development, as we did when Scharnhorst and Gneisenau broke out of Brest in 1942.

And yet another balance that an intelligence officer may have to strike is between becoming so personally involved with his sources that he may attach too much, or perhaps too little, importance to the information that they are providing, and remaining so aloof and detached that he may dampen their enthusiasm through seeming lack of appreciation.

Epilogue

All the foregoing factors therefore call for the soundest of judgment in the conduct of intelligence. It may call for the utmost in craftsmanship, perhaps even in artistry, both in its operations and in presenting its results to those who have to take the ultimate decisions. And deception makes no fewer demands on those who are charged with its practice.

In concluding this brief survey of what I myself saw of some of the problems, I deeply appreciate the honor of addressing you—all the more so because of the much greater problems you yourselves have to face. We were able to concentrate on the one major problem of

A Personal Look

Editor's Note: *The following sketch of Professor Jones was prepared by the Directorate of Intelligence's Science and Technology Officer in London who served as Jones's escort during his visit to the United States.*

During World War II, R. V. Jones, a junior scientific adviser to the RAF, had personal access to Prime Minister Churchill. His last active involvement with intelligence was during the Falklands war, when he advised Prime Minister Thatcher.

Jones first visited CIA in 1953 as head of the UK's scientific intelligence effort. Some 20 years later, at the invitation of DCI Schlesinger, he was the first foreigner to address an audience in the Agency's auditorium.

Jones taught physics for over 30 years in the University of Aberdeen's Department of Natural Philosophy. In 1981, Jones became professor emeritus there. Jones tells the story that, when new students were shown around his department, they were cautioned: "Whatever you do, be careful around Professor Jones. He thinks he won the war by himself."

An excellent raconteur, Jones also has a fine sense of humor. His jokes frequently have a point, such as his following story of the scientific mind at work:

> The Germans had won the war and decided to stamp out resistance by publicly executing the chiefs of the military services and the chief scientist. The First Sea Lord was brought to the guillotine erected on Trafalgar Square, the blade came down, but miraculously stopped an inch short of his neck. The Germans, impressed with what seemed to be divine intervention, let the man go. The same happy fate met the chiefs of the air force and army. When it came time for the chief scientist's execution, he declared his desire to lie on his back and watch the mechanism work. Just as the blade was to descend, the man cried out, "Hold it, chaps! I think I see your problem."

One of the visit's most charming moments followed a suggestion to drive Jones to Middleburg, Virginia, for a Sunday lunch. After being in Middleburg for about 10 minutes, a young lady exclaimed, "Reg!" Lisa Johnson, an artist and interior decorator, had met Jones in London and Aberdeen. After lunch at Mosby's Tavern with other friends of the professor's, Ms. Johnson sang Puccini and Schubert arias at a crowded upscale clothing shop for Jones. The shopowner accompanied on a grand piano just inside the door. Jones reciprocated on his one-inch harmonica with the Scottish lament played at Churchill's funeral.

Germany, and it was an immediate one, with all the exhilaration that a success in intelligence could bring. Your problems, including the uncontrolled spread of advanced weapons and of drugs, are on a worldwide scale. As the intelligence service of the world's most powerful nation, you have an enormous responsibility to bear. We saw something of such problems in the days of Pax Britannica, and we know that you will get little thanks however nobly you tackle them, and only showers of criticism when things go wrong. As Kipling put it; "The blame of those ye better and the hate of those ye guard."

But, for all that, intelligence, properly conducted, is not only honorable but is a vital contribution to the stability of the civilized world.

Burial at sea

The Komsomolets Disaster

George Montgomery

Some five years ago the Russian nuclear attack submarine Komsomolets sank in the Norwegian Sea. The event caused consternation in the Soviet Navy, high interest in NATO maritime and intelligence circles, and apprehension among environmentalists. This concern arose particularly in Norway, for the submarine's broken hull holds two nuclear reactors and at least two torpedoes with nuclear warheads containing plutonium, one of the most toxic substances known to man. Since the sinking, Russian authorities have elicited to an unprecedented degree scientific assistance from other countries and used remote sensors and minisubmersibles to find Komsomolets, measure radiation leakage, and assess the stability of the wreck. Ironically, the architect of this instrument of war who designed it to hunt US and Norwegian ships is asking for and receiving assistance in surveying the submarine and assessing its stability from Komsomolets' intended victims.

Komsomolets—One of a Kind

Komsomolets means "member of the Young Communist League." She was launched in May 1983 in Severodvinsk, a closed Soviet city on the Barents Sea with the world's largest shipyard. She was 400 feet long, 37 feet high and 27 feet in beam with a submerged displacement of 8,000 tons—a very large sub indeed. *Komsomolets* had two nuclear reactors, long thought to be of revolutionary design (liquid-metal coolant) but actually water-cooled. Her inner pressure hull was titanium, light and strong, making her the world's deepest diving submarine, and her operating depth below 3,000 feet was far below that of the best of US subs. She was manned by about 70 men and could carry a mix of torpedoes and cruise missiles with conventional or nuclear warheads. NATO dubbed her type *Mike* and expected the unit to be first of a class of large attack submarines.

She became operational in late 1984 but no further Alfas were built. Although a prototype, she went on operational patrols and was described as an antisubmarine warfare unit in May 1989.

The Sinking

It is 7 April 1989. *Komsomolets*, of the Soviet Northern Fleet, is cruising at 1,250 feet below the surface of the Norwegian Sea, some 100 miles southwest of Bjornoya (Bear Island) and 200 miles to the north of the Norwegian mainland. She has been on patrol for 39 days.

At 11:00 a.m. Seaman Nodari Bukhnikashvili reports all well in Compartment 7, the location of steering and the aftmost space on the ship. Moments later, a high-pressure air line connecting to main ballast tanks allowing the submarine to control its depth bursts its seal in the seventh compartment. Somehow a spray of oil hits a hot surface there, and a flash fire begins in the high pressure oxygen-rich air. Three minutes later Capt. Third Rank Vyacheslav Yudin, *Komsomolets'* watch engineer in the control room, notes a sharp rise in temperature aft. He calls Bukhnikashvili on the intercom, but receives no reply. Lt. Igor Molchanov notes the time in the deck log.



Chief Engineer Valentin Babenko and Commanding Officer Captain First Rank Yevgeniy Vanin are now in the control room. Babenko recommends Vanin smother the apparent fire with freon, a nonflammable gas. Vanin delays, knowing the gas would smother the seaman as well as the fire. But soon he reluctantly orders the system activated. The high-pressure air line is feeding the fire in Compartment 7 like a blast furnace. Bukhnikashvili is the first of the crew to die. The fire is now beyond containment.

Pressure aft forces oil into Compartment 6, and the fire arcs through cableways despite closed hatches. Turbine generators here wind down, the emergency system to protect the nuclear reactors from overload kicks in, and the propeller shaft stops. Fearing a meltdown, the reactor officer shuts down the submarine's main source of power. Now *Komsomolets* is powerless. With no way on and at a depth of 500 feet, she loses vital lift. Interior communications cut off. At 11:13 a.m. oil pumps shut down and the sub loses hydraulic pressure to control surfaces. The vertical rudder jams, and the stern diving planes cannot be controlled. Captain Vanin orders the main ballast tanks blown, and *Komsomolets* rises to nearly 300 feet. Here he repeats the procedure. Somehow, by blowing extra water ballast, Vanin manages to bring the sub to the surface. As she founders, he signals an encoded SOS to his headquarters.

But surfacing has not put *Komsomolets* out of danger. By 11:21 a.m., the fire has spread through cableways to all aft compartments and has reached nearly 2,000° F. The rubber coating on the outer hull designed to muffle acoustic detection begins to slide off in strips.

Vanin orders all hands not engaged in damage control topside. Those fighting to save the ship don masks using the emergency breathing system. But with the loss of high-pressure air, fumes from Compartment 7 have brought carbon monoxide (CO), a tasteless, odorless, and toxic gas, into the system. Men get dizzy and doctor Lt. Leonid Zayats suspects something wrong. He rips off his mask and tests the air. A fatal concentration of CO is detected. Now most of the crew will fight for their ship in a swelter of smoke and foul air.

Vanin continues signaling Northern Fleet Headquarters. By 11:41 a.m. his message is received, but garbled—a Soviet submarine somewhere is in trouble, and air crews are alerted.

By noon the fire reaches forward compartments. Nothing is heard from the nine crewmen manning the reactors in Compartment 4. Yudin and another officer don self-contained breathing gear, open the hatch, and enter. Miraculously, they find two officers still alive in the smoke-filled compartment and bring them out. More rescuers try to ventilate Compartment 5 and bring out two crewmen. One survives. In Compartment 3 Seaman Roman Filippov tries to restart a diesel generator to provide ship's power. He succeeds but becomes ill and is ordered topside. Capt. Third Rank Anatoliy Ispenkov takes over and continues to man the post.

At 12:19 p.m. Vanin abandons security protocol and sends a message in the clear giving the submarine name, location, and dire circumstances. The Navy responds. Fleet Admiral Chernavin, the senior Soviet naval officer, is alerted while at a conference at the Defense Ministry. He orders his headquarters to take all steps to rescue the crew, including assistance from Norway. Fleet Headquarters finds three Soviet ships within 70 miles of *Komsomolets* and orders them to the scene. The first Red Banner Northern Fleet rescue aircraft takes off from the Kola Peninsula at 12:43 p.m. But M-12 amphibians are not dispatched, and no one alerts the Norwegians. Nonetheless, they know of the alert through intercepted communications, but delay sending help because it is unclear whether a practice rescue is under way.

At 2:20 p.m. the rescue aircraft radios Vanin and hears that the fire is not spreading. Most men assemble on the weather deck. At 2:40 p.m. the rescue aircraft breaks through the clouds and spots *Komsomolets* dead in the water. Visibility is fair, sea state moderate. The men are heartened by the sight of aircraft. Thinking that surface help will arrive soon, they do not don wet suits, although the water is cold enough at 36° F to kill them in 15 minutes. In a short time the wind begins to kick up, seas rise to 4 feet, and the men hang on to the slippery deck. For the next two hours everything seems



under control. The crew clears Compartment 5, and the ship is not taking on water. Surface rescue is expected to arrive at 6:00 p.m. Most of the crew are now on the weather decks as the smoke inside the ship is becoming intolerable. In the control room visibility is less than 6 inches. Few now remain inside. Vanin, Yudin, and Molchanov in the control room, Ispenkov manning the generator, and Warrant Officers Slyusarenko, Krasnobayev, and Chernikov remain inside to save the ship.

For more than four hours Captain Vanin has been attempting to right his ship. Upon surfacing he corrects an initial port list by counterflooding. Two hours later a starboard list develops. Vanin is handicapped by damaged equipment, hazardous conditions, and a nearly complete lack of information from his instruments.

About 4:30 p.m. Vanin orders two port ballast tanks blown to trim the sub. This does not work and serves only to accelerate taking on water. *Komsomolets'* after ballast tanks are not equipped with kingston valves that would close under water, and her pressure hull has been breached. She begins taking on water quickly astern. No damage control measures can save her now. At 4:42 p.m. Captain Vanin orders the crew to abandon ship and minutes later sends his last radio message.

At 5:00 p.m. two life rafts are inflated on the bow, and the aircraft drops a rescue pod. Men begin to enter them. The captain goes below to get the last of his crew, but now *Komsomolets* is sinking fast. The last man on the bridge shuts the hatch as water pours over the conning tower. The water would drown those still inside if he left the hatch open. *Komsomolets* is equipped with an escape capsule, and perhaps they can use it. At 5:08 p.m. *Komsomolets* begins to sink stern first. It will be an hour before surface help arrives.

The self-rescue is not going well. One life raft overturns. Men crowd aboard, but some have to cling to the sides. The second raft goes down with the sub, breaks free, but too far for the men to reach. More small rafts are dropped from the rescue aircraft, but there are not enough for the 50 men in the water. On the large raft, men's hands are getting numb. Doctor Zayats tells them to hang on by their teeth. Some succeed, but in the next hour more than half, including Babyenko and Filippov, slip away and drown.

Inside the sinking *Komsomolets* six men are still alive. Captain Vanin guides them to their last hope, the escape capsule. American submariners would not have this option. They close the hatch. Vanin counts . . . himself, Yudin, Slyusarenko, Krasnobayev, Chernikov . . . one is missing . . . Ispenkov. They hear a knocking, try to open the hatch, but it is too late. The outer compartment's walls collapse. *Komsomolets* goes down 300, 500, 1,000 feet. At 1,300 feet the scale no longer records, but the sub continues down. The men desperately try to release the capsule but without success. Another explosion rocks the ship, and suddenly the escape capsule breaks free—flying to the surface. Once there, the hatch blows off. But only Slyusarenko is able to get out, as the capsule floods in the rough seas. Vanin, Yudin, Krasnobayev, and Chernikov sink in the capsule to rejoin *Komsomolets* more than 5,000 feet below.

Shortly after 6:00 p.m. a fishing boat arrives and picks up 30 crewmen. Of the 69 crewmembers, 39 are already dead. Molchanov is recovered and feels fine, but the smoke inhaled while keeping the deck log in the control room and the water's chill have taken their toll. He and two more will soon die. Doctor Zayats and Warrant Officer Slyusarenko are among the survivors.

The Aftermath

Komsomolets did not die quietly. In the era of glasnost this incident could not be covered up, even in the Soviet media. Moreover, the Norwegians observed the rescue attempts and were worried about radioactivity released in their economic zone. Recriminations mounted. The Norwegians claimed they could have reached the scene by air or surface two hours before the submarine sank. Within a week a blow-by-blow account appeared in the widely circulated Soviet newspapers *Komsmolskaya Pravda* and *Sovietskaya Rossiya* with detailed time-events from the rescue aircraft point of view. Within a month the crew, dead and alive, was awarded the Order of the Red Banner, and more stories explained why it took so long for help to arrive. Two months after the sinking, the oceanographic rescue ship *Akademik Mstislav Keldysh* using submersibles found *Komsomolets* a mile down.

The Russian Oceanographic Fleet and the Keldysh

If effort expended at sea is any criterion, the Russians lead the world in oceanographic research. From a humble beginning of one wooden schooner in 1922, the Soviet research fleet grew to over 300, more than the rest of the world combined. At the peak of its efforts, the Institute of Oceanology of the Academy of Sciences oversaw 15 separate institutes in acoustics, geophysics, biology, and other marine-related sciences. Although most of these institute's scientific ships were involved in fishing research, at least 120 were hydrographic in nature. Some of these were subordinated to the Navy and manned by military personnel, but most had a mixture of naval and civilian mariners and technicians, and the hulls were constructed outside the USSR. With the reduction in naval units and overseas operations now being experienced by the Russian Navy, oceanographic operations at sea are also being drawn down. But impressively capable ships still operate.

One of the most capable of Russian oceanographic research ships is **Akademik Mstislav Keldysh**. *At 400 feet in length and over 5,000 tons displacement,* **Keldysh** *is the world's largest oceanographic research ship, with 18 laboratories and space for additional special-purpose rooms. A crew of 50 supports the efforts of over 80 scientists-technicians. The outstanding specialty of the* **Keldysh** *is as the mother ship of the Mir submersibles.*



The 1991 Survey

The international outcry following the sinking of *Komsomolets* forced the Soviet and its successor Russian Government to take serious steps to determine the dangers posed by the disaster. They apparently wished to avoid another Chornobyl' cover-up. The USSR Council of Ministers approved a government commission's recommendation to examine and raise the submarine a year after the sinking. They gave the lead to Igor D. Spasskiy, head of the Russian Bureau that designed *Komsomolets*. Besides surveying the ship, he wanted to determine the reason it sank and to measure any radiation hazards and propose solutions. Spasskiy devised a program comprising efforts of hydrography, fishing, and oceanography institutes with the research ship *Keldysh* as the centerpiece featuring experts in ocean sciences and nuclear reactors and weapons.

In August of 1991, *Keldysh* returned to the scene. She used towed sonar arrays, probes, trawls, and core-samplers for site measurements of the water and sea bottom in the mile-deep area of the wreck. But most of the detailed measurements were taken by her on-board submersibles *Mir 1* and *Mir 2*.

The remote TV was able to look inside the hull in some places. It appeared as if there had been an explosion in the bow section, causing concern because this compartment houses the torpedoes with their nuclear warheads and lethally poisonous plutonium. Experts preliminarily concluded that this explosion was from gas fumes in Compartment 1 and not from high explosives in the torpedoes. The following conclusions were drawn from the 1991 survey:

- Settling of the submarine between the 1989 and the 1991 surveys was not excessive.
- The inner (pressure) hull had been breached in a number of places.
- The reactor was venting somewhat, and the torpedo tube doors were open but the torpedoes appeared intact.
- Radiation leakage was minimal, but corrosion might cause future increases.
- Raising the submarine would be difficult.
- It might be possible to seal the wreck hermetically on the bottom.
- Further surveys were absolutely necessary.

The 1992 Survey

In April 1992 the Russian government approved another expedition to clarify and further delineate the damage to *Komsomolets*. Because *Keldysh* was not available during the July-August weather window, a shorter May time frame was scheduled. A total of 286 people took part, including one Norwegian and 56 Russian scientists. The expedition used many of the same devices from the year before, but added some deep-water remote viewing equipment. The *Mirs* conducted more than 75 hours of manned bottom time.

The expedition looked at the rescue chamber about a half-mile from the hull, checked out the bow of the submarine, and took extensive samples of water, bottom sediments, and organisms. Poor weather limited the time available for collection.

Damage was more extensive than noted earlier. The inner or pressure hull had been breached near the bow. It had cracks running lengthwise. The Russians acknowledged the presence of torpedoes with nuclear warheads in the bow, but they stated that tests revealed no concentrations of radiation in excess of established drinking water standards. Further, the hull did not appear to be suffering additional damage from deterioration.

The scientists concluded that the loss of hull integrity precluded raising the submarine, that the hull should be monitored periodically for leaks, and that perhaps the hull should be sealed or the torpedo compartment cut off, raised, and buried. In any case, more expeditions were needed.

Mir Submersibles

Mir-1 and Mir-2 are the most capable manned submersibles in the Russian inventory. Only the United States, France, and Japan also have craft capable of carrying special instruments and a crew of three to below 20,000 feet, allowing first-hand observation of 98 percent of the ocean floor. The Mirs were built in Finland in 1987 for the Academy of Sciences and have been engaged in oceanographic research for over six years, often with international crews.

Mirs usually operate in pairs so that one can serve as a rescue vessel for the other. Ballast is adjusted, and predive checks are conducted much like a preflight. The pilot, copilot, and scientist climb into the tight 6-and-a-half-foot-diameter sphere that can withstand pressures of 2,000 atmospheres (30,000 pounds/square inch). A Mir is lowered by crane into the water, unhitched, and towed away from Keldysh by small boat. Then it is ready to descend untethered at 80 feet a minute, or about one hour to drop a mile. It can move at 5 knots underwater and has air for 20 hours.

Mir has three lights and can record visual images with both photographic and video cameras and make numerous electronic and hydrologic recordings with other sensors. It has two arms capable of lifting 150 pounds and cans for storing tools or bottom samples. Mir has navigation, communications, and recording systems and can obtain exact position fixes from beacons set in the sea bottom.

In addition to dives on Komsomolets, international crews have conducted Mir dives in abysses off the American Pacific coast and on the Titanic wreck in the North Atlantic.

For the Komsomolets mission, the Mirs had been equipped with dosimeters and special absorbing pads for radionuclide measurements. From 23 to 31 August 1991 the Mirs made six 10- to 13-hour dives together on Komsomolets with crews of hydronauts, scientists, and navy officers. The first dive determined that radioactivity around the wreck did not pose a hazard to the surveyors. Subsequently, the crews inspected the hull and debris; took water, bottom, and biologic samples; and took photos and videotapes.

The survey determined that the reactor's hermetic seal was broken but that radiation emission was so minor that people and the environment were not endangered. Subsequent corrosion, however, might damage the organisms found around the site.

The 1993 Survey

The Russians published results of the 1991 and 1992 surveys, including their rather benign prognosis of radioactive seepage. As plans for the next mission were under way, they changed their tack, handing out increasingly dire warnings of radiation hazards from the wreck. Whether these warnings were based on more recent findings from the earlier survey or were attempts to elicit Western cooperation and funding for measurements and cleanup is not clear.

Academician Spasskiy warned the Commissioner for External Relations of the European Community in May 1993 that two years of research revealed that plutonium leakage could begin in a couple of years, could disperse a "toxic danger" quickly, and spread radioactive contamination as much as 60 miles along undersea currents, poisoning edible sea life. His warnings reached a large audience—readers of *The New York Times* Op Ed page.

Eventually Dutch, Norwegian, and American specialists joined the Russians in *Keldysh* for an extensive survey. Sensors used were even more elaborate than those in 1992 as foreign governments contributed expertise and equipment—including robots and a high resolution video camera developed by the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution and Sony.

Results of the August 1993 survey suggested that waters at the site were not mixing vertically, and thus the sea life in the area was not being rapidly contaminated. Slow currents were moving north, not toward Europe, and were remaining at the 1-mile depth. Dr. Charles Hollister, an expert on deep-sea storms from Woods Hole, doubted that the heavy plutonium, bonding with clay, would cause significant contamination, but noted further study was needed, inasmuch as underwater storms can move mud equal to the annual discharge of the Mississippi River.

Russian engineers found the escape capsule that had separated from the submarine and later sunk. They wanted to recover logs and data books inside for further research into the causes of the disaster. As they were raising the capsule, however, the cable broke, and another attempt was not made on this cruise.

The 1993 survey detected radioactive cesium 137 from the corroding reactors but determined that contamination from the reactors remained slight.

The most startling discovery of the 1993 survey was a hole over 20 feet wide blown in the forward torpedo compartment. If this hole was noted during earlier surveys, it was not reported in the open press. Current speculation is that an explosion of hydrogen from storage batteries caused the damage. The entire compartment was deformed, and at least two of the nuclear torpedoes were "mashed up" in their tubes and could not be safely recovered. Leakage of plutonium was not immediately evident but would be unlikely to spread far.

Biologic, sediment, and water samples were sent to laboratories of all cooperating countries. Preliminary results showed environmental impact to be slight and that deep currents in the area were weaker than previously believed. Spasskiy nonetheless asserts that *Komsomolets* continues to corrode and that radioactive release will increase. Damage to human health is not significant now, but monitoring will be needed to ensure that any future threat is forewarned.

In mid-September 1993, after *Keldysh* returned but too soon for extensive research on recovered samples, Tengiz Borisov, head of the Russian Special Committee for the Conduct of Underwater Work, told reporters that his committee had decided to seal the corroding torpedoes in place in summer 1994. He added, "If there is a leak, fishing will be impossible in the Norwegian Sea for between 600 and 700 years." The discrepancy between this statement and more benign findings on site was not explained.

Epilogue

Near the end of 1993, a decision was finally reached. The Russian Government's Special Committee for the Conduct of Underwater Work found that radioactive seepage was at that time insignificant but that deterioration of the torpedoes could cause serious consequences in two to three years. Therefore, it would be necessary to seal the bow of Komsomolets, *using a special compound yet to be developed, entombing it in a special sarcophagus.*

A Reuters *wire release from Moscow on 12 July 1994 stated, "Russia said yesterday it had sealed a sunken nuclear submarine off Norway to prevent radioactive leaks. The* Komsomolets . . . *is now embedded in mud in international waters."*

Komsomolets *lies broken a mile deep in a quiet part of the Norwegian Sea. Natural sediment drifts down slowly burying the wreck, its debris, and most of its crew. Few artifacts have been raised. One of them, the ship's clock, was sent to the Central Naval Museum in Leningrad. It stopped at 5:43 p.m. on 7 April 1989.*

Sources

Komsomolets' history and general description are from *Jane's Fighting Ships 1989-90*. Information on her reactors, torpedoes, operating depth, and prototype status was obtained by the author at the Center for Naval Analyses in an open conversation on 21 October 1993 with Academician Igor Spasskiy, head of the Rubin Design Bureau and designer of *Komsomolets*.

This year, an article in *Morskoy Sbornik* ("The Tragedy of a Ship and the Honor of Her Crew," by V. Krapivin, No. 4, 1994, pp. 44-56) presented for the first time in the open press the Russian Navy's version of the causes of the sinking, based on recovered logs, interviews with all survivors, and examination of the hull and debris. In answer to the many articles blaming the Navy's inadequate maintenance and damage control training for the tragedy, Krapivin, a Captain First Rank in the Navy's technical service, reconstructs the accident from beginning to end and, in the process, exonerates the crew. The day of the patrol, the depth of the submarine, the damage control stations and duties of crew members and their actions, and the technical explanation of how *Komosolets* caught fire, flooded, and foundered are drawn from this source.

The description of the sinking also is based on the following primary sources:

- An article in *Sovietskaya Rossiya* ("The Last Order," by N. Domkovskiy, 15 April 1989, p.6) gives the point of view from the rescue aircraft.

- The 13 May 1989 issue of *Krasnaya Zvezda* (pp. 1-2) lists the full names and survivor status of the crew, and it also contains an interview of Fleet Admiral V. Chernavin, who gives the view of the Main Navy Staff and provides background information on the cause of the fire.

- An article in *Sovietskaya Voin* ("At the Deserted Mooring," by N. Cherkashin, January 1990, p. 12) gives time-lines and individual activities aboard the submarine, based on logs and personal testimony.

- *The Wall Street Journal* of 14 March 1990 (p. A-1) provides the length of the patrol, the compartment layout, Norwegian reactions, and time-lines after the sinking.

A fully footnoted version of this article is available from the author on request.

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Taking stock

Fifteen DCIs' First 100 Days

CIA History Staff

Editor's Note: These brief sketches convey some sense of the pace and preoccupations of 15 Directors of Central Intelligence (DCIs) in their first 100 days. No regular cycles or predictive patterns emerge; some DCIs eased into their jobs, while others found themselves suddenly reacting to wars, scandals, or investigations. Nevertheless, DCIs Smith, McCone, Schlesinger, Colby, and Gates managed major changes in CIA's structure and mission in the 100-day span.

The History Staff in CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence originally prepared this work in January 1993 as a background paper for the new DCI, R. James Woolsey. Seven of the staff's historians, Nicholas Cullather, Gerald Haines, Scott Koch, Mary McAuliffe, Kevin Ruffner, Donald Steury, and Michael Warner, drafted the individual sketches, and the staff's chief, J. Kenneth McDonald, edited them into final form. A few changes have been made in the original version for editorial and declassification reasons. Although this is an official CIA History Staff product, the views expressed—as in all of its works—are those of the authors and editor and do not necessarily represent those of the CIA.

RAdm. Sidney Souers, US Naval Reserve

The shape of the postwar world was still uncertain when Sidney Souers on 23 January 1946 became the first DCI for the newly created Central Intelligence Group (CIG). A wealthy St. Louis businessman and Naval Reservist who had impressed Navy Secretary James Forrestal, Souers had risen to Deputy Chief of Naval Intelligence during the war. Now 53, he agreed to take on one more task before returning to civilian life and his business interests in Missouri. At the White House on 24 January, President Truman read a mock proclamation and presented Souers with a black cloak and wooden dagger as the vestments and appurtenances of his new position as "director of centralized snooping."

Souers had helped draft the directive for the new CIG, which was not intended to challenge the position of the departmental intelligence services. Directed to coordinate, plan, evaluate, and disseminate intelligence, and to provide services of common concern, CIG had no clear authority to engage in clandestine collection or covert operations.

Souers ensured that CIG would survive his brief tenure and begin to fulfill its mission of coordinating the US intelligence activities. He gathered a cadre of experienced and mostly military intelligence professionals with some difficulty, because CIG was only grudgingly staffed and funded by the Departments of State, War, and Navy. By April he had also maneuvered successfully to gain responsibility for the resources of the War Department's Strategic Services Unit, the remnants of the substantial foreign intelligence capability the Office of Strategic Services had built up during the war.

At Truman's request, CIG also collated the deluge of Army, Navy, and State Department cables, dispatches, and reports that arrived daily, and produced a comprehensive intelligence summary for the White House; the first *Daily Summary* was delivered less than four weeks after Souers became Director. He never managed to get much cooperation from State, and the military services refused even to provide CIG with information on their own capabilities and intentions. When Souers left office on 10 June 1946, CIG's professional and clerical personnel numbered about 100.

Lt. Gen. Hoyt Vandenberg, US Army

The CIG's inherent weaknesses had become glaring by the time DCI Souers began thinking about who should replace him. In Hoyt Vandenberg, the 47-year-old

nephew of powerful Republican Senator Arthur Vandenberg and General Eisenhower's intelligence chief since January, Souers saw just the man to give CIG the leadership and connections it needed. President Truman's aides persuaded Eisenhower to part with his new G-2, and Vandenberg became the second DCI on 10 June 1946.

Vandenberg had learned the value of coordinated collection and analysis as commander of the 9th Air Force in the European war. An ambitious officer who hoped to head an independent Air Force, he set aside his parochial service concerns and worked hard to give CIG greater freedom from State and the military. His first months on the job saw enormous changes in CIG. Vandenberg campaigned to double its budget and vastly expand its staff. O er the objections of the State Department and J. Edgar Hoover's FBI, he won for CIG monopolies on clandestine collection and foreign counterintelligence, as well as the right to conduct independent research and analysis.

For these new roles Vandenberg in July established the Office of Special Operations and the Office of Reports and Estimates, and in the same month took over intelligence operations in Latin America from the FBI. To manage this growing structure, he reorganized and strengthened the Office of the Director, subjecting it to military staff discipline under the supervision of the colonels he had brought along from Army G-2.

When President Truman asked CIG to assess the Soviet Union's increasingly worrisome behavior, Vandenberg oversaw the crash production of ORE-1, the predecessor of the CIA's National Intelligence Estimates. This first Estimate of 23 July 1946 predicted that Soviet foreign policy would continue to be "grasping and opportunistic," but also judged that Stalin still had neither the capabilities nor the desire for all-out war with the West.

By early September, when he won the right for CIG to have its own budget and to hire and fire its own personnel, Vandenberg had in principle recreated an intelligence organization with all the powers—except for covert action—of the wartime OSS. By then Vandenberg had also begun his campaign to place the CIG on a firmer legal footing, an aspiration fulfilled early in his successor's term.

RAdm. Roscoe Hillenkoetter, US Navy

Roscoe Hillenkoetter had gained an appreciation for intelligence and clandestine operations as naval attaché in Vichy France in 1940-41. A 1919 Naval Academy graduate, Hillenkoetter had been wounded at Pearl Harbor and had served as Admiral Nimitz's intelligence officer in the Pacific in 1942-43. Always a sailor at heart, he had commanded the USS Missouri in late 1945, and he returned to command cruisers off Korea when he left CIA in 1950. Sworn in on 1 May 1947, he had been naval attaché again in Paris when recalled to become DCI.

As a 49-year-old newly promoted rear admiral, Hillenkoetter kept a low profile in the first months of his tenure while Congress and the executive branch hammered out the National Security Act of 1947. He let his more senior predecessor, Lieutenant General Vandenberg, provide the bulk of testimony to the Congress concerning the Act's proposed reorganization of the national intelligence structure.

Hillenkoetter had plenty of foreign developments to occupy him as the Truman administration responded decisively to spreading Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, and to the threat of new Communist successes elsewhere. The Marshall Plan was announced (and denounced by Moscow and its clients), and the mood in Washington became grim as the administration imposed strict new loyalty regulations and began military and other assistance to Greece and Turkey. Hillenkoetter did not face these new Cold War challenges full force, however, until later in his tenure.

The National Security Act of 27 July 1947 created the Central Intelligence Agency along with a reorganized defense structure and a National Security Council. Truman gave Hillenkoetter a recess appointment in August 1947 as CIA succeeded CIG on 18 September, then reappointed him in November for Senate confirmation (as the new law required) in December.

Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, US Army

Intelligence failures at the beginning of the Korean war prompted President Truman to ask Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith to take over as DCI. His appointment on 7 October 1950 marked the Truman administration's acceptance of the CIA as a permanent feature of the bureaucratic landscape. As Eisenhower's chief of staff, Smith had served as general manager of the European theater in World War II and enjoyed an unmatched reputation as an administrator. He had been Truman's Ambassador in Moscow and was regarded in Washington as an insider of formidable talents.

The June 1950 attack on South Korea took the administration by surprise and raised fears of a third world war. Truman wanted a tough, effective DCI to prevent future surprises and to wage clandestine war on the Soviet Union and China. The administration and Congress agreed on a massive expansion of the national security budget that led to a threefold increase in intelligence spending. Smith, who had just turned 55, entered office determined to sweep aside bureaucratic obstacles to effective intelligence gathering and covert action.

Largely following the recommendations of an early 1949 report to the NSC by a commission chaired by Allen Dulles, Smith moved quickly to streamline procedures for gathering and disseminating intelligence. Four months after the outbreak of war, the Agency had produced no coordinated estimate of the situation in Korea. Smith created a new Office of National Estimates specifically dedicated to producing national estimates under the direction of William Langer, the Harvard historian who had led the Research and Analysis branch of OSS. Langer's Board of Estimates and its staff created procedures followed for the next two decades, and Smith also stepped up efforts to obtain current economic, psychological, and photo intelligence. By 1 December he had formed a Directorate for Administration, beginning a reorganization that divided Agency operations by function into three Directorates—Administration, Plans, and Intelligence.

The CIA's expansive covert action program remained the responsibility of Frank Wisner's quasi-independent Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) formed in 1948 at the urging of George Kennan and other State Department activists. But Smith began to bring OPC under the DCI's control. In early January 1951 he made Allen Dulles the first Deputy Director for Plans (DDP), to supervise both OPC and CIA's separate espionage organization, the Office of Special Operations (OSO). It took until January 1952 to collect all intelligence functions under a Deputy Director for Intelligence (DDI). Although Frank Wisner succeeded Dulles as DDP in August 1951, it took until August 1952 to merge OSO and OPC—each of which had its own culture, methods, and pay scales—into an effective, single directorate.

Smith is remembered as one of the CIA's most effective DCIs, a leader who defined its structure and mission. He earned his reputation in his first months in office, when, with administration support and a strong sense of wartime crisis, he created a role for the new Agency.

Allen Dulles

The Eisenhower administration entered office in 1953 determined to seize the initiative in the Cold War while keeping a lid on the federal budget. The new president's choice for DCI shared his belief that covert action could offer an inexpensive alternative to military action in the many peripheral areas threatened by Communist subversion. As the head of OSS in Switzerland, Allen Dulles had directed operations that penetrated the German Foreign Office, contacted plotters against Hitler, and arranged the surrender of German forces in Italy.

After returning to law practice in 1945, he retained an intense interest in the fledgling Agency and joined Bedell Smith in November 1950, becoming the first DDP in early 1951 and DDCI the following August. With Eisenhower's election, Allen Dulles, 59, moved into Smith's chair on 26 February 1953 as his older brother, John Foster Dulles, took over as Secretary of State. This gave the new DCI extraordinary stature in the administration, and Allen Dulles made the Agency one of Eisenhower's principal policy tools. In 1953 and 1954, the CIA used covert operations to bring to power friendly regimes in Iran and Guatemala.

In his first 100 days, Dulles cleared the way for the Agency's expanded covert action role. Eisenhower set up a special commission on international operations, which with Dulles's approval recommended a shift of resources from the type of propaganda operations that Bedell Smith had favored to more active, paramilitary operations. In August 1953 the CIA helped an Iranian Army coup overthrow premier Mohammed Mossadeq and restore the Shah.

Although Dulles enjoyed the confidence of the administration, he received less support from Congress. In mid-March 1953, Senator Joseph McCarthy summoned the new DCI to appear before the Subcommittee on Investigations to answer charges of subversion within the Agency. McCarthy's list of "subversives and other misfits" turned out to include only two Agency employees, both of whom had already been investigated and cleared. Unappeased, McCarthy raised fresh allegations every few weeks. Fearing that a prolonged investigation would damage security, Dulles appealed to Eisenhower to shelter CIA from McCarthy's hail of subpoenas. The President prevailed on the Senator to desist, and the Agency was spared the treatment that McCarthy later gave the Army.

Many regard Dulles's tenure as CIA's golden age. A protective, avuncular figure, Dulles placed his personal mark on the Agency's operations. He has been criticized, however, for advocating covert action as a simple, cheap expedient—an easy alternative for policymakers reluctant to expend lives and money for American initiatives abroad. Toward the end of his term, he had become overconfident. The hidden costs of covert operations were exposed in the Bay of Pigs debacle, and in the moral capital expended in propping up autocratic pro-American regimes in Iran and Guatemala.

John McCone

When John A. McCone became DCI on 29 November 1961, the Agency was under a cloud from the Bay of Pigs disaster the previous spring. John F. Kennedy selected McCone because he was so unlike his predecessor. In contrast to Allen Dulles, McCone, a wealthy and successful West Coast engineer and businessman, was an excellent manager. Kennedy hoped that he could use these abilities to bring the Agency under control. McCone, 59, had no background in intelligence and little interest in covert operations; this suited Kennedy, who wanted no more Bay of Pigs fiascos.

McCone immediately set to work to establish the DCI's preeminence in the Intelligence Community. To this end he pressed the White House for a Presidential letter of instruction (which he got on 16 January 1962), emphasizing the DCI's role as the President's principal foreign intelligence adviser and coordinator of the entire US intelligence effort. Although this statement gave the DCI authority to "coordinate and give guidance" to the total intelligence effort rather than to "coordinate and direct" as McCone requested, it was nevertheless the first time that any DCI had been given this authority. Throughout his tenure, McCone took a strong but uncontentious role in the Intelligence Community.

McCone also moved quickly to reorganize the Agency. Working with a small study group, McCone on 19 February 1962 created the new Directorate of Research (which a year later became the Directorate of Science and Technology). Focusing on accountability, he elevated the Comptroller's position, and later that spring moved that office as well as those of General Counsel, Legislative Counsel, and Audit Staff into the Office of the DCI. He also created the position of Executive Director. Although he originally anticipated that his DDCI (Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, US Army) would take over the day-to-day administration of the Agency, McCone's own hands-on management style prevented this.

The Cold War was especially chilly when McCone entered office, and Cuba under Fidel Castro was a thorn in President Kennedy's side. As DCI-Designate McCone was present at the November 1961 founding of Operation MONGOOSE, an interagency effort to destabilize the Castro regime initiated by the President and carried out by CIA. McCone insisted on placing MONGOOSE under a National Security Council oversight group, to prevent what he termed "reckless" activity.

As DCI and former Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, McCone from the outset took an active part in the committee of senior administration officials that prepared policy recommendations on arms control issues. He also took many informal steps to improve the quality of the intelligence product and to get policymakers to use that product, primarily by making it useful to their concerns.

VAdm. William Raborn, US Navy (Retired)

President Lyndon Johnson appointed retired VAdm. William Raborn as DCI on 12 April 1965. Quickly confirmed, Raborn was sworn in on 28 April 1965. The new DDCI was a CIA veteran, Richard Helms, who replaced Lieutenant General Carter. Agency officers regarded the new DCI warily. Although he had directed the Navy's Polaris missile program with extraordinary success, some thought that his technical expertise could not compensate for a lack of intelligence or foreign affairs experience. Others—including President Johnson—believed that Raborn's ability to win the confidence and support of Congress, amply demonstrated in the Polaris program, would make him an effective DCI. Fifty-nine when sworn in, Raborn was severely tested by military and political crises during the first 100 days of his 14-month term as DCI.

Raborn's tenure began with a crisis in the Dominican Republic, which led him to make lasting changes in the Operations Center. He designated an analyst to screen, evaluate, and pass significant items to him as they came in, and he began the policy of assigning senior officers to weekend duty in the Operations Center, whose facilities were also used to get important information to key policymakers quickly.

Raborn focused his attention on Vietnam almost as soon as the Dominican crisis was over. In February 1965, President Johnson had ordered the bombing of North Vietnam, and in March had landed US Marines to protect the American airbase at Danang. The CIA's involvement in the war was increasing, and Raborn moved decisively to centralize his sources of intelligence and analysis. In early July 1965, he created a Vietnam Task Force and used it to support the CIA representative—George Carver—on the National Planning Task Force for Vietnam and to make independent recommendations to President Johnson.

The Intelligence Community's control of the overhead reconnaissance program also preoccupied Raborn in his first 100 days, and one of his first acts was to determine the CIA's justification for maintaining an overhead reconnaissance capability. Attempts to coordinate Air Force and CIA overhead reconnaissance programs continued during his tenure and beyond, with no satisfactory resolution.

Richard Helms

On 18 June 1966, President Lyndon Johnson announced DCI William Raborn's resignation effective 30 June, and nominated Richard Helms, Raborn's DDCI, as the next Director. Quickly confirmed by the Senate, Helms took the oath of office on 30 June.

An OSS veteran and an intelligence professional with extensive experience managing clandestine collection, Helms at 53 was everything that Raborn was not. Helms had a high reputation in CIA and with Congress and the press. Skeptical of covert action, Helms had had no part in the Bay of Pigs debacle. Many in the Agency thought that Helms, rather than Admiral Raborn, should have succeeded John McCone in 1965.

Helms breezed through hearings before Senator Russell's Armed Service Committee, and his unanimous confirmation helped Russell derail an effort by Senator Eugene McCarthy to add three members of the Foreign Relations Committee to the existing CIA oversight committees. As part of the Agency's effort to foster good relations with the press, Helms wrote a letter to the St. Louis *Globe Democrat*, praising its 18 July 1966 editorial opposing the McCarthy proposal. Unfortunately, the editorial had characterized Senator William Fulbright as "crafty" in supporting McCarthy, and Helms's letter seemed to endorse that view. The Senate reacted indignantly, and a surprised Helms immediately called not only Fulbright, but Mansfield, Stennis, and other ranking senators of both parties to apologize, and he

later appeared before Fulbright's committee for further *mea culpas*. Within days the affair was forgotten, except by Helms, who took to heart Senator Sam Ervin's advice, "I hope that out of this matter will come an appreciation by the Director of CIA of the great truth that men rarely regret saying too little."

Vietnam was the dominating intelligence issue when Helms became DCI. President Johnson had already made the essential decisions about the progress of the war without consulting the CIA. The role of finished intelligence, as Helms saw it, was to inform and not second-guess current policy decisions. Helms recognized that the Agency had to remain an independent, unbiased source of information for the President, but he also knew that if he continually gave the President bad news, the Agency's analysis eventually would be ignored. To improve the CIA's ability to handle the increasing volume of intelligence on Vietnam, Helms in August 1966 appointed George Carver as Special Adviser for Vietnam Affairs (SAVA) and expanded his authority.

Helms inherited a DCI relationship with the President that was correct but cool. John McCone had left when President Johnson became indifferent, while Admiral Raborn had remained an outsider as DCI. Helms did not win Johnson's full confidence until late May 1967, when, on short notice, CIA produced a remarkably accurate estimate of the course and length of the Arab-Israeli Six-Day War in June. This dramatically enhanced the prestige of the Agency, and of its Director, who was thereafter invariably invited to Johnson's Tuesday lunch meetings with his closest advisers.

James Schlesinger

After his reelection in 1972, President Richard Nixon fired Richard Helms, who had led the CIA throughout his first term. Intent on reforming the Agency, he appointed James Schlesinger, 43, as DCI on 21 December 1972. Educated as an economist at Harvard, Schlesinger had also served as Director of Strategic Studies at the Rand Corporation in the late 1960s. As Assistant Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in 1970, Schlesinger had prepared an extensive critical study of the Intelligence Community for Nixon, which had focused on methods for improving the quality of US intelligence. At OMB, Schlesinger had gained a reputation as a budget cutter, and in 1971 President Nixon had appointed him Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.

Although his tenure as DCI was brief, Schlesinger took charge of the Agency on 2 February 1973 with a mandate for sweeping change. With Nixon's full support, he was determined to become the real head of the Intelligence Community and to clean house at CIA by eliminating deadwood and cutting costs. The Vietnam cease-fire on 27 January 1973 seemed to offer Schlesinger and the Nixon administration a unique opportunity to make over the CIA and the Intelligence Community, and in his five-month term Schlesinger undertook a series of dramatic changes.

To coordinate the activities of the departmental intelligence services and to maximize his role as DCI, Schlesinger almost immediately put a number of non-Agency personnel on the Intelligence Community Staff. Believing that the clandestine operator's day had passed, Schlesinger focused his early efforts on increasing technical collection and reducing the Directorate of Plans' personnel level. He fired or forced to resign or retire nearly 7 percent of the CIAs total staff, predominantly from the clandestine side of the house—whose name he also changed from Directorate of Plans to Directorate of Operations (DO).

Soon after Schlesinger's appointment, the Watergate scandal exposed the Agency to charges of involvement in that affair and in the earlier September 1971 burglary of the Los Angeles office of Dr. Lewis Fielding, Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist. The revelation of the Fielding break-in and CIA's role in it—providing a disguise, a camera, and recording equipment to G. Gordon Liddy, an ex-FBI agent and member of the Watergate plumbers—outraged Schlesinger. Having known nothing of the break-in, and determined not to be blindsided again, Schlesinger on 9 May 1973 ordered all employees to report any CIA activities they were aware of that might in any way appear inconsistent with CIA's charter. Later in May the Office of the Inspector General gave Schlesinger a 693-page list of "potential flap activities," which detailed Agency involvement in MHCHAOS, mail-opening programs, the Huston Plan, MKULTRA

and drug testing, and the training of local police. Other revelations included details of CIA's attempts to assassinate foreign leaders. This is the list that became known as the "family jewels."

William Colby

In an 11 May 1973 Cabinet shakeup arising out of the Watergate affair, President Nixon announced that DCI James Schlesinger was to become Secretary of Defense and that William Colby, a professional intelligence officer, would be the next DCI. Then 53, Colby was a Princeton graduate who had served in OSS and taken a law degree from Columbia. He had joined OPC in 1950 and as a career DDP officer had served tours in Italy and Saigon. He had been Chief of Station in Vietnam in 1960 and, later, as Director, Civil Operations and Rural Development Support, he had overall responsibility for village pacification, including the controversial PHOENIX program.

Colby's swearing in as DCI was delayed until 4 September, evidently because of White House preoccupation with Watergate. During the long interim between Schlesinger's departure on 2 July and Colby's swearing in, DDCI Vernon Walters, who was serving as Acting DCI, tactfully permitted Colby as Executive Director to carry forward institutional changes that Schlesinger had set in motion.

Under Presidential pressure, Colby initiated major changes in the intelligence estimates process during his first few months as DCI. On 7 September, Colby sent Nixon an ambitious set of proposed DCI objectives to improve the intelligence product. Colby's most significant innovation was to abolish the Office and Board of National Estimates and to establish the National Intelligence Officer (NIO) system under George Carver. In his first three months as DCI, Colby also established an Office of Political Research (OPR) to provide in-depth intelligence support to top-level decisionmakers, revitalized the US Intelligence Board's Watch Committee to increase its strategic warning capabilities, created "Alert Memorandums" for key policymakers, and ordered postmortems prepared on the Intelligence Community's performance in various crises.

Overseas, Colby faced a series of unexpected crises as soon as he took office. His tenure began with a major intelligence failure, when CIA and the Intelligence Community failed to warn US policymakers before the outbreak of the Yom Kippur war in October 1973. The CIA and Intelligence Community also failed to warn of the ensuing oil crisis brought on by OPEC. Once the Egyptian-Syrian attack on Israel began, however, CIA and the Intelligence Community provided valuable support to White House crisis management.

Colby's first major problem—less than a week after he became DCI—stemmed from Congressional and press allegations that CIA was deeply involved in the military coup that had just caused the overthrow and death of Chilean President Salvador Allende. Chile left a long shadow on CIA and the investigations that came later in Colby's tenure.

George Bush

Although on 2 November 1975 President Ford asked William Colby to resign, he soon had to ask him to remain temporarily until his designated successor, George Bush, could return from his Beijing post as US envoy to the People's Republic of China. Bush did not actually succeed Colby as DCI until 30 January 1976. A former Texas Republican Congressman, Chairman of the Republican National Committee before going to China, and twice an unsuccessful contender for appointment as Vice President to succeed first Agnew and then Ford, Bush at 51 was the first clearly partisan political figure to be appointed DCI.

The CIA had been buffeted about by investigations and revelations during the Colby period, and President Ford relied on Bush to keep the CIA out of the news and to improve employee morale. On 2 February 1976, Bush told employees that he wanted to work with the Agency's professionals to solve its problems. This step was intended to reassure CIA that he would work within the current system and make no radical changes without consulting the Agency's senior managers.

Much of Bush's work in the first months centered around the investigations that had started during Colby's tenure. The Church committee released its six-volume report on 23 April 1976, while the *Village Voice* had printed a leaked copy of the classified Pike committee report on 12 February 1976. Both reports' critical reviews of CIA's performance further eroded CIA morale.

On 18 February 1976, President Ford issued Executive Order No. 11905, which established policy guidelines and restrictions for individual intelligence agencies, and clarified intelligence authorities and responsibilities. The new order, a direct result of the Rockefeller Commission and Congressional investigations, was at least partly intended to forestall or preempt Congressional legislative action. Bush was given 90 days to implement the new order, which called for a major reorganization of the Intelligence Community and firmly stated that intelligence activities could not be directed against US citizens.

Recognizing that Congressional support was crucial for CIA, Bush worked closely with Congress as both the Senate and House moved to establish permanent intelligence oversight committees. He quietly installed new leadership in CIA's Directorates, implemented the new Executive Order, and began to overhaul intelligence production to give it more depth and expertise. In April he selected a CIA career professional, E. Henry Knoche, to become DDCI when General Vernon Walters retired in July.

In spite of his brief tenure—a few days short of a year—Bush is remembered as one of CIA's most popular DCIs. Taking care not to politicize the DCI's position, Bush improved employee morale, strengthened CIA's standing after a wrenching period of scandals, and successfully began CIA's post-investigation reforms.

Adm. Stansfield Turner, US Navy (Retired)

When newly elected President Carter called him to the White House in early February 1977, Adm. Stansfield Turner, then commander of NATO's Southern Flank in Naples, thought he might be offered appointment as DCI. At this suggestion his deputy observed, "Stan, the President is your classmate and friend; he wouldn't do that to you." He did, and Turner accepted, although he regretted the end of his military career. Turner, 53, was sworn in as 12th DCI on 9 March 1977. President Carter had rejected George Bush's offer to remain DCI for a few months to demonstrate that it was not a political or policy position that had to change with a new administration; Bush left CIA on 20 January. In the face of stiff Congressional opposition, however, Carter's original nominee, Theodore C. Sorenson, had with some bitterness withdrawn his name. After this setback, it was natural for Carter to look for a nonpolitical senior military officer who could be quickly confirmed for the post.

In retrospect, Turner recalls that his attitude toward CIA was strongly influenced by the experience of his first 100 days. In that period he permitted the courts to examine CIA evidence which led to the convictions of Christopher J. Boyce and Andrew Daulton Lee in the spring of 1977. This case convinced him that CIA had severe security problems in managing its contractors. Similarly, his discovery (on information from *Washington Post* reporter Bob Woodward) that former CIA officer Edmund Wilson, who worked for Libyan President Qaddafi, had contacts inside CIA raised doubts about the DO's probity and security (although Turner trusted his DDO, Bill Wells). By summer CIA had unearthed and turned over to Congress more information about CIA's massive drug testing programs of the 1950s and 1960s, which again put CIA into the headlines.

Turner's most disturbing discovery was the harsh questioning and illegal imprisonment that the Agency's Counterintelligence Staff had imposed for several years on Soviet defector Yuri Nosenko. This convinced him that CIA could be a dangerous organization if not kept closely accountable to the DCI, the President, and the Congress.

Turner soon found that he did not have a close working relationship with DDCI Knoche, whom Bush had appointed the previous year. By summer, when he asked Knoche to leave, Turner had become convinced that the Agency's culture was an obstacle to the reforms that CIA needed.

William Casey

At 67 the oldest incumbent of the office, DCI William Casey arrived at CIA with intelligence experience that dated from a distinguished OSS record in World War II to PFIAB service under President Ford. A man of powerful intellect and great energy, Casey was an unreconstructed Cold Warrior with a penchant for action and a fascination with covert operations. He had made a lot of money in tax publications and as an entrepreneur, and had served under Nixon and Ford—often amid considerable controversy—as Chairman of the SEC, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, and President of the Export-Import Bank. His principal claim to his new appointment, however, was his extraordinarily effective service as manager of Ronald Reagan's victorious 1980 campaign.

Reagan loyalists and conservatives who dominated the new administration's CIA transition team produced a report that roundly condemned both the Agency's methods and record. In its most extreme form, this report warned the future DCI against attempts to co-opt him, called for CIA's division into several new bodies, and proposed to fire everyone in CIA above the grade of GS-14 as complicit with the failed Carter-Turner policies. Although Casey may have had some sympathy with the report's rhetoric, he entirely rejected its recommendations. Casey believed in centralized intelligence and expected to preside over an intact CIA. Moreover, he recognized that in an Agency still reeling from the crises of the 1970s, the transition team's drastic measures would only destroy what morale remained. He thus persuaded Reagan to give him a free hand to revitalize both the operational and analytical sides of the agency.

In fact, Casey was highly critical of past Agency performance, whose vision of the Soviet Union in particular he felt had been far too benign. Convinced that the sources of Soviet behavior were both revolutionary and deeply rooted in the Russian psyche, Casey was determined to incorporate these factors into Agency reporting. His goal was to make Agency analysis more "policy relevant." In the long run Casey's reforms probably did significantly improve the intelligence product; he was less likely to attempt to influence the substance of analysis than to focus on what one DI manager called "tone and balance." Although this worried many analysts, their concern was tempered with the realization that the new DCI brought with him enhanced influence and prestige for the Agency.

Except for difficult and contentious confirmation hearings, none of the political crises that were to haunt Casey as DCI surfaced during the first 100 days. Yet if this period was uneventful, it did little to reassure Congress. Uncomfortable in his dealings on the Hill, Casey performed unevenly in front of Congressional committees and tended to rely on Presidential support. Three months into his tenure, however, William Casey's most memorable decisions as DCI still lay ahead.

William Webster

When William Webster took office as 14th DCI on 26 May 1987, it was evident that his predecessor's efforts to revitalize the CIA had succeeded. Webster inherited an Agency with greatly expanded covert operational capabilities and an analytical apparatus of notably enhanced prestige and credibility. It was also in trouble, beset by charges of illegal activity arising out of the Iran-Contra scandal. Moreover, Webster's DDCI, Robert Gates, whom the inexperienced DCI required for analytical support and expertise, was himself suspected of being at least implicitly involved in the Iran-Contra affair.

Webster's brief was to bring the CIA's credibility with Congress and the public to the same high level it now enjoyed in the national security community. A former Federal judge, Webster had successfully played a similar role as Director of the FBI, and his appointment promised a lower profile for the DCI in the future. His task was made easier by the Tower Commission Report which, while not uncritical of the CIA, made it clear that the Iran-Contra affair was a National Security Council initiative and that the Agency as an institution—as opposed to the actions of specific individuals—was not involved.

In his first 100 days, Webster worked hard to emphasize CIA's accountability before the public and the Congress. Where Casey had looked for a free hand in his management of the Agency, Webster pursued a policy

that clearly recognized the CIA's subordination to national policy. Apart from strengthening ties to Congress, Webster tightened up the internal review process, defining rigorous standards by which covert action would be judged for competence, practicality, and consistency with American foreign policy and values.

Webster's tenure began in a period of great uncertainty in establishing overall intelligence objectives. By 1987 it was clear that the decline of the Soviet Union as a world power was irreversible, and its continuation as a single entity was beginning to come into question. The twin problems of terrorism and international drug enforcement already posed problems that transcended the normal lines of Intelligence Community organization. Moreover, in Webster's first 100 days the Iran-Iraq war demanded an intelligence collection and evaluation effort that drew expertise from virtually every office in the Directorates of Intelligence and Operations.

These three sets of intelligence problems—the USSR, terrorism and counternarcotics, and the Iran-Iraq war—provided models for the interdisciplinary task forces or centers that were to proliferate under Webster and, later, Gates. At the same time, the advent of a new era of arms control raised questions of treaty verification that had not been dealt with seriously for nearly a decade.

Webster's first 100 days set the tenor of the remainder of his term as DCI. Navigating cautiously in a complex world dominated by long-service professionals, his style of management was detached and his role in government a conciliatory one.

Robert Gates

Robert Gates, the first DCI from CIA's Directorate of Intelligence, entered office on 6 November 1991 at age 48 with the future of the Agency and his own professional integrity in question. Both factors helped account for the intensity with which he approached his first 100 days as DCI.

The failed coup of August 1991 had led to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the breakup of the Soviet empire, and the end of the Cold War. With the sudden demise of the CIA's chief target, the Agency unexpectedly found itself searching for a new role. This urgent situation was exacerbated by the rocky state of the US economy, which produced growing demands to reduce the burden of military and intelligence establishments.

Following Casey's resignation in 1987, President Reagan had nominated Gates as DCI, but questions about his role as Casey's DDCI in the Iran-Contra affair forced Gates to withdraw his nomination. Four years later, President Bush again nominated Gates, to succeed William Webster. This time, Gates faced charges that he had politicized intelligence estimates to conform more closely to his own world views and to those of the Republican President he had served. After committing himself to unbiased and objective intelligence analysis, and to a more forward-looking and open CIA, Gates received the Senate's confirmation. Now, he had to live up to his promises.

Gates recognized the diverse new problems that the Intelligence Community had to address, from foreign technology development and high-technology transfers to world environmental concerns. Keenly aware that US security objectives had changed dramatically, he knew that the CIA needed to prove itself to an American public that now questioned both its necessity and its highly secretive culture. Thus, in his first 100 days as DCI, he quickly assessed future intelligence priorities and needs, identified available resources, and recommended organizational changes as well as new budget and legislative proposals.

To improve performance he established a multitude of Intelligence Community and CIA task forces. These included interagency task forces on imagery, human intelligence collection, and National Intelligence Estimates, as well as on coordination of various activities within the Intelligence Community and the restructuring of its staff. Gates set up CIA task forces to expand human intelligence capabilities, improve support for military operations, provide near-real-time intelligence to senior policymakers, and raise the quality of intelligence publications. He also announced CIA task forces to improve internal communication, increase openness, and address concerns about real or perceived politicized intelligence.

By February 1992, Gates had already made many restructuring changes aimed at carrying out his task forces' recommendations, as in replacing the Office of Soviet Analysis with a new Office of Slavic and Eurasian Analysis. With an eye toward better relations with Congress and the American people, he announced a precedent-breaking openness policy for CIA, which provided more accessibility to the media and public, increased contacts with academia, and a markedly more liberal declassification standard for CIA records of historical significance.

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Intelligence support

Truman and Eisenhower: Launching the Process

John Helgerson

Editor's Note: This article is drawn from the draft of an historical study prepared by the author entitled Getting To Know the President: CIA Briefings of Presidential Candidates From 1952 to 1992.

On 22 November 1952 the newspapers reported that President Harry Truman, shortly after noon the previous day, had stolen away from the White House to give an "impromptu" speech at the Central Intelligence Agency. Truman had come to CIA at the invitation of the fourth Director of Central Intelligence, Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, to address a training course of government officials. In that speech—delivered on a Friday afternoon almost two weeks after the national election—Truman revealed a great deal about his motives in founding the CIA and his aims in having the Agency provide intelligence briefings to the new President-elect, Gen. Dwight Eisenhower.

The President reminisced with his audience about how there had been no CIA when he had succeeded to the presidency in 1945. At that time, by many accounts, he had been surprised to discover how much information relating to intelligence and national security matters had been withheld from him. The most dramatic evidence of how ill-informed he was came on his 12th day in office when Secretary of War Henry Stimson briefed him for the first time on the Manhattan (atomic bomb) Project, about which Truman had heard only hints while serving as Vice President and on key Senate committees.[1]

Truman also recalled how difficult it had been for him to obtain information from the various government departments, each of which seemed "walled off" from the others. On various occasions Truman had lamented to Smith that he "used to do all this myself." The President noted that this situation had been corrected over the intervening years, saying that the CIA's global intelligence operations and procedures for forwarding information had made it possible to "keep the President informed better than ever before." In a rather backhanded compliment, Truman said he believed that "we have an intelligence information service now that I think is not inferior to any in the world."[2]

Truman was responsible for the very existence of that intelligence service. Within a year of his becoming President, in January 1946, he formed the Central Intelligence Group (CIG). In the President's mind, its key responsibility was to ensure that he personally received intelligence reports on a timely basis. On 15 February the CIG launched the *Daily Summary*, and in June a counterpart *Weekly Summary* was produced for the first time. Both of these publications were sent to the White House for the President. Both the daily and weekly publications continued to be published after the CIG became the CIA in September 1947.

There was much bureaucratic wrangling throughout the early years of the CIG and the CIA about their proper role in the production of current intelligence. Almost all key players involved with intelligence in the military services, the War (later Defense) Department, and the State Department had serious reservations about the new intelligence agency duplicating their work in current intelligence. The President was virtually alone in expecting to receive a daily current intelligence product, whatever the formal charters of the CIG and CIA might say. Needless to say, his expectations carried the day.

To consolidate the production of current intelligence, CIA in January 1951 formed the Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), which existed until the late 1970s, when its functions were assumed by other offices. Shortly after the establishment of OCI, the previous daily and weekly publications were discontinued, and two new publications were inaugurated. The daily publication

became the *Current Intelligence Bulletin*, first issued on 28 February; in August a companion weekly publication, the *Current Intelligence Weekly Review*, was begun. A more sensitive version of the weekly publication that contained material from communications intercepts was called the *Situation Summary*. It focused on developments in Korea.

Managers of OCI felt their early efforts had been rewarded when Truman, vacationing in Key West, Florida, wrote of the new publication, "Dear Bedel [sic], I have been reading the intelligence bulletin and I am highly impressed with it. I believe you have hit the jackpot with this one. Sincerely, Harry Truman."[3] The *Current Intelligence Bulletin* continued largely unchanged for the next 25 years.

While Truman received, read, and expressed his appreciation for the Agency's daily and weekly publications, it had become clear over the years that he especially valued the oral briefings delivered by the directors of CIA. The President experimented with various procedures for these briefings, and in the early years there were periods when he received them on a daily basis. What finally proved most satisfactory, however, were weekly worldwide intelligence updates.

The weekly briefings worked best during the extended period when "Beedle" Smith served as DCI. Smith briefed Truman each Friday, accompanied at the White House by a CIA officer, Meredith Davidson. Davidson would assist the Director in the preparation of his material (a notebook was left behind with the President each week), but he did not normally go into the Oval Office. The briefing was based primarily on the *Situation Summary*, which was prepared with the President's needs in mind. Davidson's reward was to join the DCI and the President's Special Consultant for National Security Affairs, Sidney Souers (who had served as the first DCI for a five-month period in 1946), for coffee and a postmortem on the President's reactions and followup requests.[4]

Mindful of how useful the weekly briefings were to him, Truman determined that intelligence information should be provided to the candidates in the 1952 election as soon as they were selected. In the summer of 1952 the President raised this idea with Smith. He indicated he wanted the Agency to brief General Eisenhower and Governor Adlai Stevenson, remarking at the time, "There were so many things I did not know when I became President." Smith suggested to Truman that Davidson might be the proper individual to brief both Eisenhower and Stevenson to ensure they were receiving the same information.

Later, during his speech at the Agency on 21 November, Truman explained his rationale in providing briefings to the President-elect. He observed that the office of the President of the United States "now carries power beyond parallel in history," adding "that is the principal reason why I am so anxious that it be a continuing proposition and that the successor to me and the successor to him can carry on as if no election had ever taken place. I am giving this president—this new president—more information than any other president had when he went into office."

Referring to a widely publicized meeting he had held with Eisenhower at the White House to discuss foreign policy issues earlier that same week, Truman said, "It was my privilege a few days ago (18 November) to brief the General who is going to take over the office on the 20th of January." Truman did not mention in his address that on that occasion he had given Eisenhower a comprehensive *National Intelligence Digest* prepared by the CIA. Keyed to an NSC policy outline, the *Digest* summarized, in Smith's words, "the most important national intelligence on a worldwide basis."[5]

Eisenhower wrote in his memoirs more than a decade later that his meeting with Truman "added little to my knowledge." He recalled that Truman "received me cordially; however . . . the conversations . . . were necessarily general and official in nature. So far as defense affairs were concerned, under the instructions of the President, I had been briefed periodically by Gen. Walter Bedell Smith and his assistants in the Central Intelligence Agency on developments in the Korean War and on national security."[6] According to Davidson, Truman told Smith he "had kept it general on purpose, for political reasons."

Strained Relations Complicate the Arrangements

In his remarks at the Agency, Truman could not bring himself to be completely deferential to his successor. In a mild dig, he observed that Eisenhower had been "rather appalled at all that the President needs to know in order to reach decisions." In private, the President was bitingly critical of his elected successor. The press, for its part, was reporting that the meeting of the two men at the White House had been "coolly formal." *The New York Times*, for example, noted "there was some evidence of tension between Mr. Truman and his successor," observing also that "the President-elect looked serious and was somewhat brusque when he left the President's office."[7]

While Truman's motives appear to have been straightforward in providing information to enable Eisenhower to assume the presidency fully informed, the implementation of his intentions left something to be desired and prompted suspicions on the part of Eisenhower and his staff. Indeed, tensions between the two came close to undermining the planned briefing process and with it the Agency's access to the President-elect during the important transition period. Ironically, the ultimate result was to elicit from Eisenhower a statement making clear he saw the CIA as a relatively apolitical provider of information. In the end he was willing to hear from the CIA things he was unwilling to hear from others.

A difficult private exchange between the President and his eventual successor had begun shortly after the Republican convention, when Truman sent telegrams to Eisenhower and Stevenson inviting them to lunch with his Cabinet on Tuesday, 19 August. Truman proposed that he ask Smith and other CIA officers to brief "on the foreign situation" and have the White House staff report on other issues as well. In his telegram, Truman also extended an offer of weekly intelligence briefings for both candidates.[8]

Eisenhower declined the invitation. In reply, he told Truman he thought he should receive "only those communications from the outgoing Administration that could be known to all the American people." Eisenhower added that, "The problems which you suggest for discussion are those with which I have lived for many years." The General concluded with a paragraph indicating he would welcome weekly reports from the CIA, but he wanted it understood that his possession of those reports "would not limit his freedom to discuss or analyze foreign programs as he wanted."[9]

The White House, obviously irritated that Eisenhower had declined Truman's personal invitation, released the texts of the telegrams from both men. What was not released to the public nor, so far as I can tell, known to senior CIA managers at the time was a very direct note that Truman had written by hand and sent to Eisenhower at his campaign headquarters in Denver on 16 August. In that note Truman indicated he was sorry if he had caused Eisenhower embarrassment with the luncheon invitation, but he underscored that his intention was to provide information that would permit a continuous, uninterrupted foreign policy despite the change of administrations.

In language only Truman would use, he wrote, "Partisan politics should stop at the boundaries of the United States. I am extremely sorry that you have allowed a bunch of screwballs to come between us." Truman added, "You have made a bad mistake, and I'm hoping it won't injure this great Republic. There has never been one like it and I want to see it continues regardless of the man who occupies the most important position in the history of the world. May God guide you and give you light."[10]

After reading Truman's note, Eisenhower obviously decided there was no point in responding in kind and sent back to Truman, on 19 August, a relatively conciliatory reply, also handwritten. Eisenhower reiterated the thought that, for political reasons and in the absence of any national emergency, he should not meet with the outgoing President and Cabinet and thus had declined the invitation. He repeated his appreciation for the offer to send him weekly CIA reports, opined that those would be sufficient to keep him up to date on developments abroad, and assured Truman of his support for a bipartisan foreign policy.[11]

Although Eisenhower had taken a relatively moderate tone in his reply to Truman's outburst, he clearly was bothered by the overall exchange and indicated as

much in separate correspondence with Smith. The General felt free to be open with Smith; they had worked closely together for many years during the war in Europe when Smith served for an extended period as his chief of staff.

Following Eisenhower's nomination, Smith had sent a note of congratulations that Eisenhower had not acknowledged before the exchange with Truman over the briefings in mid-August. In a letter stamped "Personal and Confidential" and dated 14 August, Eisenhower thanked Smith for his note of congratulations the previous month, but then launched immediately into some observations on his exchange with Truman. "The past two days my whole headquarters has been in a little bit of a steaming stew over an incident in which, according to the papers, you were at least briefly involved. It was the meeting that Governor Stevenson had with the President and the Cabinet. According to the reports reaching here, you were brought in to help brief the Governor on the world situation."[12] Eisenhower expressed his understanding that the briefing of Stevenson had taken only a very few minutes but underscored that, "To the political mind it looked like the outgoing Administration was canvassing all its resources in order to support Stevenson's election." The General went on to stress the importance of doing what is right, recalling the challenges he and Smith had faced together in Europe during the war.

The lecture from Eisenhower caused great pain to his longtime friend and admirer (one former Agency officer recalls that "it upset the hell out of Beedle"). Nevertheless, in a reply to Eisenhower dated 18 August, Smith made no mention of the critical note. Rather, he offered in rather formal language the briefings that Smith had discussed with the President and which the President in turn had offered to Eisenhower. Smith proposed that he provide Eisenhower information on the world situation like that the President received each Friday morning, and that this information should be delivered by an officer of the CIA. Smith's letter was delivered to Eisenhower in Denver.[13] Fortunately for the Agency, in light of the tension that had developed, Eisenhower accepted the invitation to receive CIA briefings.

Eisenhower's "turning over of command" ceremony had been held at SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) in Paris on 30 May 1952. The following day the General, Mrs. Eisenhower, and Eisenhower's personal staff departed for Washington. Although he had been on leave without pay from his post as President of Columbia University since early 1951, Eisenhower had continued to use the University home at 60 Morningside Drive in Manhattan when he was in the city. This residence became his headquarters for the next several months, and it was here that the first briefing by the CIA occurred.

Pre-Election Briefings

The first briefing was given on Saturday morning, 30 August, by Melvin Hendrickson, then head of the military branch in OCI's "Indications Staff." Like many Agency officers at the time, Hendrickson had several years of Army experience; his last post had been assistant military attaché in Oslo.[14] With military precision, Eisenhower entered the library of his residence exactly at 7:45 to receive Hendrickson and an accompanying security officer, the two being introduced as "the gentlemen from CIA." Eisenhower suggested that they move to an adjoining smaller room.

The General took about 20 minutes to read carefully through the briefing material but paid scant attention to the information on the disposition of Soviet and satellite armed forces after confirming with Hendrickson that there had been no significant changes in their deployment since his briefings by the US Army in Europe some months earlier. There was more extended discussion of the situation in Iran, of France's growing difficulties in North Africa, and regarding trade between Japan and China. The latter subject was discussed in the context of the war in Korea and the ongoing armistice talks. Eisenhower commented specifically, "Since trade is one of our most powerful weapons, it seems to me that we should employ it to its maximum. Where are the Japanese going to get their materials if

they can't get them from China?" Concerning the North African situation, the General's bottom line was a cryptic "If the French don't do something fairly soon, they will have another Indo-China on their hands." At the conclusion of this first substantive discussion, Eisenhower indicated that he would like to receive future similar briefings.[15]

During the remaining weeks before the election on 4 November, Eisenhower received three additional briefings from CIA. The second in the series took place on 25 September, when the General was in the midst of an extended whistle-stop campaign tour. He had flown from New York to Moline, Illinois, and from there had traveled virtually nonstop through numerous small towns in Illinois, Iowa, Nebraska, Missouri, West Virginia, and finally Maryland. CIA's Hendrickson boarded the train in Silver Spring, Maryland, and briefed Eisenhower during the short trip into Baltimore.

During a subsequent period of almost nonstop campaigning, Eisenhower blocked out two weekends for rest. One was when the Eisenhowers were staying at the Brown Palace Hotel in Denver, Mrs. Eisenhower's hometown. Hendrickson provided the third pre-election briefing at the couple's Brown Palace suite on 11 October, again a Saturday morning. On this occasion Eisenhower, in turn, provided Hendrickson one of the more unusual experiences intelligence officers have had. Hendrickson recalls being invited to join the General and Mrs. Eisenhower at a rodeo in Denver that weekend. The Eisenhowers were driven around the rodeo grounds in a stagecoach. Hendrickson rode shotgun, up top with the driver.

The fourth and final pre-election briefing was on 25 October, 10 days before the vote. Eisenhower had been campaigning in Detroit and had taken an overnight train to New York. This time Hendrickson boarded the campaign train in the early morning at Harmon Station, New York, and briefed Eisenhower as they traveled to Grand Central in New York City

During each of the briefings during the pre-election period, Eisenhower spent 15 to 20 minutes studying the written material and, typically, another 10 to 15 minutes discussing that material and other items on his mind. He asked few specific factual questions but did make comments on a wide spectrum of issues, primarily the Soviet, Korean, and Iranian situations, which were at the forefront of US Government attention in 1952. Eisenhower also read carefully and commented on Agency materials relating to security arrangements for the prospective Middle East command then under consideration.[16]

The package of written briefing materials presented to Eisenhower (and Stevenson) at each meeting typically included 20 or more short items—one or two paragraphs in length—summarizing the current situation in a specific country of interest. Events in the USSR, Iran, Korea, Egypt, Yugoslavia, and Japan were included in almost all sessions, but in the course of the briefings more than 50 countries were addressed. In addition, there was normally one longer article on a priority country, Iran being the most common. Each package also contained the "Conclusions" of one or two recently published National Intelligence Estimates. The latter typically assessed the prospects for Communist expansionism in different regions of the world.

The General, while a candidate, was appreciative of the pre-election briefings, commenting that they had been very helpful. At the conclusion of the fourth session, however, he added—clearly referring to the Soviet Union and Korea—that he "missed the G-3 information," (military operations) which he observed "was essential for a complete understanding of those situations." Eisenhower also commented that "if he got the job, some other arrangement would have to be made for the briefings." He mentioned specifically securing clearances for some of his staff so that they, too, could benefit from the information being provided.

In an intriguing parting comment, Eisenhower mentioned to Hendrickson, "When you get back to Bedell Smith, tell him if I get elected I've got a job for him." Decades after the fact, it has proved impossible to establish whether this comment was passed to the DCI personally. In an interesting coincidence of timing, however, Smith, less than a week later on 1 November, forwarded to President Truman a written request to resign his post as DCI and to retire from active military service.[17]

Support to the President-elect[18]

One day after he was elected President, Eisenhower on 5 November 1952 traveled to Augusta, Georgia, for two weeks' vacation. When the CIA briefings resumed late in the month, the most significant thing that had changed was that they were no longer given by Hendrickson but by Smith, accompanied by Davidson. The first session following the election was held on 21 November, this time again on the train as the President-elect traveled from New York to Washington for a reunion dinner of his US Military Academy classmates at the Army-Navy Club. The President-elect's train stopped at Baltimore to permit Smith and Davidson to board in order to talk with the President-elect on the remaining leg into Washington.

By coincidence, Davidson, while still working in Army Intelligence, had briefed Eisenhower on a couple of occasions at the Pentagon just after the war. To Davidson's astonishment, when he was escorted into the President-elect's car, Eisenhower immediately brightened as he recognized him and extended a warm greeting. In a jocular exchange, Davidson explained that he had not served in Europe as Eisenhower had, rather he "had been fighting the big war in the Pacific."

Smith cautioned Eisenhower that "you had better watch out, he has been briefing the opposition," referring to Davidson's sessions with Stevenson in Springfield, Illinois. This joking remark caused Eisenhower to turn deadly serious. Davidson was impressed that Eisenhower wanted to hear no jokes about Stevenson and was very positive about the Agency's briefings of the Governor. Eisenhower observed that he thought very highly of Stevenson because he had kept the campaign on a high plane and demonstrated mastery of foreign affairs.

The relaxed social exchange with the Eisenhowers (both General and Mrs. Eisenhower were in dressing gowns) continued almost until the train had completed its late evening run to Washington. The substantive part of the briefing, therefore, continued while they were parked at Union Station. Subjects of particular interest again included events in Korea and the negotiations under way to bring the conflict to an end. But Smith also provided an overview of the general world situation.

Because the DCI himself was now conducting the briefings, and because of the pre-existing relationship between Eisenhower and Smith, the session involved substantially more give and take than had been the case prior to the election. A more serious analysis of the issues was also to be expected because Eisenhower, like all presidents-elect, realized he would have to grapple with the world's problems within a matter of weeks. Eisenhower asked a number of questions, particularly about the political aspects of the Korean quagmire. He especially wanted to clarify in his own mind what China was up to and to understand better that country's role and motivations in the conflict. Eisenhower asked, for example, "I never did know why we let the Chinese call themselves volunteers?" In reply, Smith explained the nuances of the situation, concluding by saying, "We didn't have to bomb Peking—that's why we acquieced."

Well after midnight, Smith and Davidson took their leave of the President-elect at Union Station. General and Mrs. Eisenhower spent the night in their Pullman car on the train. Mrs. Eisenhower had been an active participant throughout the discussions. Davidson recalls that "she gave me the impression of being much more political than Ike."

In Eisenhower's memoirs he recalls that "In a Detroit speech on October 24, I announced my intention, if elected, to go to Korea before the following January and to determine for myself what the conditions were in that unhappy country." For some days Eisenhower and his closest advisers had been discussing the wisdom of making this dramatic proposal public.[19] Once it was announced, the idea was very well received and, in fact, has been cited by many observers as having clinched the Eisenhower victory in the vote 10 days later.

After the election, while preparing to travel to Korea, Eisenhower telephoned Smith to inform him that he was not comfortable relying exclusively on US Army information regarding what was going on in Korea. He asked the DCI to New York to give him the Agency's independent assessment. The President-elect called at virtually the last moment and emphasized that their visit should be given no publicity.

In keeping with their interpretation of Eisenhower's instructions, Army security officers took Smith and Davidson to the briefing location in New York via a circuitous route. The two were led in the front door of a drugstore and out the back, for example, in a counterintelligence maneuver that served only to enrage the always-impatient Smith. Ironically, they reached Eisenhower's office in the Commodore Hotel for an afternoon appointment that had been wedged into a day filled with a dozen other well-publicized visitors. Smith and Davidson were waiting in an outer office as a luncheon group hosted by Eisenhower broke up. Smith was surprised to see Gen. William Donovan, the founder of the Office of Strategic Services, among those leaving the General's office.

Because the President-elect had requested Smith's frank and personal assessment of the situation in Korea, the two generals were alone for most of the briefing session. Near the end of the session, Davidson was called in to answer two or three factual questions. Eisenhower departed secretly for Korea early the following day, 29 November.

Smith took very seriously his responsibility to provide an independent assessment. He had insisted that his CIA staff derive facts about military developments from the US Army and Navy but jealously guarded his prerogatives as DCI to make assessments and estimates based on those facts. By chance, Smith and Davidson ran into John Foster Dulles in the lobby of the Waldorf Astoria Hotel shortly after they had seen Eisenhower at the Commodore. Dulles elicited confirmation that they had seen Eisenhower and asked what they told him. Smith responded with a curt, "That's between him and me."

The late-November visit to the President-elect's office also created a bit of momentary tension with the Secret Service. Smith was sometimes reluctant to have a protective officer from the Agency's Office of Security accompany him, and would override vigorous recommendations to the contrary by CIA's Director of Security, Sheffield Edwards. In this case, the DCI adamantly opposed having additional people accompany him to New York, given the ground rules Eisenhower had set regarding secrecy. Edwards earlier had approached Davidson, insisting that he become weapons-qualified so he could protect the DCI. On the train from Washington to New York, the DCI learned that Davidson was carrying a weapon and challenged, "Edwards got to you, didn't he?" The DCI's reaction was mild, however, compared with that of the Secret Service, which discovered that Davidson was carrying a weapon during incidental conversation in the President-elect's outer office.

The private meeting between Eisenhower and Smith on 28 November went on for more than an hour and allowed the two to conduct some intelligence business beyond their discussion of Korea. During that session, Smith secured Eisenhower's approval of a proposal that CIA should establish a briefing facility in New York City to provide continuous support to Eisenhower and his staff. The facility was subsequently set up but turned out not to be in an office as close to Eisenhower's as Smith would have liked. Agency officers recall that Sherman Adams, who was to become Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, intervened to ensure that the CIA office was "a broom closet some distance from the President's office." Adams obviously did not want Smith to have the same access to the new president that he enjoyed with Truman.

The Agency maintained its office in the Commodore from 28 November through the end of the transition period in January. A CIA briefing officer representing the DCI was present at all times. For most of the period the officer was Ed Beatty, a former newsman who was editor of CIA's *Current Intelligence Bulletin*. Each day a courier from Washington would bring to the New York office the latest current intelligence products for use by the President-elect and his staff. Eisenhower's staff did utilize this facility, and Adams himself came by seeking information on at least one occasion. Eisenhower, however, relied exclusively on the briefings provided by the DCI.

During the transition period in late 1952, the press occasionally wrote of the DCI's "weekly" briefings of the President-elect. But in fact the General's schedule did not permit briefings on any regular schedule. His trip to Korea and the Pacific took more than two weeks, with the result that the next CIA briefing did not occur until 19 December. Eisenhower was accompanied at that meeting by Adams, and Smith by Deputy Director for Intelligence (DDI) Robert Amory. Specifically labeled

"off the record" on Eisenhower's calendar, it was a session Smith would rather not have attended. He entered Eisenhower's office in high spirits but came out crushed. Sitting in morose silence all the way back to Washington, he finally muttered, "And I thought that it was going to be great." Smith never explained what had happened.

He had offered his resignation in writing to President Truman some six weeks before, obviously hoping for a challenging appointment from his old friend and colleague. It was widely known at the time that Smith aspired, perhaps unrealistically, to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Agency historians have surmised that Eisenhower informed Smith he would not be appointed Chairman of the Joint Staff, asking him instead to serve as Under Secretary of State.

Smith did, in fact, serve in the number-two job at the Department of State during the first year and a half of Eisenhower's first term. But it was no secret that he did not enjoy being the Under Secretary. He felt uncomfortable with the nonmilitary way the Department functioned, did not like John Foster Dulles, and was uneasy about Allen Dulles's appointment as DCI.

The last occasion on which Smith is known to have met with Eisenhower while serving as DCI was on 14 January 1953 in New York City. There, Smith joined John Foster Dulles and other Eisenhower advisers and appointees for an extended foreign policy conference with the President-elect. Less than a week later, on 20 January, Eisenhower was inaugurated.

The New President as Intelligence Consumer

To no one's surprise, Eisenhower's preferences on how he should receive intelligence support did not change once he became President. CIA histories indicate that the day after his inauguration in 1953 the Agency's Director of Current Intelligence, Huntington Sheldon, sent to James Lay, Jr., the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, a list of publications the Agency could furnish the White House. It quickly became apparent, however, that the President did not want to receive written intelligence materials on a regular basis and had no interest in frequent briefings by CIA experts. As had been his preference during the transition period, the President relied instead on periodic high-level briefings.

The practice that developed and continued throughout the eight years of the Eisenhower presidency involved DCI Allen Dulles providing weekly briefings to the National Security Council. Eisenhower chaired these NSC meetings, and under his leadership they were more regular and more formal than under any President before or since. He told President-elect Kennedy in 1960 that the NSC "had become the most important weekly meeting of the government."[20]

The NSC met every Thursday morning at 9:00 a.m. and, with rare exceptions, opened its meetings with an intelligence briefing by the DCI. The briefing addressed subjects mutually agreed with Lay of the NSC Staff, representing the interests of the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Gen. Robert Cutler. If the President, Cutler, or Lay did not have specific subjects they wanted addressed, CIA was free to propose its own agenda, although the Agency's ideas were always vetted with Lay before the briefing.

Agency veterans remember a wide variety of subjects being addressed at the NSC meetings, reflecting the President's broad interests. He was intrigued with matters ranging from Italian elections to the battle of Dien Bien Phu to updates on Agency covert action operations. Eisenhower would interrupt periodically with questions and, within limits, permit questions from others as well. When his patience ran out, however, he was not at all reluctant to cut off discussion, saying "OK, Allen, let's go ahead."

According to General Andrew Goodpaster, who served as Secretary of the White House Staff, Eisenhower expected Dulles to provide the latest intelligence on the crisis of the moment but, more important, to concentrate primarily on providing the intelligence background to whatever larger or longer term planning issue was on the agenda. Because of this long-term focus, most of the briefing materials used by the DCI were prepared by CIA's Office of National Estimates. Goodpaster recalls that Eisenhower frequently would ask, "How solid is that information—where does it come from?"

Dulles was reluctant to answer "with fourteen people in the room." Eisenhower, Dulles, and one staff aide (sometimes Goodpaster and sometimes Senior Staff Assistant Gordon Gray) would then hold a smaller, follow-on meeting after the regular NSC to answer the President's more probing questions.[21]

The briefing process during the 1950s had several important advantages from the Agency's point of view. Among these was the fact that the DCI was able to provide intelligence on important matters on a predictable schedule in a forum that included not only the President, but also the Chairman of the Joint Staff, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and other key players in the foreign policy decision making process. The single most important advantage of the system, however, was that it was unambiguously obvious each week whether the President was interested in, and well served by, the intelligence he was receiving. With this feedback, CIA was able to be responsive to his needs and those of the NSC. Senior Agency officers believed the system worked well. Sheldon summed it up by saying, "The Director got used to the procedure and was happy with it, and everybody was happy with it; it simply remained that way until the next administration."

The vast majority of the briefings of the NSC were provided by the DCI himself. It was clear to all involved, however, that Dulles was much more comfortable with political and economic subjects than with scientific and military issues. Quite often the Director would permit a specialist to brief on such subjects, always designating personally the individual he wanted to do the job. Herbert Scoville, Jr., the Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence, gave many of the briefings on scientific subjects, and the Agency's nuclear specialist, Herbert Miller, distinguished himself with briefings in that specialized field. Amory from time to time would brief on military matters.

White House records make clear that attendees at the NSC meetings noticed the difference between briefings delivered by the DCI and those delivered by the substantive experts. Gray addressed this subject in a meeting on 11 January 1961, when he discussed transition matters with McGeorge Bundy, representative of President-elect John Kennedy. Responding to questions by Bundy about whether the President should have daily briefings and, if so, who should deliver them, Gray wrote in his memorandum for the record, "I had made a note several months ago to discuss with my successor intelligence briefings in the Council. I believe that these should be crisper and should be conducted by more junior officers with a special briefing competence . . . I acknowledged to Mr. Bundy that this would cause serious personal problems and I was not sure I would advise him to tackle it. It was simply a question I left with him." In that same conversation, however, Gray asserted that the practice of having the DCI brief the Council every week was "a very useful device."[22]

Goodpaster recalls that "Eisenhower had a lot of respect for Allen Dulles growing out of Dulles's work during the war. The President thought he was very skilled at top-level intelligence—collecting it and analyzing it." Eisenhower would read enough of the Intelligence Community's estimates to get the point and the highlights and, according to Goodpaster, "felt the formal estimates and papers were the genuine view," meaning they were not politicized.

But there were some problems. Eisenhower had been struck, for example, at how the "bomber gap" of the mid-1950s turned out to be a false alarm. When the Intelligence Community and the US military began writing of the Soviets' great progress in missile production during the late 1950s, "Eisenhower was more than skeptical; he was unconvinced, challenging repeatedly, 'What do they base this on?'"

According to Goodpaster, Eisenhower believed there were at least two reasons why the bomber and missile issues turned into serious political problems. One difficulty was that there was a lot of contact between elements of the Intelligence Community, particularly the Air Force, and the Hill, in which Congress "heard this continual drumbeat about how we were falling behind." The other problem, in Eisenhower's view, was that "there was a lot of self-interest in the intelligence assessments of the military services—they were out to promote their own programs."

Throughout his presidency, Eisenhower avoided reading daily intelligence reports from any one agency. In fact, he normally read no daily reports. Instead, Good-

pastor, with the help of the President's son, Lt. Col. John Eisenhower, each morning would review the separate reports from CIA, State, Defense, and the Joint Chiefs. They would meld this material into one early morning oral briefing. In those sessions, Eisenhower occasionally would ask to see a specific raw report or analytic paper, or task additional work.

Agency veterans recall that Sheldon and DDI Loftus Becker in early March 1953 did discuss the idea of producing a brief, all-source, daily current intelligence publication exclusively for the President. As the Agency came to understand Eisenhower's preferences, however, this idea was never followed up. In the event, no such publication was actually produced until the Kennedy administration. One innovation that was begun in the early Eisenhower years and continued throughout his administration was the practice of cabling a daily intelligence report to the President while he was traveling abroad. That practice has continued to the present.

Briefing Governor Stevenson in 1952

During the 1952 presidential campaign, it proved considerably easier to arrange briefings of Stevenson than it was to arrange the briefings of Eisenhower. For a start, the Governor accepted the President's invitation to lunch and an initial round of discussions on 19 August at the White House. Thereafter, he was briefed every two to three weeks by the CIA at the Governor's Mansion in Springfield, Illinois. Those sessions took place on 30 August, 15 September, and 1 and 20 October.

In the initial division of labor, it was decided that Davidson would travel to Springfield to brief Stevenson. The plan had been for him to brief both candidates, but as luck would have it they requested their first briefing on the same day. The material Davidson took to Illinois was almost exactly the same as that provided Eisenhower. The exception—a distinction not observed in subsequent years—was that Eisenhower received material that included information derived from communications intelligence. Stevenson lacked experience with this sensitive material and did not receive it.

Stevenson was an even more gracious host and a more careful reader than Eisenhower. During their Saturday afternoon sessions, he invariably offered his CIA visitor refreshments and had numerous questions and comments about the material he read. It was clear from the outset that Stevenson had the background and the intellect to take full advantage of the intelligence the Agency was providing. Thinking back on the briefings more than four decades later, Davidson still commented with awe, "I was impressed with the questions he asked. He was well ahead of all of us."

Of the many substantive issues that arose during the intelligence briefings in 1952, the single one in which Stevenson was most interested was Iran. Mohammed Mossadeq had become Prime Minister in April 1951, and shortly thereafter he had secured passage of a law nationalizing the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. In the succeeding months, tensions between Iran and the United Kingdom grew steadily and were at a high point during the fall of 1952. Diplomatic relations were severed in October.

The UK was concerned about oil, prestige, and compensation, and the US was worried that Mossadeq might be deposed by the Tudeh (Communist) party. As a result, Stevenson, like Eisenhower, wanted to follow the situation very carefully. Serious discussions between the US and the UK about a covert action program to remove Mossadeq did not begin until after the election in 1952. Therefore, whether to brief a presidential candidate, prior to the election, on a covert action program as important as the one that was implemented in Iran the following year was a question that did not arise.

In addition to the CIA briefings Stevenson received during the 1952 campaign, he asked a number of questions to which the Agency responded with written memoranda. In one case, for example, DCI Smith personally sent a memorandum to the Governor analyzing Josef Stalin's address to the 19th Communist Party Congress, held on 15 October. In addition to a factual account of the points Stalin had made, Smith included an analysis that comes across in retrospect as a policy lecture to the candidate. The memorandum concluded with the observation that, "It is extremely unwise to underestimate the importance of any of Stalin's statements, although sometimes it is not as easy as in the present instance to highlight their actual meaning. The significance of the above is unmistakable."[23]

The Challenger Briefed Again in 1956

During the 1956 presidential campaign, President Eisenhower continued to receive routine intelligence briefings at NSC meetings just as he had for the previous four years. Without hesitation, Eisenhower authorized the resumption of support to Stevenson during the 1956 campaign along the lines of the briefing support he and the Governor had received four years earlier.

The responsibility for keeping Stevenson informed in 1956 fell primarily to the Agency's Deputy Director of Current Intelligence, Knight McMahan. This time the logistics of the briefings were not as simple as they had been in 1952, when the candidate worked out of one location in Springfield. McMahan briefed Stevenson on 10 September at the Biltmore Hotel in New York City, on 17 September and 1 October at the Sheraton Park Hotel in Washington, and on 29 October in Boston. McMahan conducted these briefings alone, with the exception of the 17 September occasion in Washington when he was joined by DDCI Gen. Charles Cabell.

Like his predecessor four years earlier, McMahan observed, "One could not help being impressed with Stevenson; he was a very informed man, but what he read brought him up to date and included things he didn't know anything about."[24] Much of the information provided Stevenson in 1956 addressed the crisis in Hungary. Beyond that issue, the Governor studied very carefully material presented to him on Soviet disarmament policy. He was also interested in developments in India and in the warming relationship between India and China. He had questions on the Sino-Burmese relationship, the Sakhalin-Kuril situation, and regarding developments in Malaysia, Singapore, and the islands off China.

Stevenson's interests in Hungary and the Asian issues, however, were secondary to his primary concern, which was the developing Suez crisis. Agency memorandums for the record make clear that Stevenson asked a number of questions about the Suez situation during the first three briefings.[25] For example, he crossexamined McMahan specifically on the nature of President Gamal Abdel Nasser's violation of existing agreements, the convention of 1888, Israeli shipping, developments in the UN, the attitudes of the nonpermanent members of the Security Council, possible solutions to the controversy, the Aswan Dam situation, and the failure of the Menzies mission. As the crisis continued to build, Stevenson evinced interest in the legal aspects of Nasser's position and in the Egyptian leader's ability to maintain his government against expected economic sanctions. And he was interested in regional aspects of the problem, including tensions between Israel and Jordan and the buildup of British forces on Cyprus.

On 29 October, McMahan, in his own words, was "caught in the worst situation possible for an intelligence briefer: briefing Stevenson in Boston on the day Israel attacked Egypt." McMahan had taken the train from Washington to Boston the previous day while the inter-Agency "Watch Committee" was reviewing newly available intelligence confirming that Israel was completing its mobilization and would attack Egypt. Because the evidence came from intercepted communications, the decision was not to include this sensitive material in the written briefing materials prepared for Stevenson. McMahan intended to handle this breaking story orally.

To McMahan's chagrin and embarrassment, he had no more than settled into a chair to begin his briefing of Stevenson when one of the Governor's aides burst in to inform him that the press was reporting Israel had attacked. McMahan had not yet said anything. In 1993, McMahan still remembered this encounter clearly, recalling, "Stevenson took the news in stride, surprised that he had heard it first from the media rather than from us. But he reacted with consternation and concern." Stevenson was more gracious than his running mate, Sen. Estes Kefauver. According to McMahan, "Kefauver (who was briefed separately) gave me a very hard time. He couldn't believe that the French and the British had shut us out of the planning process."[26]

Looking back on the Agency's exchanges with Stevenson in 1956, it is clear that he asked the right probing questions concerning the Suez crisis as it unfolded. He wanted to know not only about the situation in Egypt but also about developments in Israel, Jordan, and Cyprus that were key to understanding the intentions of the parties involved. McMahan discussed with Stevenson all aspects of the intelligence reporting but was not at liberty to review with Stevenson the politics of intelli-

gence collection and policy support that had been unfolding as well. Agency officers had noted, for example, that Secretary of State Dulles did not want to receive detailed information regarding the UK buildup on Cyprus lest the knowledge of the US Government, accompanied by its silence, represent approval. Particularly in the early stages of the crisis, there had been a clear assumption by key policymakers that Israel and others, knowing of Eisenhower's opposition to a military move, would somehow hold back.

In fact, the US Intelligence Community was unaware of all—and did not report on some—of the details of the Israeli, French, and British cooperation. The increase in tensions had been documented well in the intelligence reporting. Clear warnings of coming hostilities, however, were issued only a week ahead. When the attack occurred, the President and the Democratic candidates were furious with the European allies and less than proud of their own handling of the crisis.

Thus, from the Agency's point of view, the briefings for Stevenson in 1956 ended on an awkward note owing to the Suez crisis. In all other respects, however, the sessions with Stevenson and Kefauver were a great success. Stevenson personally wrote Acting DCI Cabell to thank him for the briefings provided by McMahan, observing that they were "excellent and I found him very well informed."[27]

Agency officers who met with Stevenson during his two campaigns came away deeply impressed with his knowledge of foreign affairs and his interest in and appreciation of the intelligence product. More than that, it had been a great personal pleasure to deal with him. McMahan recalls, "He was a very courteous, polite man. I remember thinking it was a blessing he was not elected, in light of the public and personal attacks to which our presidents are subjected."

NOTES

1. David McCullough, *Truman* (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1992), pp. 376-378.

2. *The New York Times*, 22 November 1952, pp. 1, 10.

3. Harry Truman letter to Bedell Smith, 8 March 1951.

4. Meredith Davidson, interviews by the author in Frederick, Md., 26 March and 25 October 1993. Unless otherwise indicated, the numerous references that follow concerning Davidson's briefings of Stevenson and Eisenhower come from these interviews.

5. Walter Bedell Smith, Memorandum for the President, 9 January 1953.

6. Dwight Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change, 1953-1956* (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1963), p. 85.

7. *The New York Times*, 19 November 1952, pp. 1, 18.

8. Harry Truman telegram to Dwight Eisenhower, 14 August 1952. A similar telegram was sent to Adlai Stevenson.

9. Dwight Eisenhower telegram to Harry Truman, 14 August 1952.

10. Harry Truman letter to Dwight Eisenhower, 16 August 1952. Maintained in the holdings of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.

11. Dwight Eisenhower letter to Harry Truman, 19 August 1952. Eisenhower Library.

12. Dwight Eisenhower letter to Walter Bedell Smith, 14 August 1952. Eisenhower Library.

13. Walter Bedell Smith letter to Dwight Eisenhower, 18 August 1952.

14. Melvin Hendrickson, interview by the author in McLean, Va., 23 March 1993. Unless otherwise indicated, the references to his briefings of Eisenhower

come from this interview. In discussing that first briefing, Hendrickson said his most vivid memory was of Eisenhower's powerful welcoming handshake, saying, "You had to be careful or he would squeeze your fingers off."

15. Melvin Hendrickson, Memorandum for the Record, "Briefing of General Eisenhower—30 August 1952," 5 September 1952. As a reminder of how things change in 40 years, one cannot help noting that the Agency's New York office provided the visiting CIA team a chauffeur-driven Cadillac for their 20-minute trip from midtown to Columbia University on the upper west side. Conversely, some things never change. The team reported in their memorandum for the record that, when they returned later that day to New York's LaGuardia Airport for their flight to Washington, they discovered their reservations were for a flight departing from Idlewild (now JFK) Airport. They changed their reservation and arrived back at CIA's "Que" building in Washington by midafternoon. Among the stories Hendrickson told his colleagues was an account of his pleasure at having met not only General Eisenhower but also Mrs. Eisenhower and their grandchildren.

16. Hendrickson prepared very brief memorandums for the record concerning the second and fourth briefings, dated 29 September and 28 October, respectively; no written record has been found of the third briefing, held in Denver.

17. Walter Bedell Smith letter to Harry Truman, 1 November 1952. Eisenhower Library.

18. Memorandums for the record have not been found in CIA files regarding the postelection briefings of Eisenhower, and there is reason to doubt that any exist. Davidson, who accompanied Smith to the first two sessions, remembers asking the DCI after the first meeting "whether there was anything he wanted me to write. He said 'No.' Beedle would have been happy if nothing had been written." This attitude of the DCI also explains why the memorandums written by Davidson and Hendrickson, even about briefings in which Smith did not participate, were so cryptic.

19. Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change*, p. 72.

20. Dwight Eisenhower, *Waging Peace* (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1965), p. 712.

21. Andrew Goodpaster, interview by the author in Washington, DC, 26 September 1993. Unless otherwise indicated, all references to Goodpaster's observations come from this interview.

22. Gordon Gray, Memorandum for the Record, 17 January 1961. Eisenhower Library.

23. Walter Bedell Smith, Memorandum for Governor Stevenson, 16 October 1952

24. Knight McMahan, interview by the author in Hanover, New Hampshire, 18 April 1993. Unless otherwise indicated, all references to McMahan's briefings of Stevenson come from this interview.

25. McMahan drafted memorandums for the record following his first three sessions with Stevenson, dated 12 September, 18 September, and 2 October 1956. No record is available of his fourth session, held on 29 October in Boston.

26. Memorandums for the record, dated 1 and 8 October 1956, are available for only two early briefings of Kefauver.

27. Adlai Stevenson letter to C. P. Cabell, 11 September 1956.

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The war in Laos

The Fall of Lima Site 85

James C. Linder

By 1965, US policy in Laos had evolved into a strategy of war against the Communist Pathet Lao (PL) to regain control of the remote and mountainous northern provinces, particularly Louang Phrabang, which included the strategic Plain of Jars, and the Communist stronghold of Samneua, where Phou Phathi, the Sacred Mountain, was located. Because of restrictions placed on military presence and operations in Laos by increasingly irrelevant international agreements, this war became the nearly exclusive responsibility of CIA.

Samneua was central to the strategy because it was the principal gateway between Laos and North Vietnam: the North Vietnamese used the region to infiltrate troops and supplies into Laos, and the United States used the area to conduct surveillance and support operations against North Vietnam. In August 1966, to support the escalating air war against the North, a Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN) station was first constructed on the mountain above Lima Site (for landing site) 85.

The remote mountain in northeastern Laos known as Phou Phathi to the Laotians and "the Rock" to the Americans who served there is a dramatic 5,600-foot ridgeline that is just flat enough on top to support a few buildings built into the rock of the mountain and a small clearing that was used as a helicopter landing site. Located 100 miles south of Dien Bien Phu, 160 miles west of Hanoi, and just 25 miles from the PL capital of Samneua, Phou Phathi was a place of great religious significance to the local Hmong and Yao tribesmen. They believed the forbidding mountaintop was inhabited by great *phi*, or spirits, who exercised supernatural control over the lives and circumstances of the Hmong people. US Ambassador to Laos William Sullivan, however, believed the mountain was a poor choice for the location of secret Air Force navigational equipment because it was too close to Samneua and the PL.

A Sensitive Facility

Nevertheless, because of the geography of the area and the need for a site that would be within radio and radar range of North Vietnam—a difficult problem in the exceptionally rugged terrain of the Laos–North Vietnam border area, the Air Force in 1966 installed a TACAN transmitter on Phou Phathi. A TACAN station is a nearly autonomous radio transmitter that provides military aircraft with a bearing and distance in miles relative to the station location. To support operation of the station on Phou Phathi, the Air Force rotated several technicians to and from the Rock for maintenance and resupply of the transmitter and its associated generator. The Rock was supplied weekly by a secret Air Commando unit, codenamed PONY EXPRESS and based at Udorn Airbase in Thailand, via the 700-foot Lima Site (L.S.) 85 strip in the valley below.

In 1967 the facility was upgraded with a bombing-control radar to improve the control and accuracy of the bombing campaign in North Vietnam. This upgrade brought in more Air Force personnel, "sheep-dipped" to look like civilians, and (allegedly) genuine civilian technicians from Lockheed Aircraft. In reality, the men on Phou Phathi were all Air Force CIRCUIT RIDER teams from the 1st Mobile Communications Group in Udorn who rotated to the site every 24 hours. The PL and North Vietnamese watched developments at Phou Phathi with interest.

The author has a fully footnoted copy of this article for readers interested in complete citations.

China
China
Gulf of
Tonkin
Laos
Thailand
Cambodia
Bangkok
Udorn
Airbase
100 Miles
Unclassified
735030 (R00565) 2-95

The CIA and Hmong Gen. Vang Pao, the joint commanders of the war against the PL in Military Region (MR) II, which included the provinces of Samneua and Xiangkhoang, realized the ultimately untenable position of these Americans on Phou Phathi and arranged for the mountain to be guarded by 300 Thai mercenaries reinforced by local Hmong troops led by CIA paramilitary officers.

In 1967 the military situation in MR II was starting to deteriorate under pressure from the PL, the North Vietnamese, and the Chinese, who were building a series of roads in northern Laos, delivering aid to the PL, and generally adding a wild card factor to the balance of power in the area. The Chinese had concerns about the intentions and loyalties of the Tai and Hmong peoples of northern Laos and southern Yunnan Province, and they apparently believed an active presence was the best policy to maintain control. Phou Phathi continued to receive more equipment and manpower, and it attracted increasing PL attention.

The Opium Factor

In addition to the American military and intelligence interest and Hmong religious beliefs surrounding Phou Phathi, there was another factor affecting the strategic value of the Rock: opium. Phou Phathi was in the center of a major Hmong poppy-growing region, making it a major financial interest. Opium poppies were and are the major cash crop of the highland tribes of Laos. Vang Pao, based at Longtiang, is suspected to have used the proceeds from opium production to help finance the war. There has been much controversy about possible CIA involvement in drug trafficking in Laos, but considerable research has not turned up any evidence of an Agency connection.

The Campaign

L.S. 85 was one of the most critical bases for the Hmong guerrilla army for some time before the US Air Force took interest in the site as a desirable location for a navigational aid. The airstrip and the helipad on top of the mountain resupplied a small command post, used by the Hmong officers and CIA paramilitary advisers, which in turn controlled harassing operations against the PL and North Vietnamese.

The mountain had been captured briefly by the PL in 1959, using Hmong guides who had defected. These guides were necessary because only the local tribesmen who had spent a lifetime in the immediate area were able to navigate the difficult terrain and sheer rock cliffs of the Phou Phathi ridgeline. The loyalist Hmong had not forgotten this incident, and they had vowed to prevent its reoccurrence. History, however, remained against them.

In the fall of 1967, CIA detected substantial activity associated with road construction along Route 19 leading to Nam Bac from Dien Bien Phu and along Route 6 which lead to Phou Phathi. Because the North Vietnamese totally depended on road transportation for heavy units, these developments were considered ominous. By November up to 19 North Vietnamese battalions were observed in the Samneua area, confirming the worst fears of the Embassy and 7th Air Force in South Vietnam that a substantial offensive, most likely against Phou Phathi, was in the offing.

Because of their dependence on roads and overland travel, the North Vietnamese and PL only began offensives during the dry season, which in Laos normally begins in mid-October and lasts through early June. The US Air Force had begun upgrading the TACAN site on Phou Phathi in June 1967 with a TSQ-81 COMBAT SKYSPOT radar bomb scoring and impact system. The TSQ-81, a modified air-mobile version of a SAC range-instrumentation radar, would significantly increase bombing capabilities in poor weather conditions (October through April in North Vietnam) in areas of North Vietnam and Laos. It became operational in early November 1967, almost exactly coincidental with the end of the rainy season in Laos.

The Communist offensive began in December, initially with small-scale skirmishes. But by 15 December Hmong reconnaissance patrols and CIA lookouts detected several battalions moving against Nam Bac, a crucial stronghold of the Royal Lao Army, and toward

Phou Phathi. Two PL companies took Phou Den Din, only 12 kilometers east of Site 85, on the 16th, although the Hmong recovered the position later in the day. The attacks focused serious attention on the security of Site 85 and the enemy's determination to take the mountain.

The Air Force and CIA directed numerous airstrikes of F-4, F-105, and A-1 fighter-bombers from Thailand and Vietnam, many using the new radar at Site 85, against the massed columns of enemy appearing to encircle the site. The strikes were increased, even using Air Commando A-26 Invaders to attack at night, in an attempt to turn the twin advances on Routes 19 and 6. This air campaign peaked at 45 sorties on 3 January 1968, but it succeeded only in weakening the North Vietnamese and PL. The battle around Nam Bac intensified in early January, and on the 14th the base was taken by four NVA battalions. There were no survivors, and a massive amount of material and documents were captured.

The operations of the TSQ-81, nicknamed COMMANDO CLUB, were beginning to have real effect, with 23 percent of total strikes over North Vietnam in January coming under control of Site 85's radar. Even in poor weather, the COMMANDO CLUB system was able to direct bombing accurately throughout the Hanoi–Haiphong complex as well as in the immediate area of Phou Phathi for its own defense. This capability seems to have given the Air Force and Ambassador Sullivan an exaggerated sense of the defensibility of the site using air power. Although CIA and Air Force analysts had warned of the vulnerability of the site and the Ambassador himself had serious reservations about its advisability, the strategy in early January called for its operation up to the last minute, with close air support to keeping attackers from reaching the summit until the technicians could be evacuated by helicopter. And, as so often is the case in warfare, the one contingency not considered proved fatal.

The situation at Site 85 in early January was pessimistic. The Air Force technicians on the site continued to be rotated from Udorn in teams of 12, but the COMMANDO CLUB nickname was becoming more apt by the day. Because of their sheep-dipped status as ostensible civilian employees of Lockheed Aerospace, the CIRCUIT RIDERS of the 1st Mobile Communications Group were prohibited from carrying small arms. According to Air Force accounts, this regulation was actually obeyed almost to the last days of the site. Radar vans and antennas had no identification and were rigged with explosives for demolition. Fearing sympathetic detonation of their own charges by artillery falling in the areas, however, the technicians dismantled the explosives and threw them over the cliff.

Because of the political sensitivity of the facility, no other US military personnel were permitted in the area to defend the site, so defense of Phou Phathi depended on the two CIA paramilitary officers in the area and the approximately 1,000 Hmong they advised. This situation was not reassuring; the enemy in the area knew of Americans on the mountain, knew who they were, and knew what they were doing. A notebook taken from an NVA officer killed in February described the site in detail and referred to the "TACAN" in English.

First Attacks

Two-hundred Hmong guarded the ridgeline, and the other 800 were in the valley below. They were fierce and courageous fighters who were strongly motivated to defend the mountain. Although the Hmong were effective at guerrilla-style hit-and-run actions, they were ill prepared to conduct a static defense against overwhelming odds. The Air Force and the US Embassy in Vientiane knew this, but they accepted the odds based on the confidence that the CIRCUIT RIDERS could be evacuated in the last minute by helicopters of the US Air Force and of Air America (CIA's proprietary airline) supported by fighter bombers. Ambassador Sullivan had sole authority for ordering the evacuation, a circumstance that was to prove costly.

In the first week of January, the enemy continued to shell and probe other sites in the vicinity of Phou Phathi to clear the roads leading from Samneua to positions surrounding the mountain. On 10 January the Hmong engaged and dispersed a five-man PL patrol at the base of the ridge.

On 12 January, CIA lookouts reported a four-plane formation heading in the direction of Site 85. Two aircraft split off, but the other two continued to Phou Phathi, where they bombed, strafed, and fired rockets at the ridgeline. Several local Hmong were killed. The CIA officers and the local Air Force forward air controller (FAC) fired on the slow-moving Antonov-2 Colt biplanes and called in an Air America helicopter in the area to assist. The helicopter, a Bell 212, the civilian version of the Huey, proved faster than the Colts. The Air America pilot flew alongside the Soviet-made biplanes and fired a submachinegun at them through the door. Both aircraft were shot down, and the rudder from one was taken to Longtiang, an Air America base, as a souvenir.

The Embassy believed the air attack was an attempt to eliminate the radar without resorting to a costly ground attack. It also considered, rightly, that the attack was highly unusual and was unlikely to be repeated. The North Vietnamese did not have the air assets to squander.

After the air attack, ground activity abruptly increased. On 19 January an informant at Samneua reported that a five-battalion group of NVA and PL had moved west and divided into two groups. Three battalions with a 105-mm howitzer moved into position to attack Phou Den Din, a key position in control of the Phou Phathi area. The other two battalions moved southeast of the mountain in an encircling maneuver. The American and Hmong forces at the Site 85 command post, a ramshackle structure next to the helicopter landing area, recognized another major assault in the making. They realized that, if the enemy were willing to accept heavy losses, the ridgeline could not be held.

Defensive Vulnerabilities

At this point, the Air Force personnel manning the radar at the summit were still unarmed and dependent upon orders from the Ambassador to evacuate in the event of a major attack. The officers who were in charge of the detachment that continued to rotate in and out of the site had no authority to defend their troops or to order a retreat if the ridge was overrun. Communications with Vientiane were maintained from the command post at the helipad, a 20-minute walk down the ridge from the radar vans on the peak. The Air Force personnel realized their predicament, but they continued to direct large numbers of airstrikes daily both in Vietnam and Laos. They also began looking for an escape route.

On 25 January the site conducted an autonomous self-defense exercise that apparently consisted of diverting fighters to suspected enemy positions around Phou Phathi. This exercise seems to have indicated that the plan for COMMANDO CLUB self-defense using close air support was unlikely to succeed. This test also angered the 7th Air Force because it violated procedures and caused embarrassment. The CIRCUIT RIDERS and CIA officers, however, felt that they were risking more than embarrassment. After the exercise, the Air Force technicians developed a plan to descend down the sheer rock face of Phou Phathi on ropes if the major attack came.

After the fall of Phou Den Din on 22 January, the North Vietnamese temporarily halted offensive operations to regroup and resupply. The COMMANDO CLUB radar operators continued to direct airstrikes on weakened enemy positions, and FACs from Longtiang directed other available missions and Royal Laotian Air Force aircraft to every potential enemy target in range of Site 85. The enemy apparently was delaying the next offensive until more artillery could be brought up.

A Lull

On 30 January enemy troops detonated some of the defensive mines planted on the approaches of the American compound and brought the ridgeline under mortar fire. A friendly patrol sent to investigate did not meet serious resistance, and the commander of the COMMANDO CLUB reported that only a minor testing of the defenses had taken place and no further action was required.

Following the skirmish on 30 January, the North Vietnamese settled into a containment perimeter approximately 12 kilometers in diameter around Phou Phathi. Engagements between the Hmong and the North

Vietnamese became infrequent, but those few encounters that did occur involved enemy formations of at least company strength. Through 14 February airstrikes in defense of the COMMANDO CLUB were scarce and a sense of confidence infected the US Embassy in Vientiane and the 7th Air Force in Vietnam regarding the safety of Site 85.

Casual Attitude

During this period, there was ample intelligence indicating that the enemy was gradually encircling Phou Phathi and massing for a major attack. This information, however, did not materially affect US strategy toward the operation or defense of the site. The PL were not hiding their intentions: numerous informers and spies reported the enemy planned to take Site 85 in late February. CIA reported in an estimate on 25 February that it was extremely unlikely that the site could be held beyond 10 March. Still, no significant changes were made to the strategy for defense of Phou Phathi, and Vientiane retained control of the evacuation plan.

This casual approach probably was the result of the constant air communications with the site and the continuing practice of rotating men out of it every day or every other day. The planners in the Embassy evidently believed that, in the event that the COMMANDO CLUB radar bunkers were seriously threatened, the team would be airlifted out and not replaced. They may not have realized that the situation could deteriorate rapidly or that a communications breakdown could leave the COMMANDO CLUB team stranded.

In any case, responsibility for the fate of Site 85 was maintained at the Embassy and 7th Air Force level. The local commander was never given the authority to order an evacuation or to supervise his own defense.

In late February, CIA and the Air Force FACs knew the ridgeline was in peril, but they believed it could be defended for the present. On 18 February an NVA officer was killed in an ambush. His captured notebook confirmed a major assault on the summit was planned, gave the strength of the attacking force, and described the timing for the attack.

The Air Force and the Embassy responded by ordering more airstrikes near the mountain, believing that bombing could deter or dissuade the enemy. Bombing, however, was ineffective against troops in deep jungle.

On 21 February the Ambassador authorized the Local Area Defense Commander (alternately the senior CIA officer or the FAC) to use the TSQ radar to direct any and all strikes within 12 kilometers of the summit. Starting on the 20th and continuing until the fall of Site 85 on 11 March (and beyond, as the Air Force tried to destroy the captured radar system), the area was saturated with airstrikes of increasing intensity. Between the 20th and 29th, 242 sorties hit within 30 kilometers of Phou Phathi.

By 26 February, Ambassador Sullivan was pessimistic about the site's survival. Citing a CIA report that predicted the site's fall by 10 March, the Ambassador wrote to the Air Force Chief of Staff,

> . . . in the final analysis, it seems doubtful that the site can be held in the face of consistent enemy determination. Therefore, we ar in touch with USAF authorities on evacuation and destruction plans. We are fairly certain these can be carried out in an orderly fashion.

Why, then, was this not done?

Evacuation Planning

At the end of February, the airstrikes had caused the enemy to pull back temporarily to regroup, and the evacuation plans were completed. Three Air Force HH-1 "Jolly Green Giant" helicopters and two Air America Bell 212 Huey helicopters with a combined capacity of 155 people were to be used. The plan also called for the evacuation of the Hmong guerrillas defending the immediate area of the summit. To provide immediate response in case of surprise attack, the two Air America choppers were to remain on alert at nearby Lima Site 98. The Air Force aircraft were to fly from Thailand. The wild card in the plan was weather.

Low ceilings and visibility, common in northern Laos in March, could keep any aircraft from landing on the tiny mountaintop clearing.

In early March the Air Force reinforced the TSQ facility with five more technicians from Udorn to provide for 24-hour operation of the radar in the site's own defense. At this point, the CIRCUIT RIDERS also began to arm themselves with rifles, grenades, and other light weapons. A series of slings or ropes were lowered down the front face of the mountain to allow the technicians to lower themselves down the sheer rock face and hide in the crags of the 1,400-foot cliff. There was no place to go from this position, but it also was difficult to reach or attack. The senior CIA adviser's comment later was, "The technique of personnel hanging over the cliff by straps was not discussed as a serious escape or evasion plan."

Closing In

By 9 March the enemy had the mountain surrounded, skirmishes were almost constant at the lower elevations, and the authority to evacuate still depended on the order from Ambassador Sullivan, who in turn depended on the radio link at the CIA command bunker near the helipad. The rules for airstrikes in the area had been gradually liberalized until the radar operators at the site could do nearly anything they liked except communicate directly with the attack aircraft. There were now four full battalions of the NVA 766th Regiment, including one PL battalion, within striking range of the COMMANDO CLUB.

Shortly after 1800 on 10 March an artillery barrage commenced against the summit. The 105-mm howitzer being used by the Hmong received a direct hit, and the living quarters for the TSQ personnel were also damaged. The technicians sought shelter in a bunker just outside immediately after notifying Udorn that they were under attack and were abandoning the radio in the TSQ building. The attack had begun near nightfall because the enemy knew the Americans would not bomb so close to friendly troops at night.

The Hmong, possibly reinforced by a battalion of the Thai Army operating clandestinely as "mercenaries," were dug in on the southeast face of Phou Phathi. They believed they were in a good position to repel a frontal assault. The Communists, however, believed they were strong enough to try it.

Commencing the attack with three battalions, the NVA fought up the southeast slope of the mountain. On the north side, 20 heavily armed local Hmong who had defected to the PL began to scale the cliff with the intention of surprising the Americans in their undefended rear. (This strategy was identical to the successful attack on Phou Phathi in 1959, even including the use of Hmong sappers.)

The Air Force at Udorn began urgently preparing night airstrikes, which required flare ships and specially configured night-attack A-26 Invaders from the 506th Special Operations Wing. Evacuation of the personnel still was not contemplated.

At 1945 the artillery barrage ceased, and the Air Force technicians returned to the TSQ facility. The aircraft flying to the site's defense were diverted to other targets. There was only minor damage to the TACAN antenna and no casualties. Some of the F-4s and A-26s continued to Site 85 and hit targets in the area until 0320 on 11 March. At 2020 on 10 March, the Ambassador considered the situation critical enough to permit direct TSQ control of airstrikes on the lower slope of the mountain. The approaching enemy was alleged to be using flashlights, while the Hmong sappers were at this point scaling the northeast face.

Deferring a Decision

An entry in the 7th Air Force log indicates that at 2115 the Ambassador was considering evacuating personnel from Site 85 at first light. The deputy commander of 7/13 Air Force contacted the Embassy in Vientiane and indicated that evacuation should be commenced only as a last resort if the situation became untenable. These

interactions indicate that the Ambassador, the 7th Air Force, and the men at the site did not believe as late as 2100 that the situation had become perilous. The danger appeared manageable, and the security of the ridgeline was believed intact. All concerned had good intelligence about the disposition and intentions of the enemy, so there must have been an inordinate faith in the remoteness and defensibility of the mountain. When the shelling resumed at 2121, the Ambassador, still in close communication with the site, ordered that nine of the 16 CIRCUIT RIDER technicians be evacuated at 0815 the next morning.

Sapper Attack

The situation remained comparatively stable until 0300 on 11 March. One five-man TSQ crew had continued to operate the equipment while another had descended the slings to sleep in a grotto on the northwest face. At this point, the Hmong sappers reached the summit. They infiltrated silently past its defenders, seemed familiar with the site, and began methodically destroying the buildings with grenades.

Hearing the noise of the battle, the TSQ technicians ran out the front door of the operations building into small-arms fire. Three were killed instantly, including the TSQ commander, while the rest scrambled over the side of the cliff. The invaders then began throwing grenades toward the grotto where the off-duty crew had been sleeping, waking them and killing two.

The CIA commander at the helipad, described as a former Green Beret named Huey Marlow, observed an explosion that destroyed the TACAN antenna. He began advancing on the summit, armed with an automatic shotgun and several grenades and accompanied by a few Hmong. After engaging in hand-to-hand combat between the helipad and the TSQ compound, Marlow reached the summit only to encounter an emplaced machinegun position. He killed the crew and rescued the FAC who had been hiding behind one of the TSQ buildings.

The technicians who had gone over the cliff were hanging in slings among the rocks below, still under fire from the mysterious attackers. Their return fire forced the enemy to pull back momentarily from the precipice. Marlow and his Hmong, with the FAC from Vientiane, who were still under fire from the opposite direction, fought their way back to the helipad. Marlow was later awarded the Intelligence Cross.

Evacuation Attempt

At the Embassy in Vientiane, the Ambassador lost touch with the situation after 0300, and radio contact was not re-established at the helipad until about 0500. He then ordered full evacuation at 0715, an hour ahead of schedule. The Air America helicopters were standing by and immediately tried to reach the site, as incoming fire had apparently ceased just before 0700. Approaching the summit, however, they drew fire from the sappers.

Marlow, observing this, estimated that the TSQ area was in enemy hands and called in A-1E Sandys on the facility. This strike forced at least one enemy soldier to flee over the cliff where the surviving Air Force technicians were hiding. There was then a furious firefight on the side of the cliff, and the soldier was killed.

Following the airstrike by the Sandys, the Air America helicopters were able to approach the ridgeline and evacuate some of the Americans. The Air Force combat SAR Jolly Green Giants did not join in the rescue, perhaps because of their inability to land on the tiny clearing. The Air America Hueys went in repeatedly and extracted the two CIA officers, the FAC, and five of the technicians who had hidden in the craggy rocks on the cliff face. One technician was hit during the extraction, and he died on the way to Udorn.

Return flights were able to recover or account for eight of the 11 Americans killed on Phou Phathi, as well as some wounded Hmong defenders. The other three, who were among those who scrambled over the side of the cliff after abandoning the TSQ, were believed blown off the cliff by the constant artillery and mortar fire and airstrikes. Later in the morning a counterattack was contemplated at Udorn, but this plan was temporarily set aside in favor of continued search and rescue.

Destroying the Site

By midday hopes of recovering the missing Americans were discarded and attention turned to destroying the radar to prevent it from falling into the hands of the North Vietnamese, along with the documentation and operational information that was left in the COMMANDO CLUB operations building. The North Vietnamese evidently did not realize what they had captured, or, if they did, did not care. No effort to remove or exploit the TSQ was detected in the hours immediately following capture of the site. The Air Force, however, was not going to give the enemy a chance to think about it. Beginning in late morning on 11 March, airstrikes were directed against the summit every day for a week to obliterate all traces of the COMMANDO CLUB on Phou Phathi. Between the 12th and 18th, 95 sorties were directed to destroy the radar; and on the 19th, two A-1 Sandys leveled every building on the ridge. This aerial barrage had the collateral effect of probably obliterating the remains of any Americans who were left on the mountain.

Postmortem

After the situation became clearer in the days following the battle, Ambassador Sullivan and 7th Air Force ordered a postmortem on the fiasco. The Ambassador recorded his comments in a PERSONAL FOR message to General Momyer at Tan Son Nhut:

> . . . In hindsight, it seems to me we should have pulled all technicians out morning of 10 March even if this means losing the last few hours of the installation's capabilities.
>
> What concerns me most is not the defensive action, but the disruption of the preplanned evacuation procedure. It is still not clear why technical personnel went over cliff to narrow ledge rather than down trail to chopper pad. CAS [euphemism for CIA] personnel subsequently went up same trail to installation, so we know trail was traversable, even under artillery fire. It is also not clear to me how small Vietnamese suicide squad got to the installation site, although it seems they must have scaled the cliff. . . .

Why did the COMMANDO CLUB technicians go over the cliff? That action seems to have caused most of the casualties.

The answer probably lies in the training of the Air Force personnel. The sheep-dipped technicians, unarmed and posing as civilians, were not really combatants, yet they were in a position where close combat was almost inevitable. As is often the case in war, things did not go according to Plan A and the COMMANDO CLUB did not have a Plan B. The Air Force did not train the CIRCUIT RIDERS to fight as infantry to defend themselves. This was the real tragedy of Phou Phathi. If the technicians had organized their own defense, with armed sentries manning a defensive perimeter around their facility, possibly even incorporating the Hmong guerrilla troops in their effort, their chances of survival would have been much greater. The tactic of climbing over the side of the mountain, rather than maintaining a defensible position, was not militarily sound. The CIA advisers and the Ambassador apparently realized this.

Epilogue

The loss of Site 85 was not really an intelligence failure because accurate information about the nature of the situation was available from the start. But it was a failure of command and control and leadership because the local forces did not have full authority for their own defense and depended almost wholly on local irregular troops led by CIA advisers. Nonetheless, the Hmong and the CIA nearly saved the COMMANDO CLUB; they probably would have if it had not been for the amazing feat of the sappers scaling the northeast face.

The fall of Phou Phathi was the beginning of a major enemy offensive in Laos that was to exact a heavy toll on Vang Pao's Hmong army. In fact, it was the beginning of the end for the non-Communist forces in Laos. The Hmong suffered severe casualties in the last months of 1968, and PL advances were inexorable.

By September the North Vietnamese and PL had over 20 battalions in the Samneua area—the largest concentration of forces in Southeast Asia at the time. The

US Air Force continued to strike hard at these forces. Although there were fearsome losses among the enemy units, the Vietnamese and Lao Communists accepted the losses with no change in strategy.

Vang Pao continued to insist on retaking Phou Phathi, even though the Embassy in Vientiane did not believe this was necessary or wise. At one point, Ambassador Sullivan told Vang Pao he would not provide air support for an offensive against the Sacred Mountain in the wet season, so Vang Pao said he would walk there by himself. The Ambassador relented, and the offensive went forward, but it ended in deadlock near Muong Son in late July.

Finally, with heavy support from CIA and Air Force resources, the Hmong reached the base on Phou Phathi. On 18 July a few Hmong commandos managed to reach the destroyed helipad and TSQ facility, but they were unable to hold the ridgeline. The 148th NVA Regiment sent Vang Pao's troops reeling, while taking heavy casualties. Phou Phathi was never recaptured.

Cultural cold war

Origins of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, 1949-50

Michael Warner

Give me a hundred million dollars and a thousand dedicated people, and I will guarantee to generate such a wave of democratic unrest among the masses—yes, even among the soldiers—of Stalin's own empire, that all his problems for a long period of time to come will be internal. I can find the people.

Sidney Hook, 1949

The Congress for Cultural Freedom is widely considered one of the CIA's more daring and effective Cold War covert operations. It published literary and political journals such as *Encounter*, hosted dozens of conferences bringing together some of the most eminent Western thinkers, and even did what it could to help intellectuals behind the Iron Curtain. Somehow this organization of scholars and artists—egotistical, free-thinking, and even anti-American in their politics—managed to reach out from its Paris headquarters to demonstrate that Communism, despite its blandishments, was a deadly foe of art and thought. Getting such people to cooperate at all was a feat, but the Congress's Administrative Secretary, Michael Josselson, kept them working together for almost two decades until the Agency arranged an amicable separation from the Congress in 1966.

The Congress for Cultural Freedom—despite the embarrassing exposure of its CIA sponsorship in 1967—ultimately helped to negate Communism's appeal to artists and intellectuals, undermining at the same time the Communist pose of moral superiority. But while CIA sponsorship of the Congress has long been publicly known, the origins of that relationship have remained obscure, even to Agency veterans who worked on the project.

The Congress itself sprang from a conference of intellectuals in West Berlin in June 1950, a gathering that itself marked a landmark in the Cold War. By a lucky stroke, the conference opened just a day after North Korea invaded the South. This coincidence lent unexpected timeliness and urgency to the conference's message: that some of the best minds of the West—representing a wide range of disciplines and political viewpoints—were willing to defy the still-influential opinion that Communism was more congenial to culture than was bourgeois democracy. Historians have surmised that this event had some CIA connection, but the handful of CIA officers who knew the full story are dead, and scholars today tend to skirt this issue because of the lack of documentation.

Agency files reveal the true origins of the Berlin conference. Besides setting the Congress in motion, [the Berlin conference in 1950] helped to solidify CIA's emerging strategy of promoting the non-Communist left—the strategy that would soon become the theoretical foundation of the Agency's political operations against Communism over the next two decades.

This article is an excerpt from a larger classified draft study of CIA involvement with anti-Communist groups in the Cold War. The author retains a footnoted copy of the article in the CIA History Staff. This version of the article has been redacted for security considerations (phrases in brackets denote some of the redactions).

A Conference in New York

In March 1949, New York's Waldorf-Astoria Hotel played host to one of the strangest gatherings in American history. Less than four years after Allied troops had liberated Hitler's concentration camps, 800 prominent literary and artistic figures congregated in the Waldorf to call for peace at any price with Stalin, whose own *gulag* had just been restocked with victims of his latest purge. Americans, including Lillian Hellman, Aaron Copland, Arthur Miller, and a young Norman Mailer, joined with European and Soviet delegates to repudiate "US warmongering." Russian composer Dmitri Shostakovich told the delegates that "a small clique of hatemongers" was preparing a global conflagration; he urged progressive artists to struggle against the new "Fascists" who were seeking world domination. American panelists echoed the Russian composer's fear of a new conflict. Playwright Clifford Odets denounced the "enemies of Man" and claimed the United States had been agitated into "a state of holy terror" by fraudulent reports of Soviet aggression; composer Copland declared "the present policies of the American Government will lead inevitably into a third world war."

The Waldorf conference marked another step in the Communist Information Bureau's (Cominform) campaign to shape Western opinion. A series of Soviet-sponsored cultural conferences beginning in September 1948 called for world peace and denounced the policies of the Truman administration. The conference at the Waldorf-Astoria, however, was the first to convene in a Western country and, not coincidentally, was also the first to meet organized and articulate opposition.

The Cominform could hardly have picked a riskier place than New York City to stage a Stalinist peace conference. New York's large ethnic neighborhoods were filled with refugees from Communism, and its campuses and numerous cultural and political journals employed hundreds of politically left-leaning men and women who had fought in the ideological struggles over Stalinism that divided American labor unions, college faculties, and cultural organizations before World War II.

Stealing the Show

A handful of liberal and socialist writers, led by philosophy professor Sydney Hook, saw their chance to steal a little of the publicity expected for the Waldorf peace conference. A fierce ex-Communist himself, Hook was then teaching at New York University and editing a socialist magazine called *The New Leader*. Ten years earlier he and his mentor John Dewey had founded a controversial group called the Committee for Cultural Freedom, which attacked both Communism and Nazism. He now organized a similar committee to harass the peace conference in the Waldorf-Astoria.

Hook's new group called itself the Americans for Intellectual Freedom. Its big names included critics Dwight MacDonald and Mary McCarthy, composer Nicolas Nabokov, and commentator Max Eastman. Arnold Beichman, a labor reporter friendly with anti-Communist union leaders, remembered the excitement of tweaking the Soviet delegates and their fellow conferees: "We didn't have any staff, we didn't have any salaries to pay anything. But inside of about one day the place was just busting with people volunteering." One of Beichman's union friends persuaded the sold-out Waldorf to base Hook and his group in a three-room suite ("I told them if you don't get that suite we'll close the hotel down," he explained to Beichman), and another union contact installed 10 phone lines on a Sunday morning.

Hook and his friends stole the show. They asked embarrassing questions of the Soviet delegates at the conference's panel discussions and staged an evening rally of their own at nearby Bryant Park. News stories on the peace conference reported the activities of the Americans for Intellectual Freedom in detail. "The only paper that was against us in this reporting was *The New York Times*," recalled Beichman. "It turned out years later that [*The Times* reporter] was a member of the Party."

Covert Action Prospect

In Washington, members of Frank Wisner's fledgling Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) chuckled at the news reports from New York and wondered how a group like the Americans for Intellectual Freedom could help OPC and the CIA in countering the Soviet peace offensive. OPC was the Agency's new covert action arm, a bureaucratic hybrid formed only a few months earlier and still struggling to establish a mission and identity. (It comprised only a handful of staffers in the spring of 1949, and it looked to the State Department and private contacts for operational ideas). Soviet operatives, on the other hand, had a wealth of experience to draw from, having learned from the late Willi Münzenberg before the war how to build front groups that were ostensibly non-Communist—and thus attractive to liberals and socialists—but were still responsive to Soviet direction. OPC had no such expertise, but it did have a cadre of energetic and well-connected staffers willing to experiment with unorthodox ideas and controversial individuals if that was what it took to challenge the Communists at their own game.

The day after the Waldorf congress closed, Wisner's flamboyant and ubiquitous aide Carmel Offie asked the Department of State what it intended to do about the next big peace conference, scheduled for Paris in late April. Offie was Wisner's special assistant for labor and émigré affairs, personally overseeing two of OPC's most important operations: the National Committee for Free Europe, [and other operatives who] passed OPC money to anti-Communist unions in Europe. Offie dealt often with Irving Brown, who had extensive Continental contacts.

In response to Offie, the Department of State cabled Paris proposing a US-orchestrated response to the conference, but Wisner in Washington and Brown in New York thought the suggested steps too weak. OPC took matters into its own hands in the bold but ad hoc manner that marked the Office's early operations. A series of meetings and conversations over the next few days resulted in a new plan, which OPC communicated through at least three separate channels. At the time there [were few] OPC station[s abroad, and various officials acted] as the Office's representative[s. One of them] soon heard from Brown and Raymond Murphy of State's Office of European Affairs. Wisner himself cabled Averell Harriman of the Economic Cooperation Administration (the managers of the Marshall Plan) seeking 5 million francs (roughly $16,000) to fund a counterdemonstration. Murphy graphically explained the need for a response to the Communist peace offensive:

> Now the theme is that the United States and the Western democracies are the war-mongers and Fascists and the Kremlin and its stooges the peace-loving democracies. And there is a better than even chance that by constant repetition the Commies can persuade innocents to follow this line. Perhaps not immediately but in the course of the next few years because there is a tremendous residue of pacificism [sic], isolationism and big business [sic] to be exploited. For example, a recession in the United States might cause people to lose interest in bolstering Europe .... I think you will agree that this phony peace movement actually embraces far more than intellectuals and that any counter-congress should emphasize also that the threat to world peace comes from the Kremlin and its allies.

Working with Brown, [OPC's representative] contacted French socialist David Rousset and his allies at the breakaway leftist newspaper *Franc-Tireur*, which in turn organized a meeting called the International Day of Resistance to Dictatorship and War, inviting Sidney Hook and other prominent anti-Communists. OPC covertly paid the travel costs of the German, Italian, and American delegations. The latter included Hook and novelist James T. Farrell; both were unwitting of OPC's involvement.

Disappointment in Paris

The Paris counter-conference on 30 April 1949 disappointed its American backers. Although it attracted prominent anti-Stalinists and provoked blasts from the French Communist Party, its tone was too radical and neutralist for Hook and Farrell. OPC and State agreed with Hook's assessment. The main problem, Offie

noted, was the barely concealed anti-Americanism of the *Franc-Tireur* group and many of the intellectuals it had invited. This flaw was aggravated by the loose organization of the meeting itself, which at one point was disrupted by a noisy band of anarchists. Offie did not believe that OPC had to rely on *Franc-Tireur* to reach European anti-Stalinists. Wisner added a pointed postscript to Offie's memo:

> We are concerned lest this type of leadership *for a continuing organization* would result in the degeneration of the entire idea (of having a little DEMINFORM) into a nuts folly of miscellaneous goats and monkeys whose antics would completely discredit the work and statements of the serious and responsible liberals. We would have serious misgivings about supporting such a show [emphasis added].

One small forward step was taken in Paris, however. Hook had chatted with a former editor of *The New Leader* named Melvin Lasky about the prospects for a permanent committee of anti-Communist intellectuals from Europe and America. This idea would soon take on a life of its own.

Considering Berlin

Several people in Europe and America almost simultaneously decided that what was needed was a real conference of anti-Communists. Paris would have been the logical choice, but, as was demonstrated in April, Paris seemed too ethereal, evanescent, and neutralist in the struggle between liberty and tyranny. Parisians who cared about world affairs were often Stalinists; novelist Arthur Koestler quipped that from Paris the French Communist Party could take over all of France with a single phone call.

Berlin was much better. Surrounded by the Red Army and just recently rescued from starvation by the US Air Force's heroic resupply efforts, West Berlin was an island of freedom in a Communist sea. The Soviet blockade of Berlin had been lifted in May 1949, but morale in the Western sector had flagged over the summer as the proud but exhausted West Berliners wondered what would befall them next.

In August 1949, a crucial meeting took place in Frankfurt. American journalist Melvin J. Lasky, together with a pair of ex-Communists, Franz Borkenau and Ruth Fischer, hatched a plan for an international conference of the non-Communist Left in Berlin the following year. Lasky, only 29, was already prominent in German intellectual circles as the founding editor of *Der Monat*, a journal sponsored by the American occupation government that brought Western writers once more into the ken of the German public. Borkenau too had been in Paris the previous April as a disappointed member of the German delegation. Fischer—whose given name was Elfriede Eisler—was the sister of Gerhart Eisler, a Soviet operative dubbed in 1946 "the Number-One Communist in the US" and convicted the following year for falsifying a visa application. She herself had been a leader of the German Communist Party before her faction was expelled on orders from Moscow, leading her to break with Stalin (and with her brother Gerhart).

Ruth Fischer mentioned the plan to a diplomat friend[:]

> I think we talked about this plan already during my last stay in Paris, but I have now a much more concrete approach to it. I mean, of course, the idea of organizing a big Anti-Waldorf-Astoria Congress in Berlin itself. It should be a gathering of all ex-Communists, plus a good representative group of anti-Stalinist American, English, and European intellectuals, declaring its sympathy for Tito and Yugoslavia and the silent opposition in Russia and the satellite states, and giving the Politburo hell right at the gate of their own hell. All my friends agree that it would be of enormous effect and radiate to Moscow, if properly organized. It would create great possibilities for better co-ordination afterwards and would also lift the spirits of Berlin anti-Stalinists, which are somewhat fallen at present.

Fischer hoped to talk to "a few friends in Washington" about the idea during her trip there that fall.

[OPC's representative] pouched the Fischer proposal to Offie in mid-September. [OPC] officers seemed unimpressed with the Berlin conference idea, but Offie still thought the proposal was worth a closer look.

Offie's interest notwithstanding, the Berlin congress idea remained in a bureaucratic limbo for the next two months. No one apparently seemed to know quite what to do with it. American occupation authorities in Germany probably knew that the proposed conclave would have little credibility among European intellectuals if it were obviously sponsored by the US Government. At the same time, Truman administration officials were not exactly looking for motley bands of former Communists to sponsor at a time when the White House was already taking flak at home for being soft on Communism.

An Ideal Organizer

The answer was covert funding. Michael Josselson stepped forward to promote the proposal late in 1949. Josselson had witnessed the shaky beginnings of the anti-Communist counteroffensive in New York and Paris that spring while he was still working as a cultural officer for the American occupation government in Germany. He told his composer friend Nicolas Nabokov that Berlin needed something similar. At some point that autumn Josselson talked with Melvin Lasky about the Berlin conference idea.

Josselson was the perfect man for the job of putting together such an event. Born in Estonia in 1908, his father, a Jewish timber merchant, moved his family to Berlin during the Russian Revolution. As a young man Josselson attended the Universities of Berlin and Freiburg, but he took a job as a buyer for the American Gimbels-Saks retail chain before he earned a degree. Gimbels eventually made him its chief European buyer and transferred him to Paris in 1935, and then on to New York before the war. Josselson became an American citizen in 1942. Drafted the following year, he made sergeant and served as an interrogator for the US Army in Europe. Like Melvin Lasky, Josselson stayed on in Berlin after demobilization to work with the American occupation government. Berlin was an ideal post for Josselson, who spoke English, French, German, and Russian with equal ease.

The drama and intrigue of postwar Berlin awakened something in Josselson and gave him scope to exercise his considerable talents as an operator, administrator, and innovator. His enthusiasm was boundless, his energy immense.

In Josselson's capable hands the still-amorphous Fischer plan took specific shape. Where Fischer had proposed an essentially political gathering, the self-taught Josselson sensed that an explicitly cultural and intellectual conference, to be called "the Congress for cultural freedom," could seize the initiative from the Communists by reaffirming "the fundamental ideals governing cultural (and political) action in the Western world and the repudiation of all totalitarian challenges."

With the backing of several prominent Berlin academics, a committee of American and European thinkers would organize the event and invite participants, selecting them on the basis of their political outlook, their international reputation and their popularity in Germany. In addition, the congress could be used to bring about the creation of some sort of permanent committee, which, with a few interested people and a certain amount of funds, could maintain the degree of intellectual and rhetorical coordination expected to be achieved in Berlin. The Josselson proposal reached Washington in January 1950.

Michael Josselson's interest in the congress idea gave Lasky all the encouragement he needed. Lasky, unwitting of OPC's hand in the plan, forged ahead while official Washington made up its mind. He sent a similar proposal of his own to Sidney Hook, his old boss, who liked the idea. In February, Lasky enlisted Ernst Reuter, Lord Mayor of West Berlin, and several prominent German academics, who endorsed the plan and promised their support. Together these men formed a standing committee and began issuing invitations.

Lasky's freelancing, however, was not all for the good. As an employee of the American occupation government, his activities on behalf of the congress struck

more than a few observers, both friendly and hostile, as proof that the US Government was behind the event. This would later cause trouble for Lasky.

OPC officers also liked Josselson's plan. Headquarters produced a formal project proposal envisioning a budget of $50,000. Time was of the essence, although OPC soon realized that the congress would have to postponed to May or even June. Wisner approved the project outline, which essentially reiterated Josselson's December proposal, on 7 April, adding that he wanted Lasky and Burnham kept out of sight in Berlin for fear their presence would only provide ammunition to Communist critics of the event.

Enthusiastic Response

It was already too late to rein in Lasky. He had appointed himself the driving force behind the event, inviting participants and organizing programs. Josselson defended Lasky when informed of Wisner's comment. Josselson explained that Lasky's name on the event's masthead as General Secretary had been largely responsible for the enthusiasm that the congress had generated among European intellectuals. "No other person here, certainly no German, could have achieved such success," cabled Josselson.

The congress in Berlin rolled ahead that spring gathering sponsors and patrons. World-renowned philosophers John Dewey, Bertrand Russell, Benedetto Croce, Karl Jaspers, and Jacques Maritain agreed to lend *gravitas* to the event as its honorary chairmen. OPC bought tickets for the American delegation, using [several intermediary organizations] as its travel agents. Hook and another NYU philosophy professor named James Burnham took charge of the details for the American delegation. The Department of State proved an enthusiastic partner in the enterprise, arranging travel, expenses, and publicity for the delegates. Indeed, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs Jesse MacKnight was so impressed with the American delegation that he urged CIA to sponsor the congress on a continuing basis even before the conclave in Berlin had taken place.

Dramatic Opening

The Congress for Cultural Freedom convened in Berlin's Titania Palace on 26 June 1950. American delegates Hook, James Burnham, James T. Farrell, playwright Tennessee Williams, historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., actor Robert Montgomery, and chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission David Lilienthal had been greeted on their arrival the previous day with the news that troops of North Korea had launched a massive invasion of the South. This pointed reminder of the vulnerability of Berlin itself heightened the sense of apprehension in the hall. The Congress's opening caught and reflected this mood. Lord Mayor Reuter asked the almost 200 delegates and the 4,000 other attendees to stand for a moment of silence in memory of those who had died fighting for freedom or who still languished in concentration camps.

The time had come to choose sides. Austrian physicist and Congress panelist Hans Thirring dramatized this feeling by repudiating his own prepared remarks, which were essentially neutralist in tone, because the Korean invasion had betrayed his trust in Stalin's peaceful aspirations. German writer Theodor Plievier made a spectacular entrance after flying in from hiding in West Germany, defying the danger that he might be kidnapped by the Soviets or East Germans while visiting Berlin.

Leadership of the Congress sessions spontaneously devolved on two eloquent Europeans with very different views: the Italian socialist Ignazio Silone and the Anglicized Hungarian writer Arthur Koestler. Although both had penned autobiographical essays about their breaks with the Party for a new book titled *The God That Failed*, they represented the two poles of opinion over the best way to oppose the Communists. Koestler favored the rhetorical frontal assault, and his attacks sometimes spared neither foe nor friend. Silone was subtler, urging the West to promote social and political reforms in order to co-opt Communism's still-influential moral appeal.

Sidney Hook speaking at the opening session

These competing themes lent a certain dramatic tension to the Congress, but their rivalry by itself helped to make the point that debate in the West is truly free, with room for all shades of anti-totalitarian opinion. In the end, it was liberty that really mattered. "Friends, freedom has seized the offensive!" shouted Koestler as he read the Congress's Freedom Manifesto before 15,000 cheering Berliners at the closing rally on 29 June. The irony was subtle but real; Koestler had once worked for Soviet operative Willi Münzenberg managing front groups for Moscow, and now he was unwittingly helping the CIA's efforts to establish a new organization designed to undo some of the damage done by Stalin's agents over the last generation.

Epilogue

Having set the Congress in motion, OPC sat back and watched while events played themselves out. The men that OPC brought together in Berlin needed no coaching on the finer points of criticizing Communism. Josselson kept out of sight, although he kept track of everything that transpired. In Josselson's eyes, Silone seems to have won his debate with Koestler; Josselson personally eschewed the frontal assault in favor of the subtle approach. Indeed, Josselson's Congress for Cultural Freedom would later be criticized (by American anti-Communists, in particular) for tolerating too much

Author Arthur Koestler, Irving Brown, and Professor James Burnham.

criticism of America's own shortcomings by figures on the anti-Communist left. And thus was born not only the Congress for Cultural Freedom but also one of its most controversial features.

Reactions in the US Government to the Berlin conference initially ranged from pleased to ecstatic. Wisner offered his "heartiest congratulations" to all involved. OPC's political sponsors were also gratified. Defense Department representative Gen. John Magruder deemed it "a subtle covert operation carried out on the highest intellectual level" and "unconventional warfare at its best" in a memo to Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson. American occupation officials in Germany sensed the Congress had given a palpable boost to the morale of West Berlin, but believed the event's most important effect would ultimately be felt by Western intellectuals who had been politically adrift since 1945. Although Congress delegates had argued over strategies for combating Stalinism, their spontaneous and sincere unanimity in denouncing tyranny of all stripes had "actually impelled a number of prominent cultural leaders to give up their sophisticated, contemplative detachment in favor of a strong stand against totalitarianism."

Almost before the last chairs were folded in Berlin, [at least one OPC officer] began campaigning for covert backing for the Congress on a permanent basis. Wisner agreed that a standing Congress could pull European opinion away from neutralism, but ordered Lasky and Burnham removed from prominent positions in any

Final session (at Funkturm).

ongoing project. Burnham was happy to step aside, agreeing that he made an easy target for Communist critics of the Congress.

The unwitting Lasky was another matter, at least as far as [one OPC officer] was concerned. Josselson had defended Lasky in April, and OPC's new Eastern Europe Division (EE) agreed with Josselson that Lasky had been a key to the Congress's success. This apologia infuriated Wisner because it betrayed "an unfortunate tendency, apparently more deeprooted than I had suspected, to succumb to the temptation of convenience (doing things the easy way)."

In a scathing memo to EE, Wisner declared himself "very disturbed" by the "non-observance" of his April command to have Lasky moved to the sidelines of the project; Lasky's visibility was "a major blunder and was recognized as such by our best friends in the State Department." Wisner made himself clear: unless the headstrong Lasky was removed from the Congress for Cultural Freedom, OPC would not support the organization. He tempered this bitter pill a little in a postscript. According to Wisner, Secretary of Defense Johnson was so impressed with the Berlin conference that he had sung its praises before President Truman, who was reported to be "very well pleased."

EE had no choice but to cable Wisner's instructions to Germany. [The OPC officer who received it exploded] and cabled back a histrionic protest, but there was nothing to be done. Lasky had to go, and OPC contrived to have him removed from the project.

With Burnham and Lasky gone, the Congress's steering committee established the organization as a permanent entity in November 1950 (CIA support, under a new project name, had already been approved by OPC's Project Review Board). Josselson swallowed his pride and went along, resigning his job with the American occupation government to become the Congress's Administrative Secretary for the next 16 years.

A good pick-me-up

Robert Fulton's Skyhook and Operation Coldfeet

William M. Leary

The infiltration of agents behind enemy lines during World War II could be accomplished without undue technical difficulty, thanks to the use of parachutes. Thousands of individuals descended upon occupied Europe through "Joe holes" in Royal Air Force Halifaxes and Army Air Force B-24s, or out the side doors of C-47s. Extraction of personnel, however, proved a far more challenging task. Usually, individuals had to exfiltrate enemy territory by hazardous land routes. Sometimes they could be flown out by light aircraft, like the British Lysander, that landed at night on makeshift airstrips.

All American System

An innovative extraction method, reportedly used by the British toward the end of the war, involved the use of a modified version of a mail pickup system that had been invented by Lytle S. Brown during the 1920s and perfected before Pearl Harbor by All American Aviation. The All American system used two steel poles, set 54 feet apart, with a transfer line strung between them. An aircraft approached the ground station in a gentle glide of 90 mph, while a flight mechanic paid out a 50-foot steel cable. As the aircraft pulled up, a four-finger grapple at the end of the cable engaged the transfer rope, shock absorbers cushioned the impact, and then the flight mechanic winched the mail pouch on board.[1]

In July 1943, the need to rescue airmen from difficult terrain led to tests of this system by the Army Air Forces. Initial results, using instrumented containers, were not promising. The instruments recorded accelerations in excess of 17 g's following the pickup, a force far in excess of what the human body could tolerate. Changes in the transfer line and modifications in the parachute harness, however, brought this down to a more acceptable 7 g's. The first live test, with a sheep, failed when the harness twisted and strangled the animal. On subsequent tests other sheep fared better.

Lt. Alex Doster, a paratrooper, volunteered for the first human pickup, made on 5 September 1943. After a Stinson engaged the transfer rope at 125 mph, Doster was first yanked vertically off the ground, then soared off behind the aircraft. It took less than three minutes to retrieve him.

The Air Force continued to improve the system, even developing a package containing telescoping poles, transfer line, and harness that could be dropped by air. The first operational use of the system came in February 1944, when a C-47 snagged a glider in a remote location in Burma and returned it to India. Although the Air Force never used it to pick up individuals, the British apparently did use it to retrieve agents.

CIA Involvement

During the Korean war, CIA became interested in the All American system. In the spring and summer of 1952, CIA tried to establish a resistance network in Manchuria. Civil Air Transport (CAT), its air proprietary, dropped agents and supplies into Kirin Province as part of a project known to the pilots as Operation Tropic. The All American system seemed to answer the problem of how to bring people out of Manchuria.

In the fall of 1952, CAT pilots in Japan made a number of static pickups, then successfully retrieved mechanic Ronald E. Lewis. On the evening of 29 November

Robert E. Fulton, inventor of Skyhook. (Credit: Robert E. Fulton)

1952, a CAT C-47 with CIA officers John T. Downey and Richard G. Fecteau departed Seoul for Kirin Province, intending to pick up members of a team that had been inserted the previous July.

But a double agent had betrayed the team, and the Chinese shot down the C-47 as it came in for the pickup, killing the pilots and capturing the CIA officers. Fecteau was not released until December 1971; Downey was freed in March 1973.[2]

A Remarkable Inventor

Robert Edison Fulton, Jr., a talented inventor, had observed a demonstration of the All American system in London after World War II. He believed that he could do better, although at the time he was busy formulating plans for a flying automobile.

Fulton may have been a collateral descendant of the steamboat inventor, but he never bothered to check the genealogical connection. Moreover, Edison had been a family name long before it became associated with the famous inventor. Nonetheless, with Fulton and Edison as part of his name, he seemed destined for a career as an inventor.

Born in 1909, Fulton grew up in affluent circumstances in the New York area, where his father was president of the Mack Truck Company. He attended Choate and

Harvard, then studied architecture in Vienna. In 1932, he embarked on a 17-month motorcycle adventure, visiting 32 countries and traveling 40,000 miles. Interested in photography, he worked for Pan American Airways in the mid-1930s, taking pictures of the development of the trans-Pacific air route.[3]

Following the outbreak of World War II in Europe in 1939, Fulton began work on an aerial gunnery trainer. He developed a static device that used films to simulate aerial combat.

Fulton demonstrated his trainer in May 1942 to Cdr. Luis de Florez, who was in the process of establishing a Special Devices Division for the Navy. De Florez endorsed Fulton's trainer and provided developmental funds. Eventually, the Navy ordered 500 trainers at a cost of $6 million. Together with a gunnery manual written by Fulton, the trainer became the Navy's primary simulator for teaching air-to-air marksmanship.[4]

The Airphibian

After the war, Fulton bought 15 acres of land adjoining the airport at Danbury, Connecticut, where he built a house and workshop. He devoted most of his time and remaining funds to the development of a flying automobile.

Fulton built and tested eight versions of the "airphibian" and was about 90-percent finished when he ran out of money. He sold control of his company in order to raise funds to complete the lengthy government certification process, but the new owners decided not to continue the project.[5]

A New Challenge

While flight-testing the airphibian, Fulton often had wondered what might happen if he had been forced down in inaccessible terrain. A helicopter had only limited range. The All American system, he believed, was not the answer. Following the disappointment of the airphibian venture, he decided to try to create a more viable pickup system.[6]

Experiments began in 1950. Using a weather balloon, nylon line, and 10- to 15-pound weights, Fulton made numerous pickup attempts as he sought to develop a reliable procedure. Successful at last, he had his son photograph the operation. Fulton then took the film to Admiral de Florez, who had become the first director of technical research at the CIA.[7] Believing that the program could best be handled by the military, de Florez put Fulton in touch with the Office of Naval Research (ONR). Thanks to de Florez's interest, Fulton received a development contract from ONR's Air Programs Division.

Over the next few years, Fulton refined the air and ground equipment for the pickup system. Based at El Centro, California, he conducted numerous flights over the desert, using a Navy P2V for the pickups. He gradually increased the weight of the pickup until the line began to break. A braided nylon line with a test strength of 4,000 pounds solved the problem. More vexing were the difficulties that were experienced with the locking device, or sky anchor, that secured the line to the aircraft. Fulton eventually resolved this problem, which he considered the most demanding part of the entire developmental process.[8]

The Skyhook System

By 1958, the Fulton aerial retrieval system, or Skyhook, had taken its final shape. A package that easily could be dropped from an aircraft contained the necessary ground equipment for a pickup. It featured a harness, for cargo or person, that was attached to a 500-foot, high-strength, braided nylon line. A portable helium bottle inflated a dirigible-shaped balloon, raising the line to its full height.

The pickup aircraft sported two tubular steel "horns" protruding from its nose, 30 feet long and spread at a 70-degree angle. The aircraft would fly into the line, aiming at a bright mylar marker placed at the 425-foot level. As the line was caught between the forks on the nose of the aircraft, the balloon was released at the same time the spring-loaded trigger mechanism (sky anchor)

secured the line to the aircraft. As the line streamlined under the fuselage, it was snared by the pickup crew, using a J-hook. It was then attached to a powered winch and pulled on board.

Fulton first used instrumented dummies as he prepared for a live pickup. He next used a pig, as pigs have nervous systems close to humans. Lifted off the ground, the pig began to spin as it flew through the air at 125 mph. It arrived on board undamaged but in a disoriented state. Once it recovered, it attacked the crew.

Human Pickups

The first human pickup took place on 12 August 1958, when S. Sgt. Levi W. Woods, USMC, was winched on board the P2V. Because of the geometry involved, the person being picked up experienced less of a shock than during a parachute opening. After the initial contact, which was described by one individual as similar to "a kick in the pants," the person rose vertically at a slow rate to about 100 feet, then began to streamline behind the aircraft. Extension of arms and legs prevented the oscillation that plagued the pig, as the individual was winched on board. The process took about six minutes.[9]

In August 1960, Capt. Edward A. Rodgers, commander of the Naval Air Development Unit, flew a Skyhook-equipped P2V to Point Barrow, Alaska, to conduct pickup tests under the direction of Dr. Max Brewer, head of the Navy's Arctic Research Laboratory. With Fulton on board to monitor the equipment, the P2V picked up mail from Floating Ice Island T-3, retrieved artifacts, including mastodon tusks, from an archeological party on the tundra, and secured geological samples from Peters Lake Camp. The high point of the trials came when the P2V dropped a rescue package near the icebreaker USS Burton Island. Retrieved by a ship's boat, the package was brought on deck, the balloon inflated, and the pickup accomplished.[10]

Operation Coldfeet

The stage was now set for the first operational use of Skyhook. What became known as Operation Coldfeet began in May 1961, when a naval aircraft flying an aeromagnetic survey over the Arctic Ocean reported sighting an abandoned Soviet drift station. A few days later, the Soviets announced that had been forced to leave Station NP 9 when the ice runway used to supply it had cracked.

The prospect of examining an abandoned Soviet ice station attracted ONR's interest. The previous year, ONR had set an acoustical surveillance network on a US drift station used to monitor Soviet submarines. ONR assumed that the Soviets would have a similar system to keep track of American submarines as they transited the polar ice pack, but there was no direct evidence to support this. Also, ONR wanted to compare Soviet efforts on drift stations with US operations.

The problem was how to get to NP 9. It was far too deep into the ice pack to be reached by an icebreaker, and it was out of helicopter range. Fulton's Skyhook seemed to provide the answer. To Capt. John Cadwalader, who would command Operation Coldfeet, it looked like "a wonderful opportunity" to make use of the pickup system.[11]

Following a recommendation by Dr. Max Britton, head of the Arctic program in the Geography Branch of ONR, RAdm. L. D. Coates, Chief of Naval Research, authorized preliminary planning for the mission while he sought final approval from the Chief of Naval Operations. The mission was scheduled for September, a time of good weather and ample daylight. NP 9 would be within 600 miles of the US Air Force base at Thule, Greenland, the planned launching point for the operation.

ONR selected two highly qualified investigators for the ground assignment. Maj. James Smith, USAF, was an experienced paratrooper and Russian linguist who had served on US Drift Stations Alpha and Charlie. Lt. Leonard A. LeSchack, USNR, a former Antarctic geophysicist, had set up the surveillance system on T-3 in 1960. Although not jump qualified, he quickly went through the course at Lakehurst Naval Air Station. During the summer, the two men trained on the Fulton retrieval system, working in Maryland with an experienced P2V crew at the Naval Air Test Center, Patuxent River.

Some Problems

Meanwhile, ONR's scheme was running into difficulty at the Navy's highest level, as skeptics argued that the plan would never work and likely would cost the lives of the investigators. Thanks largely to Dr. Britton's efforts, approval eventually came through, but not until late September.[12] This meant that the operation could not be launched until the return of well-below-freezing temperatures. When equipment was sent to Eglin Air Force Base for testing in the cold chamber, problems with the gear developed that took several weeks to correct. Also, promises for a support aircraft fell through. All the while, NP 9 kept moving farther away from Thule. "The winter dragged without solution," Captain Cadwalader lamented.

New Target

In March 1962, the mission planners received the unexpected news that the Soviets had abandoned ice station NP 8 in haste after a pressure ridge destroyed its ice runway. A more up-to-date facility than NP 9, it also was in a more accessible position at 83°N 135°W. "With the operation finally about ready to take off," Cadwalader reported, "the target was shifted to this new and tempting target." After the Canadian Government readily agreed to the use of the Royal Canadian Air Force base at Resolute Bay, 600 miles from NP 8, Project Coldfeet got under way.

In mid-April, the P2V and a C-130 support aircraft from Squadron VX-6 departed Patuxent River for Resolute Bay via Fort Churchill. Captain Cadwalader, the project's commander, had hoped that the Hydrographic Office's monthly ice reconnaissance flight that flew between Thule and Point Barrow would provide an up-to-date position on NP 8; bad weather and a navigational error, however, prevented a sighting. Still, with the last known position only a month old and given the general dependability of the Hydrographic Office's drift predictions, he expected no difficulty in finding the target. The C-130 carrying the drop party would locate NP 8, while the P2V would be standing by in case an immediate extraction was necessary.

The hunt for NP 8 began in perfect weather. The C-130 flew to the station's last known position, then began a box search at 10-mile intervals. Hours went by, but nothing could be seen except ice. The next day, the C-130 started searching at five-mile intervals. It spotted the abandoned US Ice Station Charlie but not NP 8. Four more searches failed to reveal the elusive Soviet drift station. With the flight time available for the C-130 running out and the weather deteriorating, Cadwalader called off the operation.

Back in Business

The expedition had no sooner returned to the US when the monthly ice reconnaissance flight on 4 May spotted NP 8 well to the east of its predicted position. ONR remained convinced that Coldfeet could work, but its funding for the project had run out. Perhaps the Intelligence Community, which had displayed interest in the scheme, might be persuaded to support the operation.

As it happened, Fulton had been working with CIA on the development of Skyhook since the fall of 1961. Intermountain Aviation, an Agency proprietary at Marana, Arizona, that specialized in aerial delivery techniques, had equipped a B-17 with the Fulton gear in October. Over the next six months, Intermountain's veteran CIA-contract pilots Connie W. Seigrist and Douglas Price flew numerous practice missions to perfect the equipment needed to infiltrate and extract agents. (They later conducted demonstrations for the Forest Service and Air Force while training for a covert operation to extract fellow CIA-contract pilot Allen L. Pope from an Indonesian prison.)[13]

Fulton then approached Intermountain about participating in Coldfeet. Garfield M. Thorsrud, head of the proprietary, liked the idea. After $30,000 was made available by the Defense Intelligence Agency, Coldfeet was ready to resume, with Intermountain furnishing the Skyhook-equipped B-17 and a C-46 support aircraft for the project.[14]



Intermountain Aviation's B-17 at Point Barrow, May 1962. (Credit: Robert E. Fulton)

The Search for NP 8

On 26 May, the B-17 and C-46 reached Point Barrow, which was selected to replace Resolute Bay in order to avoid the delay in obtaining the necessary diplomatic clearance from the Canadian Government. Carrying William Jordan, an experienced Pan American Airways polar navigator who had been hired by Intermountain, the B-17 began the search for NP 8 the next day.

Seigrist and Price flew a northerly heading at 8,000 feet for almost four hours until they reached the ice station's predicted position. They then descended to 1,500 feet and initiated a square search pattern. The visibility was poor—"a forbidding dusky grey," Siegrist recalled. "It was the most desolate, inhospitable looking and uninviting place I had ever seen." NP 8 never appeared, and the B-17 returned to Point Barrow after more than 13 hours in the air.[15]

On 28 May, assisted by a P2V from Patrol Squadron One at Kodiak, the B-17 located NP 8. Seigrist circled the station while Major Smith and pickup coordinator John D. Wall selected a drop point. Drift streamers determined the wind, then Smith left the aircraft through a "Joe hole," followed by LeSchack. After dropping supplies to the men and receiving a favorable report from Smith over his UHF hand-held radio, the B-17 departed.



Operation Coldfeet, May–June 1962. (Credit: Robert E. Fulton)

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The plan called for Smith and LeSchack to have 72 hours to explore the Soviet base. While they conducted their explorations, Intermountain mechanics Leo Turk and Carson Gerken installed the pickup booms on the nose of the B-17. Seigrist and Price tested the equipment on 30 May by making a practice pickup in front of the Arctic Research Laboratory at Point Barrow.

The next day the mission to retrieve Smith and LeSchack got under way. In addition to pilots Seigrist and Price, the B-17 carried navigator Jordan, coordinator Wall, jumpmaster Miles L. Johnson, winch operator Jerrold B. Daniels, nose-trigger operator Randolph Scott, and tail-position operator Robert H. Nicol. Cadwalader, Fulton, and Thorsrud also climbed aboard to observe the operation.

The weather, Seigrist and Price soon learned, had deteriorated since their last trip over the frozen sea. Warmer temperatures had heated the ice mass, causing dense fog to form. The target eluded the B-17, and it returned to Point Barrow.

After a second fruitless search on 1 June, Thorsrud asked Cadwalader to call out the P2V. The next morning, the P2V took off from Point Barrow two hours and 30 minutes before the B-17. Using its more sophisticated navigational equipment, it quickly located NP 8, then guided the trailing aircraft by UHF/DF steers to the location.

Up, Up, and Away

Conditions for the pickup were marginal at best. The ice had a grey hue, and it was difficult to make out an horizon. The surface wind was blowing at 30 knots, nearing the limits of Skyhook's capability. After inflating the balloon attached to 150 pounds of exposed film, documents, and equipment samples, Smith and LeSchack had to keep a tight hold on the canvas bag containing the cargo lest it be blown away.

As Seigrist lined up for the pickup, the horizon disappeared. "I was instantly in a situation," he recalled, "what could be imagined as flying in a void." The pickup line and its bright orange mylar marker, however, provided sufficient visual clues to enable Seigrist to keep his wings level. He flew into the line, made a good contact, then immediately went over to instrument flying to avoid vertigo. Winch-operator Daniels brought the cargo on board without difficulty.

As prearranged, Price, a former Navy pilot, now took over the left seat to make the pickup of LeSchack. The wind was blowing stronger, and Smith had to struggle to hold LeSchack from being blown away. As the rising balloon caught the wind, LeSchack tore away from Smith's grasp, pitched forward on his stomach, and began to drag across the ice. After 300 feet, his progress was stopped by an ice block. As he lay on the ice and tried to catch his breath, Price hooked into the line.

Smith watched as LeSchack rose slowly into the air, then disappeared throughout the overcast. Although LeSchack rode through the air facing forward, he managed to turn around and assume the correct position before being hauled on board the B-17.

Price and Seigrist again changed seats so that Seigrist could make the final pickup. Smith held tightly to a tractor as he inflated his balloon. Still, he started to drag across the ice until he managed to catch a crack with his heels. He lay on his back as Seigrist approached the line. "The line made contact on the outer portion of the left horn," Seigrist remembers. "It just hung there for what to me was an eternity."

Slowly, the line slid down the horn and into the catching mechanism. As the line streamed along the bottom of fuselage, assistant jumpmaster Johnson reached down through the "Joe hole" and placed a clamp on it. He then signaled nose-trigger operator Scott to release the line. Next tail-position operator Nicol secured the line, Johnson released his clamp, and winch-operator Daniels quickly brought Smith on board. He received a warm welcome from Fulton, Cadwalader, and Thorsrud—and a drink of "medicinal" Scotch.

Major Smith samples "medicinal" Scotch after being winched on board Intermountain's B-17, 2 June 1962. Lieutenant LeShack is in the lower right corner. (Credit: Robert E. Fulton)

Valuable Intelligence

Operation Coldfeet, Cadwalader reported, produced intelligence "of very great value." ONR learned that the Soviet station was configured to permit extended periods of silent operation, confirming the importance that the Soviets attached to acoustical work. In addition, equipment and documents obtained from NP 8 showed that Soviet research in polar meteorology and oceanography was superior to US efforts. "In general," Cadwalader summarized, "the remarkable Soviet accomplishments in their drift stations reflect their long experience in this field and the great importance that their government attaches to it."[16]

Operational Success

Beyond the intelligence obtained, Cadwalader wrote, perhaps the greatest accomplishment of Coldfeet "was to prove the practicality of paradrop and aerotriever recovery to conduct investigations in otherwise inaccessible areas." Certainly, Coldfeet had been an outstanding operational success. The recovery of Smith and LeSchack had been especially challenging. As Admiral Coates wrote to Thorsrud, the pickup had been conducted "under stronger winds and lower visibility than had previously been attempted; nonetheless, through

the exceptional skill of pilots and the coordination and efficiency of the crew, all pickups were made without a hitch, and in the best time (6 1/2 minutes) yet achieved."[17]

While the Skyhook system provided an important asset for all manner of intelligence operations, its utility as a long-range pickup system was somewhat undermined during the 1960s by the development of an aerial refueling capability for helicopters. Still, it appears likely that Fulton's Skyhook did find employment in a number of specialized clandestine operations following Coldfeet, although its subsequent use by CIA and the military services remains shrouded in secrecy.

NOTES

1. The All American system is best described in W. David Lewis and William F. Trimble, *The Airway to Everywhere: A History of All American Aviation, 1937-1953* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988).

2. On Operation Tropic, see William M. Leary, *Perilous Missions: Civil Air Transport and CIA Covert Operations in Asia* (University, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1984), pp. 138-42.

3. Fulton's background is detailed in Wesley Price, "The Automobile Gets Wings," *Saturday Evening Post* 219 (17 May 1947): pp. 51-52, 54, 56. He describes his motorcycle trip in *One-Man Caravan* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1937).

4. Interview with Fulton, 9 November 1988; Robert Lewis Taylor, "Captain Among the Synthetics," *New Yorker* 11 (11 November, 1944): pp. 34-43, and (18 November 1944): pp. 32-43.

5. Price, "The Automobile Gets Wings"; James R. Chiles, "Flying Cars Were a Dream That Never Got Off the Ground." *Smithsonian* 19 (February 1989): pp. 144-46, 148, 150, 152, 154, 156, 158-60, 162; interview with Fulton, 9 November 1988.

6. Interview with Fulton, 28 September 1988.

7. Harvey M. Sapolsky, *Science and the Navy: The History of the Office of Naval Research* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 51.

8. Interview with Fulton, 9 November 1988.

9. "Skyhook-Aerotriever System: Operations Conducted by NADU," *Naval Research Reviews* (October 1960): pp. 18-21; Leonard A. LeSchack, "Skyhook Retrieval," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings* 92 (March 1966): pp. 138-42.

10. "Skyhook," *Naval Research Reviews* (October 1960); pp. 18-21.

11. John Cadwalader, "Operation Coldfeet: An Investigation of the Abandoned Soviet Arctic Drift Station NP 8," *ONI Review* 17 (August 1962): pp. 344-55. I am indebted to Dr. Edward J. Marolda, head, Contemporary History Branch, Naval Historical Center, for a copy of this declassified report.

12. Cadwalader to the author, 30 October, 1989.

13. Connie W. Seigrist, "Coldfeet,"n.d. The author is grateful to Captain Seigrist for a copy of this narrative account of his participation in the operation. Pope had been shot down on 18 May 1958, while flying a B-26 for the CIA-supported rebel group that was trying to topple the Sukarno government. The planned rescue attempt proved unnecessary after Attorney General Robert Kennedy obtained Pope's release in July 1962.

14. The operation finally cost nearly twice the project figure of $30,000 because bad weather led to increased flying time.

15. Seigrist, "Coldfeet." My account of events in May and June 1962 is also based on a telephone interview with Garfield M. Thorsrud, 7 February 1994; Cadwalader, "Project Coldfeet," and the Robert Fulton

Company, "Pictorial Report of Operation 'Cold-feet,' " 23 June 1962. I am indebted to Mr. Fulton for a copy of this report. The accounts vary somewhat in detail, and I have had to reconstruct events on the basis of what seemed to me most logical.

16. Cadwalader, "Project Coldfeet."

17. Coates to Thorsrud, n.d.; copy courtesy of Mr. Thorsrud.

Selection and training

The Role of US Army Military Attachés Between the World Wars

Scott A. Koch

British and American ability to read Axis radio communications during World War II was an important contribution to Allied victory in 1945. Cryptological breakthroughs like ULTRA and MAGIC undeniably were impressive and significant, but most of the information that the US Army had about the armed forces of the Axis powers before December 1941 came from the routine, tedious, and often unappreciated peacetime collection efforts of US Army military attachés.

Attachés were the Army's eyes and ears abroad in the days before satellite photography and sophisticated electronic intelligence collection techniques. They were not spies. They used overt means and sources to collect facts about foreign weapons specifications, military doctrine, and order of battle.

The US Army had military attachés in Rome, Berlin, and Tokyo in the 1920s and 1930s. They stayed until the United States entered World War II in December 1941. American officers watched the Fascists consolidate their rule in Italy, Hitler rearm Germany, and Japan begin its march of conquest in Asia. They sent thousands of reports on these developments to the Military Intelligence Division (MID) of the War Department General Staff (WDGS) in Washington. Most reports languished forgotten in the files, even though the arms and services (infantry, cavalry, artillery) could borrow copies for study.

The overwhelming majority of reports were heavily factual and were too narrowly focused to be useful to the War Plans Division, the strategic planning arm of the WDGS. They covered such topics as the number of men in a motorized rifle regiment, the specifications of a new 105-mm cannon, or how a combat engineer company functioned. These reports were surprisingly accurate. Others, dealing with speculative and nonquantifiable matters like civil-military relations, proved wildly wrong. In 1934, for example, the American military attaché in Berlin reported that a monarchical restoration under the leadership of Field Marshal Ludendorff was imminent.

There is no evidence that attaché reports influenced either American weapons development or strategic planning before the war. Prof. Ernest May of Harvard concludes that the forces with which the United States entered World War II "were designed virtually without analysis of intelligence about potential enemies. Roosevelt and his armed services simply ordered the most powerful weapons which American industry could produce and Congress would finance."

MID's files were an underused source of information about Axis military power. One reason may be the Army's attitude toward its attachés and their work. Officers went overseas with almost no training except in codes and rudimentary finances. Officially, the Army maintained that it chose only the best men and gave them superlative training. This position contrasted sharply with the attachés' experiences and recollections.

The Orphan Branch

Attracting talented officers to intelligence work and to attaché positions was a constant problem before World War II. During the appropriations hearings for fiscal year 1942, Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2 (Military Intelligence), testified that his branch often had difficulty persuading officers that intelligence was a specialized job. Many officers considered attaché duty a career dead end. Lt. Col. Truman

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The author retains a copy with full citations for interested readers.

Smith, one of the most successful American military attachés in Berlin before World War II, called MID the orphan branch of the General Staff and discovered that attachés "lacked prestige and were little regarded or listened to."

Much of the blame for this perception rests with MID and the Army itself, for neither did anything to persuade officers that intelligence work was important and could be a valuable career in its own right. Attachés were on temporary detail from their branch or service and returned when their tour ended. Most talented and ambitious officers sought combat command positions, promising greater chances of promotion, and considered noncombat assignments, like intelligence, obstacles to advancement.

General Miles indirectly blamed the Army's promotion policy for G–2's inability to attract talented officers. After the war, he told Congress during the hearings on Pearl Harbor that military intelligence never attracted the numbers of top-quality officers that he would have liked. He acknowledged that, because many of the best officers preferred combat commands, "We did not have a free field for the selection of personnel, and quite rightly. We did the best we could with the personnel and the funds we had available."

Besides its promotion policies that favored the command of combat troops, the Army failed to provide the attaché corps with a career educational system. The high command never encouraged the attaché corps to develop its own identity and tradition through a system of specialized and progressive training courses. Unlike the combat arms, which had their own school systems imparting the finer points of their craft, attachés could not attend a basic, then intermediate, then advanced attaché course. This type of education fostered professionalism and esprit de corps in the combat arms and led combat officers to identify closely with their branch.

Selection and Training

Any officer could indicate his interest in attaché duty on a duty preference card. The chiefs of the different branches also compiled lists of suitable and available candidates. MID placed this information in its files, along with language proficiency lists.

When an attaché post became vacant, MID compiled a list of officers with the desired qualifications. The division compared the candidates' efficiency ratings and then ranked the officers. The tentative choice was the man with the best overall qualification willing to accept the assignment. MID then wrote a memorandum to the Chief of Staff—in which the officer's branch chief and G–1 (Personnel) of the WDGS concurred—recommending the appointment. If the Chief of Staff approved, the appointee became the Army's newest military attaché.

No officer went to his new post without receiving prolonged and intensive training, according to statements in MID's files. In the annual report of intelligence activities prepared on 30 June 1931, G–2 claimed that it familiarized attachés with conditions in their host country, told them what information G-2 had about the host country, and told them what information was missing. Gen. Harry Knight, Chief of G–2, told War College students that new attachés received extensive instruction in principles, policies, and procedures as well as definite missions to accomplish overseas.

Reality was different. Knight and the upper levels of the Army's intelligence bureaucracy may have *thought* that attaché training was exemplary, but the recollections of the men "trained" as attachés is so different that one wonders if they were all in the same army.

Before Maj. Truman Smith became the military attaché in Berlin in 1935, he spent two weeks in training at MID. During his time in Washington, he said that he received superficial instruction in codes and finance but little else. Nonetheless, he thought the time he spent was valuable, for he discovered "how inadequately organized, staffed, and financed the MID was."

Maj. Ivan Yeaton reached the same conclusion when he was preparing to become the military attaché in Moscow in 1939. G–2's instruction in security and codes left him "with the feeling that it had been a very superficial course." Yeaton also learned that G–2's files on the Soviet Union were underevaluated and unorganized. No one in the East Europe section—which covered the Soviet Union—seemed to know what to do with the

files. Reports on Soviet military organization, strategy, tactics, weapons, and similar topics overwhelmingly relied on official Soviet sources. Yeaton got the impression that the attaché in Moscow could obtain nothing other than what the Soviet authorities wanted him to have.

Conspicuously absent from Smith's and Yeaton's accounts is any kind of writing instruction. An attaché spent much of his time writing reports but received no training to help him prepare them effectively. The art of drafting a coherent, concise, and thorough narrative escaped most officers. "My observation is that if there is any one thing in which the average Army officer is weak," the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2 complained in 1923, "it is in his ability to paint a brief pen picture of a situation and not to clutter it up with details and data as to make it unintelligible."

Some attachés were able, through their own ability, to write effective reports in spite of MID's failure to prepare them for this task. Others were not, and the results were predictable. The military attaché in Cuba, for example, peppered MID with superficial and useless reports. An exasperated Col. J. A. Crane, chief of the Attaché Section in MID, carefully explained to him the types of reports Washington needed. "Picture a hemisphere situation arising which necessitates the United States sending the assistance of an expeditionary force," Crane wrote to the hapless officer. "Picture yourself as the Commanding General of this force. Then ask yourself what information you and your staff *must* have before you can make intelligence plans for the expedition."

The culmination of an attaché's "training" was a final interview with the Chief of Staff. Truman Smith's meeting with Gen. Douglas MacArthur was perfunctory but memorable:

> I was shown in to General MacArthur. He was seated at his desk, his jacket of a loud rancous [sic] tweed, smoking a cigarette. He looked at me considering, waved me to a chair and began pacing the room back and forth as was his custom when considering a problem, smoking furiously. He stopped in front of me. I rose.
>
> "You are very young to be going to Berlin."
>
> "Yes, sir."
>
> Pacing again. I sat down.
>
> He confronted me again. I rose.
>
> "You have no rank."
>
> "Yes, sir."
>
> Pacing. Then he stopped once more and once more I rose.
>
> "Well, Smith, I have only this to say to you. I have long noted when young officers go abroad they very soon end up in the British pocket. Now, Smith, my advice to you is never go to bed with a corpse."
>
> He waved me away.

With that advice, Smith left for Berlin.

Problems at the Post

When an attaché arrived at his new post he faced obstacles concerning rank, language, money, and his relationship with the Ambassador. MID gradually addressed the first, was ambivalent about the second, was powerless to do anything about the third, and left the fourth to the personality of the attaché himself.

Other members of the local attaché corps usually outranked the new American attaché. Maj. W. E. Shipp, the military attaché in Riga, Latvia, wrote that foreign officers regarded the American attachés with a mixture of amusement and condescension. Foreign attachés, usually colonels and generals, believed that their American colleagues were little more than ambassadorial aides with social duties.

Some attachés could speak the language of their host country; many could not. Language proficiency was controversial. Brig. Gen. W. K. Naylor, Chief of G–2, told an Army War College class in 1923 that whether an attaché should be able to speak the language of his host-country was "open to question." Naylor

feared that an attaché fluent in his host-country's language risked losing his objectivity. Most attachés strongly disagreed because the ability to speak with foreign officers was an essential part of an attaché's duties. Based on personal experience, Major Shipp suggested to MID that *every* officer sent to a foreign country meet minimum language requirements. MID ignored Shipp's advice.

Lack of money was a constant problem that MID never solved. MID wanted its attachés to have an independent source of income to supplement their pay and allowances because, as one head of G–2 admitted, "in many foreign countries an officer's pay and allowances do not permit him creditably to represent his government." Attachés received many invitations to parties and receptions and had to reciprocate. Lt. Col. Truman Smith called this part of the job "very trying and very boring," but social functions were lucrative sources for collecting information informally. The British military attaché in Berlin, Maj. Kenneth Strong, recalled that German officers routinely volunteered sensitive and valuable information about their country's rearmament because they thought another war with Great Britain would ruin Germany.

The United States was in a serious economic depression, and Congress was not about to increase MID's budget so that a few attachés could host cocktail parties in Paris, Berlin, Rome, London, Moscow, and Tokyo. Unfortunately, the annual appropriations battle reinforced the perception in the Army at large that the attaché corps was nothing more than a well-heeled country club.

All American military attachés were directly responsible to the War Department through the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, but they also were members of the Embassy staff and advised the Ambassador on all military matters affecting US national interests. The Ambassador, as the accredited representative of the US Government, technically was the attaché's commanding officer and could have him recalled for any reason.

Cordial relations between the Ambassador and attaché sometimes were difficult to maintain. William Dodd, one of the American ambassadors to Germany in the 1930s, had a poor opinion of the military attachés on the Embassy staff. Dodd believed that attaché training was deficient, that the attachés were unduly attracted to the discipline of the Nazi Reich, and that they were not suited for their real mission, which he imagined was spying.

The Ambassador thought that his attaché, Col. Jacob W. S. Wuest, lacked objectivity and analytical skill. "Wuest," he wrote, "knows German well, and is watchful of his opportunities, but the military appeal is strong and he instinctively approves of the army drills and demonstrations—contradictory as these are to the interests of the United States." Dodd had little patience with what he considered Wuest's hysterical overreactions to German rearmament.

In October 1934, Dodd confided to his diary that Wuest predicted imminent war. The attaché had just returned from a motor trip around Germany in which he saw extensive military activity. Dodd dismissed Wuest's warning because the attaché "was not specific and I had little time to listen."

When Maj. Truman Smith arrived in Berlin in August 1935 to relieve Wuest, he knew his relationship with Dodd might be a problem. Smith decided that he would try to maintain a good working relationship with the Ambassador and his staff—regardless of the difficulties.

If Dodd thought that Wuest was hysterical and infatuated with the German Army, Smith believed that the Ambassador was uninterested in German rearmament. Smith later recalled that "not once in the two ensuing years of Dr. Dodd's service in Berlin did the Ambassador make any request of the military attaché to furnish him data on either the German Army or air expansion."

Conclusions

After the war, Congress held extensive hearings on the intelligence failure that led to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. No hearings were held to determine whether the US Army adequately prepared its military attachés for duty or whether MID properly used their intelligence reports. Why were Congress, the War Department, and the Army evidently satisfied with a

training system that by today's standards was deficient? In part, attachés collected "departmental intelligence" for the MID rather than what Sherman Kent would later term "strategic intelligence" for the president. The Army never intended that the military information the attachés collected was to aid in the formulation and conduct of American foreign policy; it was for the Army's defense planning. More important, defense planning before the war was based upon different assumptions than it is today.

The armed services used the intelligence they gathered for their own planning, which the 1930's doctrine of "national defense" narrowly circumscribed. With President Wilson's crusade in Europe over, Americans rushed to what President Harding called a "return to normalcy." The widespread belief that the war was an aberration directly affected the US Army's planning by focusing efforts on the defense of the continental United States.

The doctrine of "national defense" reflected the country's prevailing political climate of isolationism, for it required only that the Army defeat an armed invasion of US territory. Sending another expeditionary force overseas, as Wilson did in 1917, was unthinkable for most policymakers and the majority of the public. Historian Charles Beard spoke for many Americans in 1939 when he wrote that "Not until some formidable European power comes into the western Atlantic, breathing the fire of aggression and conquest, need the United States become alarmed about the ups and downs of European conflicts, intrigues, aggressions, and war." According to this view, which many policymakers and public opinion leaders held, a small constabulary army and a navy dedicated primarily to coastal defense were sufficient for American needs.

The Army's intelligence requirements to meet its obligations under "national defense" were minimal. All military planners needed to know were a potential enemy's order of battle, tables of organization and equipment, doctrine, and mobilization and manpower figures. Consequently, the digests that the MID kept on each country were factually heavy and analytically light.

The MID did not analyze intelligence as contemporary professionals understand the idea. Emphasis on analysis began after the war, when the *US Strategic Bombing Survey* revealed that many American conceptions and assumptions about the German economy's ability to produce war materiel were wrong. Instead of simply amassing facts, the intelligence bureaucracy needed some way to translate the mass of data into meaningful conclusions. Doing this effectively required integrating traditional military variables with psychological, political, and social considerations.

The early bias in favor of collection rather than analysis extended to the military attachés in the field. Their superiors expected them neither to analyze information nor to synthesize and explain raw data. Their job was to collect the kinds of quantifiable information that MID wanted. MID probably considered extensive training unnecessary, because the division assumed its attachés could count and could easily compile order-of-battle data, production figures, and mobilization projections.

Improved training may have enabled the US Army's military attachés to write more accurate and useful reports, but better reports likely would have made no significant difference in the Army's preparation for combat in 1941. The attachés were part of a system that discouraged the development of intelligence professionalism. That system would change only after the shock of global war and the emergence of the United States as a superpower with worldwide security interests.

CIA's early days

Historical Intelligence Documents

Editor's Note: The following reprints are part of a series designed to illustrate important events in the history of CIA.

Document 1

The first page of the minutes of the DCI's staff meeting on 23 September 1947, in which he announces the establishment of CIA.

Document 2

The final issue of the *Daily Summary*, dated 20 February 1951. It was the the intelligence digest prepared by CIA for President Truman. The *Current Intelligence Bulletin* (CIB) replaced it.

Document 3

A note from President Truman to DCI Smith giving his reaction to the CIB.

Document 1

MINUTES OF STAFF MEETING

23 September 1947

9:00 AM

PRESENT:

Director	- Rear Admiral Hillenkoetter
Executive Director	- Captain W. C. Ford
ICAPS	- Captain H. C. Doan
OCD	- Captain C. E. Olsen
OO	- Brig.General E. Sibert
	Mr. George Carey
ORE	- Mr. Theodore Babbitt
	Captain A.H. McCollum
OSO	- Colonel Donald Galloway
Inspection & Security	- Colonel S. Edwards
Administration & Management	- Colonel L.T. Shannon
General Counsel	- Mr. L. R. Houston
Advisory Council	- Captain J. Finnegan
Secretary, NIA	- Mr. John S. Earman
Personal Ass't to the Director	- Mr. R.A. Richard

Document No. ---
No Change in Class. ☐
☒ Declassified
Class. Changed to: TS (S) C
Next Review Date: ---
Auth: NR 70-3
Date: 22 may 90 By: 087 157

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DIRECTOR:

We are now known as the Central Intelligence Agency. According to the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, CIG became CIA the day following the date Mr. Forrestal was sworn in. Mr. Hill, Admiral Souers and the Director have not yet been sworn in -- this may take place today. Until such time as the Director is sworn in, certain provisions of the Act will not be put into effect, for instance, the section authorising CIA to terminate employment of individuals found undesirable.

The Director wishes that we continue using our present letterhead stationery until supply is exhausted, as an economy measure.

Mr. Forrestal is moving to his new offices in the newly-designated National Defense Building (formerly the Pentagon). No decision has as yet been made with regard to other agencies who might be moved to the National Defense Building.

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR:

Captain Ford stated that the Monthly Progress Reports of the Branches are being circulated to the other Branch chiefs -- their circulation, however, should be limited to the Branch chiefs only and should not go to the lower levels.

HS/HC-461

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Document 2

20 FEB 1951

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GENERAL

1. Embassy Moscow's analysis of Stalin interview--US Embassy Moscow, in commenting on the 16 February Stalin interview in Pravda, expresses the view that the most significant aspect of the interview is the discussion of the inevitability of war. Pointing out that Stalin declared war can become inevitable if "the deception practiced by warmongers" is successful, the Embassy remarks that this constitutes a notice to the Soviet people and others that war is a possibility.

The Embassy considers that the interview as a whole may have been calculated to: (a) establish a favorable popular attitude toward the Soviet position prior to the prospective CFM exploratory talks; (b) give new momentum to the "peace drive" on the eve of the World Peace Council meeting; (c) demonstrate the "reasonableness and righteousness" of Soviet policy for the benefit of peoples in the Soviet orbit and wavering Communists abroad; (d) nourish popular dissatisfaction in the West over the economic burdens of rearmament; and (e) widen the split now evident in the UN between Asiatic and NATO countries.

The Embassy comments that in this interview Stalin has permitted his reputation for superior wisdom to become involved in much more sophistry than previously. This may reflect a greater degree of Soviet vulnerability on the issues involved; it may reveal a feeling on the part of Soviet leaders that Stalin's authority is the margin needed to assure popular support abroad for Soviet foreign policy; or it may reflect a Soviet belief that Stalin's intervention will cause sufficient confusion to pave the way for success in any adventure to be undertaken in the near future.

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No. 31 MAR 1978 023

Document 2 (continued)

Looking at the question of what strategy is desirable for the US and the "free world," in the light of Stalin's pronouncements, the Embassy observes that Stalin has attempted to regain a measure of the diplomatic initiative wrested from him through effective inauguration of a Western defense program and that it is consequently important that the program be continued vigorously.

EUROPE

2. YUGOSLAVIA: Tito warns Communists to accept policy--US Embassy Belgrade, in commenting on a speech by Tito before a Communist Party group, notes that Tito warned Yugoslav Communists to accept Yugoslav foreign policy and declared that dissension on this point "would not be tolerated." The Embassy observes that there is probably a minority among Yugoslav Communists who find it difficult to accept a Yugoslav-Western rapprochement and that this speech was aimed at such elements. The Embassy has long felt some danger that Tito, in reorienting the Yugoslav Government toward the West, might get too far ahead of the Communist Party. It is now apparent that the Party leadership is aware of the problem and has taken steps to meet it.

FAR EAST

3. CHINA: Reported Russian military control in Peiping--The US Air Attache in Taipei transmits a report from a source in Peiping that Russian officials there called a meeting on 6 February of the Chinese responsible for

Document 2 (continued)

garrison control of the Peiping area and told the Chinese that the military control in the Peiping area was too weak. The Chinese Commander reportedly stood up to defend his position and was told to sit down and shut up. According to this report, the Chinese were then told that a Russian Commander would give orders in the Peiping area in the future. The Chinese made no open protest but deeply resent such control by the Russians.

Source also reported that several Chinese representatives who returned to Peiping from the recent Moscow Conference said that the Korean cease-fire discussions have closed, with the conclusion that no further cease-fire proposal will be presented to the UN.

Document 3

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

U. S. Naval Station,
Key West, Florida,
March 8, 1951.

Dear Bedel:

I have been reading the Intelligence Bulletin and I am highly impressed with it.

I believe you have hit the jackpot with this one.

Sincerely,

Harry Truman

General Walter B. Smith,
Director, Central Intelligence Agency,
Washington 25, D. C.

1960 summit conference

General de Gaulle In Action

Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters

This article originally appeared in the winter 1974 edition of Studies in Intelligence.

On 14 May 1960 I left the United States with President Eisenhower to attend the Four-Power Meeting in Paris among the USSR, France, Great Britain, and the United States. This conference had been scheduled for some time, but its convening had been in doubt following the crash of the U-2 in the Soviet Union and the capture of its pilot, Gary Powers. After a period of doubt, General de Gaulle had announced that the conference would be held as scheduled and the other chiefs of government had successively announced that they would attend. When Khrushchev announced he would attend, a worldwide sigh of relief went up.

Shortly after arriving in Paris on 15 May, I accompanied President Eisenhower on his call on President de Gaulle. As always, the meeting between the two was most cordial, almost affectionate. I had accompanied a number of American dignitaries to see General de Gaulle; the two he did not really talk down to were General Eisenhower and Governor Harriman. But only to Eisenhower did he show real warmth.

De Gaulle said Khrushchev had been to see him and was highly excited about the U-2 overflights. He had read to de Gaulle a long statement denouncing the overflights and demanding an apology from President Eisenhower. De Gaulle, who had with him only his superb English and Russian interpreter Constantin Andronikof, added, "Obviously you cannot apologize but you must decide how you wish to handle this. I will do everything I can to be helpful without being openly partisan."

He said he had asked Khrushchev whether under these circumstances they should go ahead with the conference. He had had his Ambassador in Moscow put this question to Khrushchev before he left Moscow, and Khrushchev had said that they should. He had repeated the question to Khrushchev after his arrival in Paris, and again he had said that they should go ahead. De Gaulle had indicated to Khrushchev that he could not seriously expect that the U. S. President would apologize to him. This sort of thing was not done among serious chiefs of government. But Khrushchev had been adamant that Eisenhower must apologize for the U-2 flight. De Gaulle felt that Khrushchev's readiness to go ahead with the conference after he had told him that Eisenhower could not be expected to apologize was a hopeful sign, but he added, "We shall see."

The U.S. delegation was clearly embarrassed by the shootdown and Powers's confession, but it was determined that Khrushchev would not be allowed to use this for public humiliation of the United States. President Eisenhower clearly felt that in the discharge of his responsibilities to the United States he must ascertain the measure of the threat against it, and, with a closed society such as the Soviet one we faced, there was no way other than by such imaginative methods as the U-2. After all, Soviet satellites had already overflown the United States, and the Soviets had published pictures taken by cameras aboard such satellites.

The conference was held in the Elysée Palace, the traditional residence of the presidents of France. It was held in a large, high-ceilinged room on the second floor of the Elysée, only a few rooms removed from General de Gaulle's office. The windows looked out to the south and west over the gardens of the Elysée. In the center of the room was a large table in the form of a square. General de Gaulle and the French delegation sat on the east side, nearest to de Gaulle's office. Opposite him sat the U.S. delegation (I was seated at the far right of

the U.S. delegation, closest to the Soviets). On the right of the U.S. were the Soviets, and facing them were the British.

As I entered the room with President Eisenhower and General de Gaulle, who had met him at the top of the stairs, the Russians were already there, standing around talking together. Eisenhower greeted the other French delegates and the British, but the Russians kept talking among themselves, and so Eisenhower walked around to his own side of the table and sat down with the Secretary of State beside him. After a few minutes, General de Gaulle called the meeting to order, and all who were still standing sat down.

General de Gaulle then greeted the chiefs of delegation, thanked them for coming, and expressed the hope that the meeting which was about to begin would be fruitful and contribute to world peace. He then said that inasmuch as President Eisenhower was the only other chief of delegation who was also a chief of state, he would give him the floor first. Khrushchev, obviously agitated, stood up and said that he had asked to speak first and that as chiefs of delegation they were all equal. He demanded the right to read a prepared statement first. De Gaulle, when this outburst was translated, raised his eyebrows and looked questioningly at General Eisenhower, who nodded. De Gaulle then gave the floor to Khrushchev. Khrushchev stood up and began to read from a prepared statement in a very loud voice. This was clearly the same statement he had read to de Gaulle previously. De Gaulle assumed a pained but patient expression as Khrushchev rumbled on. From time to time, he would pause for translation and take a drink of water.

I had been strongly enjoined by the State Department not to wear my uniform as this was a "peace conference." Notwithstanding this, Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Rodion Malinovsky was there glowering in full uniform. As Khrushchev thundered on, I fell to counting the ribbons on Malinovsky's chest. There were 54, including, as I noted with some interest, the U.S. Legion of Merit. At one point as Khrushchev read (and I noticed that his hands trembled as he held the piece of paper he was reading—whether from agitation, anxiety or anger, I do not know), he raised his voice even louder. De Gaulle interrupted, turned to the Soviet interpreter, rather than his own, and said, "The acoustics is this room are excellent. We can all hear the Chairman. There is no need for him to raise his voice." The Russian interpreter blanched, turned to Khrushchev with a faltering voice, and translated. Khrushchev paused, looked over the top of his glasses, and cast a furious glance at General de Gaulle and then continued reading in a somewhat less loud voice.

As Khrushchev read, he was clearly lashing himself into an even greater frenzy, and, as he denounced the U.S. overflights, he pointed at the ceiling as though a U-2 were overhead at that moment. De Gaulle interrupted to say that he too had been overflown. "By your American allies?" asked Khrushchev. "No," said General de Gaulle, "by you. Yesterday that satellite you launched just before you left Moscow to impress us overflew the sky of France 18 times without my permission. How do I know you do not have cameras aboard which are taking pictures of my country?" De Gaulle crossed his arms and looked at Khrushchev questioningly. Khrushchev's jaw dropped. Then an almost beatific expression came over his face. He raised both hands above his head and said clearly. "*Bog menya videt. Moi ruki chisti.* (God sees me. My hands are clean.) You don't think I would do a thing like that?" "Well," said General de Gaulle, "how did you take those pictures of the far side of the moon which you showed us with such justifiable pride?" "Ah," said Khrushchev, "in that one I had cameras." "Ah," said General de Gaulle, "in that one you had cameras. Pray, continue."

This exchange had upset Khrushchev, and his hands trembled even more as he continued reading his long statement. While he was talking, State Department Counselor and former Ambassador to Moscow Chip Bohlen kept grumbling, "We can't sit still for this. We've got to answer." Eisenhower sat silently listening to the original and its translation. He doodled impatiently with a pencil. (I still have the doodle, as I picked it up when he left the table.) His face and neck were flushed, however, and I could tell he was extremely angry. I had worked closely for General Eisenhower for a number of years, and I had never seen an outburst of temper, but long experience had taught me the signs of anger on his part, and they were all present here. Once or twice he looked at de Gaulle, who was sitting there with a slightly bored expression. He had already heard

all of this from Khrushchev. The British Prime Minister was uneasy as he looked at the angry Khrushchev, the flushed Eisenhower, and the bored de Gaulle.

At one point Khrushchev exclaimed, "What devil made the Americans do this?" De Gaulle observed that there were devils everywhere, on both sides, that this was a matter of espionage such as went on all the time and was not worthy of the consideration of chiefs of government to whom the peoples of the world were looking for hopes of peace. Khrushchev shook his head like a bull and went on reading. He finally ended his long diatribe by announcing that, unless President Eisenhower apologized, he would not attend the conference.

President Eisenhower then made a mollifying statement containing many of the justifications used publicly for the U-2 flights and said that U.S. aircraft would not overfly the USSR again. Khrushchev angrily repeated that he would not attend any further meetings of the conference if Eisenhower did not apologize.

De Gaulle said, "Chairman Khrushchev, you have imposed conditions that are obviously impossible for General Eisenhower to accept. Before you left Moscow and after the U-2 was shot down, I sent my Ambassador to see you to ask whether this meeting should be held or should be postponed. You knew everything then that you know now. You told my Ambassador that this conference should be held and that it would be fruitful. I repeated this question to you when I saw you alone before this meeting, and once again you said it should be held. Now, by imposing conditions that cannot be met by the American President, you make it impossible to go further. You have brought Mr. MacMillan here from London, General Eisenhower from the United States and have put me to serious inconvenience to attend a meeting which your intransigence would make impossible. We should all reflect on this and on the hopes that the people of the world have placed in this meeting and meet again here tomorrow at the same time."

Khrushchev jumped to his feet and said that unless Eisenhower apologized he would not come. De Gaulle looked at him as one would look at a naughty child and announced that the conference would meet on the following day. Khrushchev, accompanied by his whole delegation, strode out of the room and down the stairs. The other delegations looked at one another. De Gaulle said that he would stay in touch with the Russians. All then rose and started out of the room. De Gaulle came over to Eisenhower and took him by the arm. He took me also by the elbow and, taking us a little apart, he said to Eisenhower, "I do not know what Khrushchev is going to do, nor what is going to happen, but whatever he does, I want you to know that I am with you to the end." I was astounded at this statement, and Eisenhower was clearly moved by his unexpected expression of unconditional support. Only the three of us heard it, but it remains vivid in my mind to this day 15 years later. Eisenhower thanked de Gaulle, who walked down the stairs with him to his car. As we entered the car, Eisenhower, still upset by the whole episode, looked at me and said of de Gaulle, "He's quite a guy." We drove the short distance to the U.S. Embassy Residence, then on Avenue d'Iéna, where the U.S. delegation went into a meeting to decide what to do next.

I was not privy to this discussion and do not know what was decided, but President Eisenhower's mollifying statement and promise that the U-2s would not overfly the Soviet Union had evidently not done the job of bringing Khrushchev back to the conference table, and Eisenhower's pending invitation to visit the USSR was obviously withdrawn.

In the meantime, Khrushchev had been holding a stormy and furious press conference making veiled threats and inveighing against the treacherous nature of the United States. Next day at the time appointed de Gaulle, MacMillan, and Eisenhower met in the same room in the Elysée where the meeting had taken place the previous day. The three delegations sat looking slightly sheepishly at one another and General de Gaulle said that he had had no word from Khrushchev, but he was out "kissing babies on the street and generally electioneering for the French Communist Party." Marshal Malinovsky was out near Verdun, where Malinovsky had been a sergeant in the two Russian divisions fighting in France in WW I, and "where he had attempted to subvert the Russian troops from fighting with the Allies." After some wait, General de Gaulle gave an order to contact Khrushchev and ask him whether or not he would attend the meeting. After a further delay, an

assistant came into the room to say that Khrushchev had sent word he would not attend the meeting unless President Eisenhower apologized. De Gaulle looked furious, MacMillan, crushed by the news, and Eisenhower, torn between embarrassment and anger. De Gaulle turned to the assistant and said that Khrushchev had been invited in writing; therefore, he should reply in writing. A few minutes later the aide came back in to say that Khrushchev had answered that he would not answer in writing. De Gaulle said to the aide, "Tell him it is the usage between civilized nations to reply to written communications by written communications." The aide departed to return a few minutes later to announce that Khrushchev would answer in writing but would not come.

De Gaulle, who appeared pleased to have won this minor point, adjourned the conference. To my surprise neither de Gaulle, who did not seem unduly shaken, nor MacMillan, who was clearly staggered by the whole business, ever suggested, even indirectly, that Eisenhower should apologize.

Adenauer, who was still in Paris, appeared relieved that at least Germany would not pay the cost of a four-power agreement.

President Eisenhower then left for Portugal, where he was given a most warm welcome by President Tomas and Prime Minister Salazar.

It seemed to me that the Soviets had gambled on a capitulation by Eisenhower and were disoriented when it was not forthcoming. They had counted on both de Gaulle and MacMillan to pressure Eisenhower for some form of apology, and this had not happened.

I have often been irritated and antagonized by some of the things General de Gaulle has said publicly where he sometimes appeared to equate the USSR and the United States as threats to the grandeur and independence of France. But I have not forgotten the statement he made at this crucial time—"Whatever happens or whatever he does, we will be with you to the end."

Seven years later, I returned to Paris as the U.S. military attaché, shortly after General de Gaulle had taken France out of the integrated military structure of NATO and had asked the United States to remove its military presence from France. I could not help but wonder what had led us from the first statement of unconditional support to the second situation. During the years between 1967 and my departure from France in 1972, I tried as a matter of personal curiosity as well as of national interest to ascertain what had led General de Gaulle to undergo such a change. I never asked General de Gaulle point blank, but I did talk to him about his philosophy of the defense of France. I talked to many of his closest military and naval aides, some of whom I had known for more than 20 years, and I came to the following conclusion, based not just on what they told me but also on what I remembered of the discussions between General de Gaulle and General Eisenhower on nuclear weapons and their use.

In 1962, when President Kennedy had sent Dean Acheson and Sherman Kent to see General de Gaulle and to show him the photographs of the Soviet nuclear-tipped rockets in Cuba, General de Gaulle, unlike many of the European leaders, had accepted that it might be necessary for the United States to take preemptive military action against Cuba. He was a man who understood the uses of power, and he watched carefully to see what we would do. When he saw that instead of taking such action, we appeared to him to have made an agreement with Khrushchev by which we took our missiles out of Greece and Turkey in return for the withdrawal of Soviet missiles in Cuba, he felt that we had not really won the Cuban missile confrontation. One of his closest aides said to me that de Gaulle had told his entourage, "If the Americans will not fight for Cuba 90 miles from the United States, they will not fight for Europe 3,500 miles away. I must draw the conclusions from this that affect France's independence and defense." I cannot prove this, but nearly all my contacts close to de Gaulle reflected something very like this.

I remembered sitting before the fire at Rambouillet Castle in 1959 between General Eisenhower and General de Gaulle in bathrobes after dinner and de Gaulle saying, "You, Eisenhower, would go to nuclear war for Europe because you know what its loss would mean and you are bound to us by special ties. As the Soviet Union develops the capability to strike with nuclear

rockets the cities of North America, one of your unknown successors will decide to go to nuclear war only if there is a nuclear strike against North America. When that day comes, I or my unknown successor must have in hand the nuclear means to turn what the Soviets may want to be a conventional war into a nuclear war. I do not seek to compete with SAC or the Long Range Air Army, but I wish France to have the means of some tactical and strategic strike against the Soviet Union. The addition of another center of nuclear decision will multiply the uncertainties of the Soviet planners. You Americans could survive—for a short time—the loss of Western Europe. We Europeans could not."

Spy stories

Of Moles and Molehunters

Cleveland C. Cram

Editor's Note: The following background essay first appeared in a monograph published by the Center for the Study of Intelligence in October 1993.

The year 1975 was a watershed in literature about the CIA. Before that time, only a few outsiders, usually professional journalists, had written books critical of the Agency. Most of the others were neutral or even positive, especially those written by former Agency officials like Allen Dulles and Lyman Kirkpatrick. But in 1975 a disgruntled former Agency employee, Philip Agee, published his highly critical book, *Inside the Company: CIA Diary*. Books by other ex-employees—J. B. Smith, John Stockwell, Victor Marchetti (with J. D. Marks), and R. W. McGehee—followed in quick succession, each exposing highly confidential material.

These authors usually wrote about subjects of which they had special knowledge, and the cumulative effect was to breach the walls of confidentiality that had protected Agency operations and personnel. Although the net effect was damaging—especially in the case of Agee, who disclosed the identities of officers serving abroad under cover—information about sensitive operations against the Soviet Union and its intelligence organs was not compromised.

A Turning Point

The change that occurred in the mid-1970s began when Edward J. Epstein published a series of articles that later, in 1978, were the basis for his book, *Legend: The Secret World of Lee Harvey Oswald*. The articles, and especially the book, publicized for the first time clashes that had occurred within the Agency between the Counterintelligence (CI) Staff and the Soviet Division over the bona fides of a KGB defector named Yuriy Nosenko. Because Epstein's writings contained so much information about sensitive CIA and FBI operations, it was generally assumed he had a willing and knowledgeable source, either a serving officer (considered doubtful) or a retired senior person with wide knowledge of anti-Soviet operations overseas and in the United States. Neither the articles nor the book was annotated, however. Epstein stated that he had spoken occasionally with James Angleton, the retired chief of CIA's CI Staff, but did not acknowledge that he was the source. [1]

When Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) William Colby dismissed him in 1974, Angleton for the next six months spent part of his time at Langley, introducing members of the new CI Staff to such people as his defector friend, Anatole Golitsyn. Gradually, however, the former counterintelligence chief realized that his career with the CIA in fact was finished. The dismissal was a terrible blow; he became embittered and withdrew for a time into alcohol.

Later, the press began to seek him out, and this revived his combative spirit. Angleton began to play off one writer against another, planting his ideas and opinions among them. He also changed his luncheon venue from a local Washington restaurant to the more politically congenial atmosphere of the Army-Navy Club. A counterattack was planned against the Agency, in particular the new CI Staff. His objective was to prove how wrong its assessment of Soviet operations was and to indict his successors for negligence of duty.

In this period, Angleton, while not neglecting the possibility of KGB penetration, stressed his belief that the main threat came from KGB deception and disinformation. To support his thesis, he continually cited

evidence that Golitsyn had provided. Angleton's ideas, propounded by Epstein and other writers, caught fire and created a virtual cottage industry of academic and think tank specialists on the issues he raised.

Angleton's British allies took a different line. They concentrated on KGB penetration because events in the United Kingdom provided some exceptional examples, such as the treachery of Sir Anthony Blunt, which became public in 1979. Moles in Her Majesty's Government became a public scandal when the traitors in the Cambridge "Ring of Five"[2] were exposed, embarrassing the Thatcher government and culminating in the 1986 *Spycatcher* trial in Australia.

The American and Canadian Scenes

In 1975, Aaron Latham, a young writer interested in the CIA, contacted Angleton. Latham, who held a doctorate in literature from Princeton and was editor of *New York Magazine*, was attracted by Angleton's association with Ezra Pound and other American poets. An initial two-hour call was followed by luncheon and visits to Angleton's home and orchid sheds. Latham wanted to write about the CIA and claims he decided to do a fictional work on the advice of Victor Marchetti, a former CIA officer who had written one entitled *The Rope Dancer*. The result was Latham's novel, *Orchids for Mother*, published in 1977, about a CIA officer who is fired by the Director over differences in policy.

The protagonists obviously are Angleton and Colby. The Angleton character, "Mother" in the story, is portrayed as a genius whose talents are wasted, and the Director is an ambitious bureaucrat of dubious loyalty. The dismissed CIA man decides he must rid the Agency of this DCI. Distraught and depressed, the old veteran accomplishes this by sacrificing himself to an assassin he hires. In the process the Director is implicated and accused of murdering his antagonist. This bizarre and vicious tale did not sell well. Mrs. Angleton called the book "garbage" and claimed her husband never read it.

In the summer of 1977, Angleton developed a new forum for his ideas. He and like-minded associates organized the Security and Intelligence Fund (SIF) to defend US security and intelligence organizations and to raise money for the defense of two FBI officers then under indictment by the Carter administration. Here, Angleton was on surer ground. He had the support of a large number of FBI retirees as well as many former CIA officers. This was the period when the Pike and Church Congressional committees were in full cry investigating and exposing CIA operations, and numerous ex-intelligence people believed they had gone too far. SIF raised more than $600,000 and within six months was reported to have more than 17, 000 members. Angleton was chairman, and his friends held senior positions.

Soon thereafter, however, the US Attorney General decided not to prosecute the accused FBI officers, and the purpose for which SIF was created more or less evaporated. Angleton then converted it into a forum for spreading information about Soviet deception. The Fund remained in effect into the 1980s until, after Angleton's death and the coming of *glasnost*, it withered away.

Publication in 1978 of Edward J. Epstein's *Legend: The Secret World of Lee Harvey Oswald* provided enormous stimulus to the deception thesis by suggesting that Yuriy Nosenko, a Soviet defector, had been sent by the KGB to provide a cover story for Lee Harvey Oswald, who, the book alleged, was a KGB agent. Epstein in effect wrote two books: one focused on Lee Harvey Oswald's Marine career in Japan, his time in Russia, and his return to the United States; the second gave Nosenko the key role in an alleged KGB deception operation designed to cover Oswald (and the Soviet Government) and negate Golitsyn's revelations.

Because Epstein cited so much classified information that could only have come from someone with intimate knowledge of the Nosenko case, blame for the leak naturally focused on Angleton and his supporters. Thus, it came as no surprise when, two years after the former CI chief's death, Epstein admitted his sources had included Angleton, Tennent H. Bagley, N. S. Miler, and other ex-Agency associates who shared his views. Despite some negative reviews, the book sold well and was important

in spreading Angleton's theory of a super KGB manipulating American society and politics through its sophisticated deception apparatus.

The theme of *Legend* was extended in a 1980 novel called *The Spike* by Arnaud de Borchgrave and Robert Moss. De Borchgrave, soon-to-be editor of the new *Washington Times*, and Moss were friends and admirers of Angleton, whose conspiracy theories were consistent with their own. Moss had been spreading Angleton propaganda for some time, such as the claim that Golitsyn had provided the lead to H. A. R. "Kim" Philby. This caught the eye of Adm. Stansfield Turner, who was then DCI. When he asked the CI Staff about it, the staff replied from solid knowledge that the claim was false.

The inferior quality and crudeness of *The Spike* exceed even that of the Latham novel. Briefly, it told the story of a young liberal who had been taken in by leftists. He came to realize his error, thanks to guidance from an elderly, former CIA counterintelligence officer who had been fired by a Director obviously acting at the Kremlin's direction. Moscow's secret designs are revealed by a high-level KGB defector whose escape is managed by MI-6 because the CIA is so penetrated it cannot be trusted with the mission. The KGB defector identifies the Soviet agents in the White House, the CIA, and elsewhere in the government, and the wise old counterintelligence chief, obviously meant to be Angleton, saves the country. Though far-removed from reality, the book was an alternate Book-of-the-Month Club selection.

The year 1980 was not entirely one of wine and roses for the Angletonians because *Wilderness of Mirrors*, written by David Martin, also appeared. Now considered a classic of intelligence literature, the book was the product of more than two years of interviewing CIA retirees, including Angleton. The latter at first favored the author with many secrets but then cut him off when he learned Martin was also in touch with Angleton's CIA critics. One of these was Clare E. Petty, who had worked on Angleton's staff and accepted his conspiracy theories but by this time had concluded his boss was either a giant fraud or a KGB agent. Martin originally intended to publish Petty's view in *Newsweek* but abandoned that plan when Angleton threatened legal action. *Wilderness of Mirrors* exposed Golitsyn as an unimportant defector who caused more trouble than he was worth, suggested Nosenko was genuine, and punched many holes in the Angleton myth. Publication provoked a lengthy and denunciatory review by Epstein in *The New York Times* and a long public statement by Angleton claiming Martin had robbed him of his phrase "wilderness of mirrors." In fact, Angleton had himself lifted it from "Gerontion," a poem by T. S. Eliot.

Events, however, were weakening Epstein's faith in his master. In 1981, Prime Minister Thatcher was forced by the publication of Chapman Pincher's *Their Trade Is Treachery* to admit that her government had investigated Sir Roger Hollis, the former Director General of MI-5, as an alleged Soviet agent. Mrs. Thatcher stated in Parliament that a high-level investigation of these charges found them to be false.

Some months later Epstein managed to interview Michel Goleniewski, a defector who had become convinced he was the last of the Romanovs but otherwise remained a sensible person. Epstein asked if Goleniewski thought Hollis was a KGB mole, an idea supported by Angleton. The defector replied in the negative and then listed the Soviet agents MI-5 had apprehended from the information he had provided, adding, "If the KGB had had a mole at the head of MI-5, you can be sure all these men would somehow have escaped."

A further confusion of the issues occurred in 1979 and 1980 with the publication of a series of articles by Joe Trento, a reporter in Wilmington, Delaware. Trento launched a number of charges against Angleton, including some erroneous information about certain cases. Angleton's response to the Trento articles was to attack DCI Stansfield Turner, who he assumed was the source of the classified information Trento cited. [3]

The next significant book involving Angleton was Henry Hurt's *Shadrin*, published in 1981. While working on *Legend* as an assistant to Epstein, Hurt had become aware of the mysterious disappearance of Nicholas Shadrin, a Soviet defector. Sensing there was a story there, Hurt began interviewing the missing defector's wife and her lawyer. The *Reader's Digest*

agreed to provide financial support for the project, which began as a magazine article but quickly grew into a book. Fulton Oursler, then the chief editor of the *Reader's Digest*, was a man of strong rightwing views and much influenced by the Angleton-Epstein theories. The inability of the US authorities to provide an answer to the mystery of Shadrin's disappearance had provoked wide criticism. Hurt's account not only revived the old Golitsyn-Nosenko controversy but also made it more current by citing the appearance of a mysterious KGB man referred to as "Igor."

Angleton doubtlessly contributed information to Hurt, but so did a number of FBI people who talked more than they should have. In sum, much classified information was made public that could only have endangered the safety of Igor, assuming he was genuine. This was a matter on which Agency people again divided: Angleton believed Igor was not genuine; others thought his valuable information proved his bona fides. The Hurt book, however, was essentially propaganda intended to benefit Mrs. Shadrin. Its attack on the Agency, the FBI, and the new CI Staff did not help her cause, and the book's many inaccuracies distorted an already confused situation.

A number of other books appeared during the early 1980s: William Colby's *Honorable Men*, in which he explains why he dismissed Angleton; Tom Powers's *The Man Who Kept the Secrets*, highly praising Angleton (a position from which Powers later retreated); and John Sawatsky's *For Services Rendered*, on the Bennett case in Canada.

Leslie James Bennett, a longtime civilian employee of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) Security Service, was impugned by Clare Petty, then a major conspiracy theorist on Angleton's staff. Angleton could have stopped the ensuing investigation but instead lent it impetus by suggesting that the Mounties consult Golitsyn. That sealed Bennett's doom and in due course brought his dismissal from the service in 1972, even though there was no substantial evidence against him, and he passed his polygraph tests. The case tore the Mounties apart and gave ammunition to those who argued that the internal security service should be removed from the RCMP. Within a few years, Canada had a civilian security service. Sawatsky's book drew considerable attention in Canada but little in the United States.

The Decline of Conspiracism

In the years after *Legend* was published, Epstein became a specialist on Soviet disinformation and deception that, along with "active measures" to which they are related, preoccupied a number of scholars and writers during the 1980s. They were encouraged by the testimony of several Soviet defectors as well as the indefatigable Golitsyn, who in 1984 added his own volume, *New Lies for Old*.

Epstein's *Deception: The Invisible War Between the KGB and the CIA* was published in 1988, a year after Angleton's death. Like *Legend*, its predecessor, it has two parts. The second part describes various deceptions practiced through the centuries and can be ignored; it says nothing new. The first 105 pages, however, are interesting. Therein Epstein repeats the old theories about Nosenko and, in his acknowledgments, names all his sources for the past years, including Angleton, Bagley, Miler, and the FBI's William Sullivan. He also asserts that his informants wittingly gave him sensitive information.

This is an astonishing set of revelations. The feeling that this book is Epstein's last hurrah, at least in the world of intelligence, is hard to avoid. With *glasnost*, he apparently sensed that the days of the conspiracists were numbered. It was time to take the money and run.

Ron Kessler, an investigative journalist who writes frequently on espionage, in 1988 published *Spy vs Spy: The Shocking Story of the FBI's Secret War Against Soviet Agents in America*. The book is an excellent review of the FBI counterintelligence division's work against Soviet agents during roughly the past 20 years. In it, he chronicles the damaging activities of the US Navy spy, John Walker, as well as Ronald Pelton, who had penetratred the National Security Agency (NSA). Both worked for the KGB.

Kessler also recounts the disastrous career of Edward Lee Howard, the only CIA officer ever to defect to the USSR. For CIA people, his account of two penetrations of the Agency during the period James Angleton was chief of counterintelligence is riveting: one agent, Karl Koecher, worked for the Czech Intelligence Service, which passed his material to the KGB, and the other was a long-term agent of the Chinese Intelligence Service. Until the Aldrich Ames case came to light in 1994, these two were the only moles known to have penetrated the CIA. *Spy vs Spy* provides the layman an excellent inside view of how the FBI operated successfully against Soviet agents in the US. At the same time, Kessler is critical, when appropriate, of FBI errors.

In 1991 an English writer, Tom Mangold, published *Cold Warrior: James Jesus Angleton: The CIA's Master Spy Hunter*, to which he devoted three years of intensive work and $300,000 of Simon and Schuster's money. Mangold has carefully sourced his book, the research is impressive and impeccable, and the writing is good if at times a bit overwrought. But it is far more a history of the Agency's CI Staff for the last 10 years under Angleton's command than it is a story about the man himself. As history it is accurate and fair, although the absence of a chapter on liaison with Israeli intelligence (chopped out by the editor) is unfortunate.

The book caused considerable commentary because Mangold claimed he had interviewed 208 CIA retirees, until it was noted that John Ranelagh, another English author, had interviewed even more CIA retirees for his book, *The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA*. Mangold's conclusion that counterintelligence suffered at Angleton's hands during the Cold War when the Agency most needed common sense and honesty is well established and supported by numerous examples.

A second book about Angleton and the old CI Staff followed only 10 months after *Cold Warrior. Molehunt: The Secret Search for Traitors That Shattered CIA* by David Wise, the veteran intelligence writer, is also well researched and smooth reading. It concentrates on the hunt for "Sasha," a Soviet agent who, Golitsyn claimed, had provided the Russians valuable information. That search for the supposed mole within CIA severely damaged the careers of some CIA officers. Because his sources did not have the complete "Sasha" story, however, Wise has presented a somewhat distorted account.[4] Otherwise, the Wise book is accurate and can serve as a useful cautionary tale for management.

The British Connection

The intelligence literature discussed below is by British authors and deals almost solely with British events. None of the books is anti-CIA. Several express some respect for James Angleton, although this attitude also was in retreat among British authors by the end of the 1980s. A few of the books explore the Golitsyn-Nosenko controversy, and some think Golitsyn helped British intelligence. Most of the writing in varying degrees criticizes MI-5, the British internal security service. Less attention is given to the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS)—Britain's foreign intelligence arm, otherwise known as MI-6—except where the Philby and Blake cases are discussed.

Angleton helped at least three of the authors, but poor sourcing makes it hard to determine the amount of information he gave them. He in fact played an important role in igniting a series of events that embarrassed the Thatcher government. Had Thatcher not enjoyed such strong majorities in the House of Commons, one or more of these affairs might have brought her government down.

Angleton, dating from his early contacts with Philby, had a keen interest in British intelligence affairs. Partly on his recommendation, Golitsyn spent nearly five months in Britain in 1963 and met with British security and intelligence people several times afterward. Golitsyn made a powerful impression on two British officers in particular: Arthur Martin, the senior counterespionage officer in MI-5, and Stephen de Mowbray, a junior officer in MI-6 who served in Washington in the mid-1960s. Both men admired Angleton and largely accepted Golitsyn's ideas about penetration and deception, despite the fact that most of the earlier British believers in his allegations had become apostates.

Angleton's influence in MI-5 and MI-6 declined further during the early 1970s, but Martin and de Mowbray remained in contact with Golitsyn. In the early 1980s, the two British officers helped Golitsyn prepare his book, *New Lies for Old*. De Mowbray fervently believed the West was not sufficiently alert to the threat of Soviet deception. He was especially annoyed when a paper he had prepared on Soviet penetration, with special reference to Hollis, received no response from 10 Downing Street, even after he had personally delivered it to Prime Minister Thatcher's secretary.

In 1978, Andrew Boyle, an English writer, came to Washington to do research at the National Archives on a book he was preparing on the career of an Englishman rumored to have been a Soviet agent during World War II. The subject was Sir Anthony Blunt, Keeper of the Queen's Pictures, who had long been a target of gossip revolving around his homosexual lifestyle as well as his close association with Guy Burgess and Kim Philby. To avoid getting himself in legal difficulty, Boyle codenamed the subject of his book "Maurice" after a homosexual character in an E. M. Forster novel. During his research in Washington, Boyle met Angleton, and, as a result his book, *The Climate of Treason*, includes frequent respectful references to him.

The Climate of Treason appeared on 5 November 1979. Within 10 days, it forced Mrs. Thatcher to disclose in Parliament Blunt's 1964 confession to having been a Soviet agent while working for MI-5 during World War II, and that he had been granted immunity from prosecution in order to obtain full disclosure of his treachery. This agreement had been kept a secret for 15 years, during which time he worked for the Royal Household and was given a knighthood by the Queen. The shock of Boyle's exposure of Blunt was only the first and least damaging of several revelations of treachery that were in store for Mrs. Thatcher. At the time, however, her long and revealing statement about Blunt seemed to confirm that she was an exponent of unusual candor who intended to demystify the secret world of intelligence. The question of how much penetration there had been of the foreign, secret, and security services in the 1940s and 1950s seemed to be moving toward an answer. Mrs. Thatcher's statement made the Boyle book a best seller, earning its author a reputation and much money.

For some inexplicable reason, Boyle included a story that brought him considerable trouble and damaged his enhanced reputation. In Chapter Nine, "Enter the Fifth Man," he introduces a figure codenamed "Basil" who, he suggests, was a homosexual nuclear scientist serving in the British Embassy in Washington with Donald Maclean. From this slender evidence he offers this person as a likely candidate for "the fifth man," the then-unidentified fifth member of the group of traitors from Cambridge University. The press soon found an elderly British scientist in Washington named Dr. Wilfrid Basil Mann, by then an American citizen who, during the period 1949-51, had served under Philby in the MI-6 office of the British Embassy as a scientific officer in liaison with the CIA.

Dr. Mann denied he was "the fifth man," and rather belatedly the American authorities came to his rescue with assurances that he was not a Soviet agent and never had been. Both Boyle and Angleton remained silent, however, and it was left to Dr. Mann later to write his own rebuttal in which he set the record completely straight. Boyle had never interviewed Mann, nor did he apologize after the affair was resolved.

Dr. Mann, who had a personal friendship with Angleton in the Philby days, remains perplexed regarding the origin of the spurious story. We know that Angleton and Boyle had a close relationship during Boyle's stay in Washington. Angleton probably confirmed Boyle's suspicions of Blunt and, at some point in his circular and obscure way of speaking, very likely provided some information about Dr. Mann. For unexplained reasons, Boyle got the story wrong and foolishly included this distorted version in his otherwise quite admirable book. Dr. Allen Weinstein, author of *Perjury: The Hiss-Chambers Case*, later called the libeling of Dr. Mann a "case of blatant McCarthyism based on gossip from spook informants."

The early 1980s were marked by more trouble for Mrs. Thatcher from the secret world. There was the union trouble at Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and the conviction of Geoffrey Prime for spying for the Soviet Union, but the worst blow of all came with the publication in 1981 of *Their Trade Is Treachery* by Chapman Pincher, an investigative journalist.

The Pincher book was to prove a major political problem because it triggered a series of events culminating five years later in the *Spycatcher* trial in Australia.

To some extent the book was the result of a conversation between Jonathan Aitken, a Tory member of Parliament, and James Angleton in Washington in December of 1979, just a few days after Mrs. Thatcher had made her admission regarding Blunt. For reasons best known to himself, Angleton apparently hinted to Aitken that the Blunt revelations were just the tip of a mammoth problem, which might lead to an investigation of penetrations of MI-5 and MI-6. Aitken was fascinated and asked for more data, but Angleton demurred and said he would think about how next to proceed. Upon his return to England, Aitken found a letter from Angleton telling him to speak to Arthur Martin and Christopher Phillpotts, both of whom had been involved in mole-hunting for British counterintelligence. They told Aitken exactly what Angleton intended he should hear: that, beginning in 1963, the government had investigated Graham Mitchell and Roger Hollis as putative Soviet agents. The letter Aitken subsequently sent Mrs. Thatcher reflects what they told him, and a copy is in an appendix to the Pincher book, *The Spycatcher Affair*.

Aitken told Pincher most of what he had learned from Martin and Phillpotts, but then, in the early autumn of 1980, events took an even more bizarre turn. Lord Rothschild secretly brought Peter Wright, a former member of MI-5, to England from Australia and introduced him to Chapman Pincher. This led to a working partnership between Wright and Pincher resulting in the eventual publication of *Their Trade Is Treachery*, which revealed the investigations within MI-5 of Hollis and Mitchell as possible Soviet agents and many other MI-5 secrets. It was this book that forced Mrs. Thatcher, in yet another admission to the House of Commons, to confirm the investigations had taken place but that subsequent reviews revealed no evidence to support the charges.

When Pincher's book became a best seller, it was not public knowledge that the major source for his sensational revelations was Peter Wright, who was quietly tucked away at his Australian stud farm. Nor was it common knowledge that Angleton had played a role in launching the project. There was, however, much speculation about the source for so much sensitive material.

The mystery was resolved in 1986, when Peter Wright had completed a book, *Spycatcher: The Candid Autobiography of a Senior Intelligence Officer*, and was moving to have it published in Australia. Upon learning this, the British Government got an injunction to stop its publication. The trial that followed revealed that Wright had been the main source for Pincher's allegations in *Their Trade Is Treachery* against Hollis and Mitchell. A small group within the British Government (including MI-5) knew this and could have stopped Pincher from publishing his book but decided not to do so. Pincher, in effect, thus had published with implicit government approval.

This revelation during the trial seriously undermined the British Government's position and prompted publication of Wright's *Spycatcher* in many countries. When the case finally made its way to a final hearing in the House of Lords, the judges found themselves unable to uphold the obligation of confidentiality on which the government depended. As the affair unfolded between 1985 and 1988, the government's efforts to stop publication were perceived as absurd and desperate.

Mrs. Thatcher assigned Sir Robert Armstrong to present the British Government's case in the Australian court. He did not do well: he was a reluctant witness and was harried by a disrespectful young Australian lawyer, Malcolm Turnbull. Armstrong admitted he was the government's "fall guy" in the effort to exhaust every recourse against Wright's book. He will always be remembered for his locution during the trial that in his job sometimes one had "to be economical with the truth."

The book that prompted Mrs. Thatcher's futile effort was Peter Wright's but was ghostwritten by Paul Greengrass. Wright could not have anticipated that, by an accident of fate, it would be propelled onto the best-seller lists and thus make him a fortune. He had two grievances against MI-5, his former employer:

- Its failure to give him the full pension to which by any standard of decency he was entitled, a failure for which under secrecy regulations he possessed no redress.

- MI-5's determination that it could not be proved that Hollis had been a Soviet agent, a position that was strongly reinforced in a subsequent official study by Lord Trend, a former Cabinet Secretary.

The *Spycatcher* trial in 1986 generated three books worth reading. The most spirited, although a bit prejudiced, is Turnbull's account of the trial in Sydney entitled *The Spycatcher Trial*. The second is Pincher's *The Spycatcher Affair*. Although self-exculpatory, it is a good account of what took place between 1980 and the trial. The third book is *Molehunt* by Nigel West, which summarizes the trial from a pro-Thatcher point of view. In addition, a chapter in David Hooper's *Official Secrets* called "The Wright Case: A Tale of Perversity" is an excellent summary by a British solicitor who participated in the case as a member of Turnbull's team.

In the end, a cartoon that appeared in a London daily after the trial perhaps summed it up best: A group of bewigged barristers is shown in the office of Her Majesty's Attorney General, and one is commenting: "So far the legal fees come to approximately ten million pounds—wouldn't it have been cheaper to have increased the old codger's pension in the first place?"

Counterintelligence Histories

Two books on counterintelligence history are Robert Lamphere's *The FBI/KGB War: A Special Agent's Story*, published in 1986; and Gordon Brook-Shepherd's *The Storm Birds: Soviet Post-War Defectors*, published in 1988. These two works describe the counterintelligence benefits flowing from defectors and other exceptional events, such as the break into the KGB ciphers achieved at the end of World War II.

Lamphere's book concentrates on the FBI's work against the Soviet intelligence services' operations in the United States. Although Soviet espionage operations had been suspected for some time, details of these activities were obtained through the defection in Canada of Igor Gouzenko and in America of Elizabeth Bentley and others who had been involved in the Soviet spy apparatus. Their revelations were supplemented by an unusual accomplishment in the cryptographic field. Lamphere had the good fortune to be assigned to handle the FBI's liaison with NSA. While there, he was the Bureau's principal contact with Meredith Gardner, the cryptographic wizard, about the time he broke the KGB cipher system. Using the fragmentary but valuable information obtained from this breakthrough, Lamphere participated in uncovering some of the major Soviet espionage rings then in operation. His work included the Philby case as well as interrogating the atomic scientist Klaus Fuchs, pursuing Harry Gold, assisting in the Judith Coplon trial, and participating in other memorable cases of the immediate postwar period.

Conflicts with J. Edgar Hoover led to Lamphere's early resignation from the Bureau. In writing his book, his excellent memory was reinforced by access to FBI records. NSA, after considerable pressure was brought to bear, gave Lamphere permission to describe in elementary detail Gardner's magnificent achievement against the KGB cipher system. It is a gripping story well and accurately told.

The Storm Birds, Brook-Shepherd's excellent history of the postwar Soviet defectors, benefited from assistance by the British intelligence and security services and the CIA. As a result, the author produced an accurate and complete story about most of the major Soviet defectors, all but one of whom (Shevchenko) had served with the KGB or GRU. He eschewed the controversial issues featured in many of the other books in this collection, although he devotes a chapter each to Anatole Golitsyn and Yuriy Nosenko and gives each objective and fair consideration. Brook-Shephard's summaries of those defections are probably the most accurate evaluations available to the public and help to make comprehensible the two men and the issues associated with them.

These two histories constitute a mine of important information on the early defectors, both American and Soviet, as well as detail on later ones, like Oleg Gordievsky, who provided inside information at critical periods in history. The books also illustrate how important the defectors were, not only in helping Western intelligence and security services but also in alerting the Western public to the Soviet threat. Counterintelligence officers should read both.

Two More of Special Note

Finally, two other books are essential reading for the counterintelligence specialist and for anyone else interested in recent events affecting that field of intelligence. The first is the magisterial work by Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, *KGB: The Inside Story of its Operations From Lenin to Gorbachev.* Published in 1990, it is the only complete and definitive history of the KGB at this time. As such, it demands inclusion in this study. The second work is *The Spy Who Saved the World: How a Soviet Colonel Changed the Course of the Cold War* by Jerrold L. Schecter and Peter S. Deriabin, published in 1992. This is a detailed story of Col. Oleg Penkovsky, easily the greatest Anglo-American espionage success of the Cold War. Its counterintelligence significance rests on the fact that this superb operation was run under the nose of the KGB in Moscow, an embarrassment of major significance to the Soviets.

Both books also make important contributions to the conspiracist controversy. On the one hand, Gordievsky, from his unique position in the KGB, was able to assure his British friends that Hollis, Mitchell, Liddell, and Lord Rothschild were never Soviet agents. Equally important is a definitive chapter in the Schecter-Deriabin book that makes clear that, for the major period of his intelligence production, Penkovsky was not under Soviet control, and his product was not and could not have been deception. The controversy over whether he was bona fide (fueled largely by Angleton and Golitsyn) had arisen after Penkovsky's arrest on 22 October 1962 and was only put to rest within the CIA's Directorate of Operations in 1979 by a long-overdue study of the case. That the Agency made important documentary material available to Schecter and Deriabin so they could provide many of the details to the public via their excellent book was a laudable action by Dr. Robert Gates, who was DCI at the time.

Notes

1. Subsequently—in *Deception*, published in 1989, two years after Angleton's death—Epstein was more forthcoming regarding his sources. He admitted that, from 1977 onward, he had obtained large amounts of information from Angleton, N. S. Miler, Tennent H. Bagley, and others formerly in the CIA, all of whom shared Angleton's controversial views on the nature of the threat posed by Soviet intelligence operations.

2. H. A. R. "Kim" Philby, Guy Burgess, Donald Maclean, Anthony Blunt, and, identified later, John Cairncross.

3. At the time, this writer had interviewed Angleton on several occasions in conjunction with a history being written of the years when he was in charge of counterintelligence at CIA. (The interviews had ended because it had become evident that his judgment and veracity could no longer be trusted.) When Angleton queried the writer about whether he was responsible for the leaks to Trento, he was assured they had come from others. Angleton then proceeded to accuse Admiral Turner of being the source—a totally unfounded accusation.

4. The complete "Sasha" story resides in the archives of CIA's Counterintelligence Center, where access to it remains highly restricted.